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Abstract 
Mental health nurses are frequently called upon to care and provide intervention for 
suicidal men. While there is substantial literature on male suicide, far less is known about 
the understandings men have of  their suicidal experiences. This study draws upon 
Gadamers philosophical hermeneutics to explore the understandings that four men 
have had of  their past suicidal experiences.   
The interpretations developed in this study, as far as possible, make explicit use of  my 
own particular horizon of  meaning as researcher and mental health nurse, and as such, 
seeks to engage with a tradition of  mental health nursing. In addition, by consciously 
bringing an anti-essentialist perspective of  masculinity to this process, I explore the way 
in which gender impacts on mens suicidality. The primary source of  information for 
this study is in-depth, open-ended conversations with four men of  European descent in 
their middle adult years who were asked to talk about their past experiences of  
suicidality. 
The interpretations developed here show that for these men, the hermeneutic fusion of  
history, language, and sociocultural context, provided limited possibilities with which 
they were able to construe themselves as fitting in with normative standards. These 
constraints, that are otherwise taken-for-granted and invisible, became explicit through 
their experience of  ongoing victimisation. Furthermore, early understandings of  these 
experiences became a potent horizon of  meaning from which they then came to 
understand later difficult experiences. Victimisation became constitutive of  an 
understanding of  self  as fundamentally different and (hierarchically) less-than other 
men. Ultimately, suicidality emerged out of  a background of  ever-present psychological 
pain accompanying a construction of  self  as being unable to see themselves as ever 
fitting in.  
These men did not regard themselves as having recovered from suicidality, but remain in 
a process of  recovering. This process did not mean figuring out how to fit in, or 
become normal men, but rather, to live meaningfully as men in spite of  not fitting 
in with the sociocultural ideal. This involved a process of  repeated cycles of  revisiting 
and reflecting on their personal histories from vantage points permitting understandings 
that opened up opportunities for personal growth and learning. Relationships were 
significant for either enabling or disabling this process. Recovering was therefore a 
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continual and idiosyncratic process, rather than an outcome of  a specific technique or 
knowledge. 
The position taken in this study is that mental health nursing seeks to engage with 
people and work with them in collaborative, respectful, human relationships. It is argued 
that mental health nurses work with an individuals situated understandings rather than 
delivering prescribed treatment determined by diagnosis. Hence, viewing suicidality as 
socioculturally situated and historically emergent suggests mental health nurses must 
closely attend to the way in which we bring ourselves into relationships with our clients 
so that we are then able to create opportunities for change. The exploration of  
suicidality in this study also alerts us to the possibility that through fusion with clients 
pre-understandings, mental health intervention can inadvertently further constrain 
choices to survive.  
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C h a p t e r  1  
INTRODUCTION 
Meeting a person who tells of  a desire to kill him or herself  is regarded as an 
extraordinarily challenging experience. While there is an abundant research literature on 
the topic of  suicide, and evidence-based guidelines are now available to direct clinical 
decision-making, the experience of  progressively eliciting the story of  someone 
intending to end their life is an inescapably personal experience for both the 
professional and the suicidal client who is seeking help; and indeed, it is also a deeply 
personal experience for all those who have a significant relationship to the person. 
While assessment and management guidelines are clearly a useful synthesis of  
knowledge gleaned from the currently available research, the face-to-face encounter as a 
mental health nurse requires more than an interview for risk and mental status 
assessment. In the human encounter with a person in a profound state of  existential 
crisis, a meeting limited to an assessment process seems a pallid offering. In confronting 
such desperate need, risk evaluation and assessment of  mental health appears superficial 
and distant. If  nursing is at its core, about nurturance and caring for another person (as 
well as caring about another person), it is necessary then to answer the question what is it 
in this encounter that is mental health nursing? 1 This is one of  the questions grappled 
with through the exploration undertaken in this study. 
While each person and their experiences are unique, and each encounter with a person 
who is suicidal is unique, my own clinical experience as a mental health nurse suggests 
to me that the person-to-person experience with suicidal men was characteristically 
different to that with women. The character of  the discussion with men; the form of  
words, the explanation and content of  events, the description of  feelings (if  any), 
questions of  what to do, and so forth, were strikingly different to that I encountered in 
                                                 
1 Except where I refer to practice that has a specific psychiatric focus, I use the broader term of mental health 
nursing.  
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my engagement with women who were suicidal.2 Reflecting on these encounters, I also 
noticed that my response to men was likewise characteristically different. What I 
expected of  men and thought was needed in order to engage with men was shaped by 
my life experiences rather than any clinical text. For instance, rightly or wrongly, I 
expected an inarticulateness around feelings and considered a certain degree of  anger to 
be normal for men, but not for women. I also expected men to drink and get angry 
when dealing with personal difficulties. In my risk formulation I also put a high degree 
of  my attention on the risk of  violence to myself  as well as others (especially family) 
when dealing with suicidal men in the expectation that angry (and irrational) men are 
potentially violent men. When considering potential interventions I also frequently 
constructed these as things for men to do rather than contemplate, on the basis that 
solving problems through working harder seemed to be the norm for men. Hence, how 
I interacted with men and what I expected of  men were what my life and professional 
experience had shown me rather than something taught to me formally from nursing or 
mental health literature.   
Concerns aroused from my reflections upon my clinical practice were left unsatisfied by 
an exploration of  mental health nursing texts and generic clinical guidelines on suicide. 
These resources did not elaborate on the particular issues for men when in mental 
health crisis, other than to say that men are at higher risk of  suicide than women. They 
did not answer the questions of  what it was about men that left them at higher risk, or 
what I needed to bring as a (male) mental health nurse to my interventions that would 
address masculinity in the face of  an experience that appeared to force men into contact 
with services they did want to be associated with. While I felt that one focus of  my 
engagement was quite properly upon the evaluation of  risk and mental status 
assessment, I was unsatisfied with the current practice guidelines for suicide 
management (e.g. Ministry of  Health, 1998; Sumich, Andrews, & Hunt, 1995). Neither 
these guidelines, nor mental health nursing frameworks dealt with the meaning of  
feeling suicidal as a man.  Hence, another focus of  this study is masculinity in the 
context of  experiencing suicidality, and the implications of  this consideration for 
practice as a mental health nurse. 
                                                 
2 At this time I was practicing in drought-stricken rural Australia. A striking example of gender differences at this time 
was in the process of seeking help from mental health services. Men would rarely approach our service directly, and 
instead, I or my colleagues would be first approached by their wife or some other community member (or by the local 
Department of Agriculture representative). The issues would then be discussed from their viewpoint. Eventually, a 
process would be negotiated to manage my first contact with the distressed farmer in order to provide him with some 
help.  
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The mental health nursing context 
To practice as a mental health nurse means to practice within a social context. The 
advanced practice competencies of  the Australian and New Zealand College of  Mental 
Health Nurses (2002) state this clearly naming four areas of  relating and relationships 
situated within the socio-political and cultural contexts: self, consumers, colleagues, and 
the profession. Hence, there is a clear assumption within these competencies that as 
mental health nurses we always deal with people in a relationship that is also assumed to 
be socially situated.  
The focus of  mental health nursing practice and what mental health nurses are needed 
for has been the subject of  a recent debate (Barker & Reynolds, 1996; Gournay, 1995, 
1997; Lego, 1997; Philbin, 1997; Rolfe, 1996). At issue is a nursing practice driven by a 
biomedical model or driven by a concern for human living and meaning, and how these 
two viewpoints are located in a practice framework (Geanellos, 2004). While not 
necessarily opposing positions, there is an inherent tension between the approaches 
derived from these two positions.  
While the mental health nursing practice context includes consideration of  the 
biological and cognitive aspects of  people and responding accordingly, the particular 
need for mental health nursing is a socially situated one and the interventions mental 
health nurses provide should necessarily be socially situated. Even if  mental health 
nursing interventions are biological (e.g. administration of  medication), this aspect of  
practice is situated within a social context. That is, the processes of  providing 
medication by mental health nurses is a social one involving a relationship not only with 
the client, but because medication and being medicated are socially meaningful terms in 
their own right, this aspect of  practice occurs within a larger social context. 
Communication or interaction is a social process and takes place in relationships and in 
social contexts. For those who take the position that interpersonal process is at the core 
of  mental health nursing (Peplau, 1952; Travelbee, 1971), practice is fundamentally a 
process of  engaging with another who is need of  what mental health nurses can offer. 
In this regard, Peplau (1997) has stated that much of  the work of  nurses occurs during 
their interaction with patients (p. 153). Horsfall and Stuhlmiller (2000) agree, stating 
that mental health nursing texts investigate communication because that is the 
foundation of  what nurses do (p. 23). While language is an important aspect of  
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communicating, it is not the only way of  communicating. A significant part of  
communicating is non-verbal and is an essential aspect of  interpersonal interaction. 
In their study of  the need for psychiatric nurses Barker, Jackson and Stevenson 
(1999a, 1999b; Jackson & Stevenson, 2000) show that people who are in contact with 
psychiatric mental health nurses need mental health nurses to respond in a flexible 
process that is responsive to changes in need. In their research, engagement emerged as 
a continuous process of  getting to know the person and her/his needs, as the person 
was getting to know the nurse (Barker et al., 1999b, p. 275). The core of  the need for 
psychiatric mental health nurses was seen as a complex knowing you  knowing me 
process. Knowing you  knowing me was discussed as involving a mobility across what 
the researchers termed the Ordinary Me to the Professional Me. The knowing aspect of  
what was needed from mental health nurses within an interpersonal process necessitates 
an ability to understand the other person. Without the responsiveness, openness, two-
way engagement and sharing, that the researchers assert was part of  what was needed 
of  psychiatric mental health nurses, understanding would not be able to occur. 
Accepting that knowing and understanding are embedded within an interpersonal 
nursing process presumes a concern for socially meaningful relationships. Or to put this 
differently, mental health nurses are professionally concerned about people as meaningful 
rather than meaningless. The stories people tell are presumed to be meaningful and able 
to be comprehended; they are not told because they are meaningless to the person. That 
is, people care about what they are telling and want to be genuinely heard. There are 
many distressing stories that people tell. Thoughts of  suicide and the personal story of  
suicidality has long been recognised as one of  the more difficult stories to hear and 
respond to. 
Mental health nurses engage in socially situated relationships purposefully. However, the 
effect is not all in one direction. Insofar as we genuinely hear or attend to others, mental 
health nurses are also affected by the relationships that we professionally exist within. In 
this sense, through our engagement with the people we call our clients we become 
experienced. These experiences enable us to better engage in future relationships and 
offer help. Through our relationships, in which we are open and sharing, we are able to 
better understand; that is, through a meaningful interpersonal process in which we seek 
to understand the other person we become better at meeting the need for mental health 
nursing in the future.  
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Given an interpersonal process as a fundamental underpinning of  mental health nursing 
practice, the current risk orientation provided in nursing texts and generic mental health 
guidelines do not readily provide an adequate practice framework for mental health 
nurses who are seeking to meet the needs of  men who are suicidal. In order to address 
their human responses to psychiatric disorder, rather than the disorders (Barker, 
Reynolds, & Stevenson, 1997, p. 5), concepts such as risk should be located within a 
framework that helps mental health nurses to understand the person and their 
experience. As Wilkin (2003) has recently argued, scientific theory and technical artistry 
may inform practice, but cannot deliver it (p. 27), concluding that the craft of  caring 
is always dependent upon the other, whose own personal growth becomes a catalyst for 
the incidental development of  the nurse (p. 28). 
A methodological approach to fit the needs of mental health 
nursing practice 
Insofar as mental health nursing is about understanding and responding to human 
problems involving his [sic] relationship to himself  or others (Barker, 1997, p. 8) as the 
central mode of  intervention, the task of  mental health nursing research should be to 
address human meaning and interpersonal relating. This position accepts that people are 
understood to live and move in a world made meaningful through what is shared rather 
than by a process of  universal laws. Likewise, health and ill-health, including mental 
disorders, are not somehow a separate thing in peoples lives. Barker, Reynolds and 
Stevenson (1997) subscribe to this view stating that:  
From bir th onwards and throughout  l i fe ,  people are in  
interpersonal  mi l ieu, of one k ind or another ,  in which they 
have human responses which shape them as persons and 
which register in the organic body.  (p. 5)  
On the basis that socially situated engagement is at the core of  mental health nursing 
practice, a focus for research that seeks to inform mental health nursing practice should 
include understanding and meaning as a situated activity. That is, psychotherapeutic 
activity is approached as a somewhat unique, socially sanctioned interpersonal activity 
devoted to assisting individual members (Martin & Sugarman, 1999, p. 78) in which a 
collaborative effort brings about change through the clients internalization of  the 
therapeutic conversations and activities through which their personal theories have been 
elaborated, interpreted, and analyzed (Martin & Sugarman, 1999, p. 78). A focus on 
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understanding and meaning as situated also means that the therapeutic encounter is 
located within a larger social context. Martin and Sugarman note that change is 
therefore ultimately dependant on the life context of  the person before, during and after 
this encounter. Hence, a research methodology exploring mens suicidality from this 
position must account for understanding and meaning as socially mediated rather than 
as stable and discoverable universal notions. The research outcome is therefore 
interpretive rather than objective. 
Cutcliffe and Goward (2000) compare mental health nursing practice to a kind of  
phenomenological research study in which the engagement with a client operates 
through a relationship whereby the nurse makes use of  themselves to understand the 
personal meaning and lived experience of  another. As with such a research approach, a 
certain tolerance and embracement of  ambiguity and uncertainty that comes with 
situated meaning is required in this engagement. Such an approach makes explicit the 
involvement of  self  in both research and practice. As researcher, or as clinician, I am 
inextricably bound up in the creation of  new understanding through the experience of  
conversation. 
The task set for this study then, is an exploratory one that seeks to further understand 
the human experience of  a specific group of  people (i.e. men of  European descent) 
who have experience of  a particular phenomenon (suicidality). The methodological 
premise made here is somewhat similar to that of  Cutcliffe and Goward (2000), that by 
engaging with people who have lived through the experience, then that experience can 
be better understood by the researcher. Applying this position to mens suicidality, 
Cutcliffe, Joyce and Cummins (2004) have recently put forward the argument that there 
is an urgent need to understand suicide as a result of  a persons life, his/her 
experiences and the situated contextual meaning that the person attributes to these 
experiences (p. 309) and advocate a research approach in which data is collected 
using hermeneutic conversations. This approach is not put forward as a replacement 
for a positivist method to the study of  suicide and suicidal experiences, but to augment 
or complement current research.  
A further consideration is that a methodology concerned with the process of  
understanding will also inform mental health nursing as a practice that engenders 
change through social processes. The work of  Hans-Georg Gadamers on 
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understanding is particularly pertinent because of  his concern with situatedness, the 
centrality of  language, and attention to the unique vantage point that each person brings 
to the encounter with another person. While Gadamer does not provide a ready-to-hand 
approach for social science research, philosophical hermeneutics has been variously 
utilised to undertake nursing research (e.g. Fleming, Gaidys, & Robb, 2003; Geanellos, 
1997; Pascoe, 1996; Thompson, 1990; Walsh, 1996).  
Thesis structure 
Having set out the initial motivation for this study and located it in relationship to my 
position on the proper focus (viz. Barker & Reynolds, 1996) of  mental health nursing, 
this study draws upon the work of  Gadamer to explore the past suicidal experiences of  
four men.  
The next three chapters of  this thesis explores the initial theoretical position from 
which this study enters into an exploration of  mens suicidality. Chapter 2: Mental 
Health and Masculinity examines gender in relation to mental health. This chapter 
examines psychiatry and the broader field of  mental health for its relationship to gender 
in order to develop an argument that clinical intervention in mental health is a potent 
influence in which psychiatry and mental health services police the boundaries between 
normal and abnormal for women and men. Whereas diagnosis and intervention are 
frequently positioned as universal and objective, this argument sets out to show that 
mental health and disorder are gendered.  
In the third chapter, Mens Suicide and Suicidality, the literature on suicide and 
suicidality is overviewed and specific terminology to the field of  suicidology is 
explained. The discussion then focuses on mens mental health in relation to suicide and 
suicidality. In particular, notions of  risk, intentionality and lethality are critiqued. While 
men and women are considered in the research on suicide, differences are generally 
theorised as a category of  sex (i.e. female/male dichotomy) rather than as socially 
engaged meanings related to the body (i.e. gendered). This chapter develops a position 
from which to explore mens suicidal experience as gendered. 
Masculinity is rarely examined within mental health nursing literature as an issue 
considered for mental health or illness. Where adverse outcomes are seen to be more 
characteristic of  men, that the problem, label, diagnosis or syndrome is gendered is not 
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usually examined. Chapter 4: Masculinities begins by overviewing the literature on 
masculinity in order to develop a non-essentialist position from which to examine the 
mental health effects of  masculinity for men. Drawing on recent research on 
masculinities, I take the view here that masculinity is a social construction. Rather than 
biologically determined, masculinity is problematised here in an effort to closely 
examine the taken-for-granteds about men experiencing suicidality.  
Chapter 5: Methodology develops an approach strongly influenced by the work of  
Gadamer. Similar to other nursing studies that have drawn upon Gadamer, the approach 
developed here attends to understanding as a hermeneutical process in which language 
and history are central, and that the process of  interpretation occurs as a fusion of  the 
horizons of  the dialogical participants; in this study, myself  as researcher and four men 
who have had past experiences of  suicidality. The notions of  conversation and text are 
discussed in some detail. In attending closely to how a Gadamerian methodology 
informs the connection between conversation and transcription, it is proposed that 
understanding has already occurred in the dialogue of  the interviews and that 
interpretation of  the transcripts is disconnected from, but related back to, the original 
dialogue. Hence, the methodological approach taken in this study is that of  a double 
hermeneutic interpretation. 
Since Gadamer critiques the dominant reliance on method to establish truth, method 
becomes idiosyncratic to any proposed research drawing upon his work. Chapter 6: 
Method and Analytical Process develops the methodological approach further to 
describe the specific processes adopted for this study. This chapter begins with a 
discussion of  ethical issues of  particular note to the method used in this study in the 
context of  suicidality. It then traces the concrete, practical processes undertaken to 
conduct this study as well as the justification for these. In addition, the nature of  what is 
considered to be data in the context of  Gadamerian hermeneutics is discussed in 
some detail. The methodological argument set out in Chapter 5 is used to elaborate the 
process of  interpretation for both the conversations and transcripts. In particular, the 
conditions of  understanding are closely examined. In describing the interpretive 
processes, the personal positioning from which I bring myself  into this exploration is 
briefly described, whilst at the same time acknowledging that this can never be 
completely explicated.  
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Chapter 7: Conversations with Four Men sets out the result of  the first interpretive 
process. This chapter describes the major themes, as I understood them to be, as a result 
of  conversing with the four men who discussed with me their experiences of  suicidality. 
It commences with a brief  introduction to each of  the four men. The emphasis in this 
interpretation is upon that understanding formed through the spoken dialogue of  the 
conversations. Drawing upon numerous quotes from the transcriptions, the interpretive 
effort in this chapter is directed toward a thematic description of  my new understanding 
of  these mens suicidal experiences as emerging from the dialogical fusion of  horizons.  
A (Re)interpretation of  Four Conversations revisits the conversational understanding I 
developed by exploring the records (transcripts, memos, etc.) of  these conversations. 
The transcripts are examined as the primary, but not the only source, of  historical 
records that relate to the original conversations. In this new interpretation the 
theoretical lens developed in the earlier chapters of  this thesis are put fully into play to 
reveal the gendered nature of  four mens past suicidal experiences. A conception of  
suicidality is understood here to be deeply historical, emergent, and part of  a sense-
making process in which suicidality develops against the dominant taken-for-granted 
(and hence, unseen) ideas of  what being manly entails. 
In the concluding chapter, the interpretive process, and the results of  this process are 
discussed in the context of  the position taken in this study, that the proper focus of  
mental health nursing is a situated, interpersonal and purposeful process. Whilst 
considering generic guidelines for risk assessment and intervention, it is argued that 
there is a need for mental health nursing intervention to be guided by practice 
frameworks that are underpinned by nursing theories on interpersonal process such as 
that articulated by Hildegard Peplau (1952). Gadamers work on understanding is well-
suited to advancing mental health nursing knowledge given the centrality of  
understanding to working with interpersonal processes intended to facilitate client 
growth and development. It is also argued that the consideration of  mens suicidality 
through a nursing lens informed by a Gadamerian approach, shows new possibilities for 
mental health nursing intervention. In light of  the interpretive analysis of  mens 
suicidality, this chapter also discusses the potential risks inherent in an uncritical 
acceptance of  evidence-based guidelines being regarded as sufficient to inform nursing 
practice. 
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C h a p t e r  2  
MENTAL HEALTH AND MASCULINITY 
Until recent years, the interest in mens suicide has been studied as a difference between 
women and men. That there may be something particular about living as a man that has 
health effects is a relatively recent issue for the study of  suicide. Connell et al.  (1998) 
have argued that a substantial amount of  research literature on mens health and mental 
health focuses upon the differences between the sexes and that such research fails to 
connect with the existing research on gender. He argues that the consequence of  this is 
that there is a lack of  understanding about the causes of  health problems from the 
perspective of  the way in which people live their lives as women and men. By gender, I 
refer to the social meaning attributed to being a woman or a man, whereas a persons 
category of  sex is determined physiologically. Research using positivist methods 
frequently use the terms gender and sex as if  they are synonymous and therefore 
interchangeable. However, there is a substantial body of  literature that shows that the 
category of  sex does not necessarily determine a persons experience of  being a woman 
or man, or the social meaning of  woman or man that is attributed by others (e.g. 
Broom, 1995; Caplan, 1987; Chesler, 1978; Connell, 1985, 1995; James & Saville-Smith, 
1994).  
In their review of  the literature on mens health Connell et al. (1998) argued that the 
health research literature is predominantly based on a positivist approach. Through the 
utilisation of  tests of  statistical significance, difference becomes the focus of  interest 
whilst similarity is regarded as uninteresting. As the dominant form of  health research 
on men, sex difference research exerts a powerful influence on both the definition of  
health problems and the clinical approaches used to address these issues. The exemplar 
of  the scientific method, the randomised controlled trial (RCT), is seen as the best 
evidence of  efficacy. The premise is that intervention based on scientific evidence will 
lead to better health outcomes, than intervention based on evidence from research 
approaches that do not use the scientific method. Both the medical model and scientist-
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practitioner approach of  clinical psychology are strongly premised on the scientific 
method. However, such approaches have been critiqued for supporting dominant social 
structures and doing little to counter existing inequalities in health (Busfield, 1982; 
Chesler, 1972), and for emphasising treatment rather than caring within nursing (Barker, 
1990; Barker et al., 1997).  
As gender is a fundamental division of  inequality in our society, it is therefore necessary 
to critically examine how clinical intervention and gender interact to produce different 
health outcomes for women and men. This requires commencing with a critique of  our 
understandings of  mental illness.  
Gendering explanations of mental illness 
Arguably the dominant model by which our society seeks to explain ill health is a 
medical one (Clarke, 1991). Although the term medical model is imprecise, the term 
nevertheless refers to an approach within medicine premised on science. The medical 
model takes a person (the patient) from which signs (observable indications) and 
symptoms (subjective descriptions) are used to formulate a diagnosis. Treatment is 
prescribed on the basis of  the diagnosis and is generally expected to produce a cure.  
In the medical model, illness is a natural phenomenon occurring within the body and 
subject to scientific inquiry in the same manner the natural sciences acquire knowledge 
about the natural world. It is this very claim to science, Busfield (1986) argues, upon 
which the legitimacy and authority given to the medical view of  health and ill-health 
rests. It is also upon the claim to science that medicine is open to critique.  
In their textbook on research methods, Neale and Liebert (1973) state that science 
generally refers to the pursuit of  objective knowledge gleaned from observation (p. 6). 
Hence, the term science refers to a method and a goal. Research into that which can 
only be directly observed reflects an empirical approach to science. A pursuit of  
objective knowledge points to an overarching assumption of  objectivism. The 
epistemology of  objectivism holds that meaning, and therefore meaningful reality, 
exists apart from the operation of  any consciousness (Crotty, 1998, p.8). Within the 
scientific approach, objects in our world are assumed to have meaning irrespective of  
whether or not we are conscious of  their existence. It is then the task of  scientists to 
discover the meaning already inherent in objects. The sharp division between science 
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and non-science is that of  objectivism. The epistemological stance of  objectivism 
separates science from beliefs, values, opinions, feelings and bias (Busfield, 1986; Crotty, 
1998; May, 1997). By way of  contrast, Crotty points out that while subjective 
understandings may be important to us, the subjectivist understanding we ascribe to 
objects are essentially a different knowledge to that established through science.  
Being a speciality of  medicine, psychiatry is likewise extraordinarily influential in how 
mental illness is defined, perceived and treated. Beumont, Andrews, Boyce and Carr 
(1997) state that although psychiatry uses science, it is not itself  a science, directed at 
the discovery of  new facts, but a practical professional activity (p. xiv). Nonetheless, 
Busfield (1986) notes that psychiatry is assumed to be rational, objective, and value-free; 
and hence makes a claim to science for its authority. Additionally, Busfield makes the 
point that, like clinical medicine, the purpose of  psychiatry is also assumed to be 
essentially altruistic. 
In her review of  the thought and practice of  psychiatry, Busfield identifies four 
important characteristics of  the medical task. The first is its curative orientation. This 
curative orientation directs the attention of  medicine toward the investigation and 
treatment of  existing illness rather than prevention. The second characteristic is the 
focus on acute illness rather than chronic illness. This, in part, according to Busfield, 
directs attention to the preservation of  life rather than the amelioration of  suffering. 
The third characteristic is one of  individualism. Here, Busfield observes that 
individualism permeates every aspect of  the medical orientation to sickness, including 
the explanations and treatments it offers (1986, p. 25). According to this view 
explanations for illness reside within the individual and consequently so does treatment. 
That is, an individual has a disease, and an individual is treated. Social changes or 
conditions, such as workplace, clean water and sanitation, social practices, or poverty are 
not usually examined as explanations. The fourth characteristic mentioned by Busfield is 
that of  voluntarism. An assumption of  medicine is that medical intervention is sought 
out rather than compelled by law or other authority. It is assumed that patients will seek 
out help when and if  it is needed, and that treatment offered is accepted free of  
compulsion. Thus, practitioners only treat those who have sought to consult them.  
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The medical explanation of mental illness 
The dominant view of  mental illness and disorders is that these can be understood in 
the same way as the natural sciences view any phenomenon occurring in nature and 
therefore amenable to investigation by scientific methods. Being based upon science, 
psychiatric knowledge shares the same assumptions inherent to science, in particular 
assumptions of  objectivity.3 Guba and Lincoln (1994) critique the conventional 
approach (post positivist) to research and the basis for its privileged status, arguing for 
the utility of  qualitative, or non-positivist, approaches. In their critique of  the 
conventional view of  research, they assert that human behaviour cannot be understood 
without reference to the meanings and purposes attached by human actors to their 
activities (p. 106). Doing science, or the using the scientific method, requires a 
hypothesis about selected variables to be posited and then tested for falsification of  the 
hypothesis (hypotheses may only be disproved). There is frequently an omission to 
acknowledge the process for the development of  a priori hypotheses before proceeding 
to test them. The scientific approach therefore privileges the method used to test the 
hypothesis over the development of  the hypothesis (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Within the language of  objectivism, human behaviour (and even cognition) is reduced 
to the status of  variables. In experimental and quasi-experimental research, all variables, 
except those selected for hypothesis testing are controlled or excluded. Inclusion of  
such information may in fact greatly alter the findings (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). To the 
extent these variables are decontextualised, the objective view may bear little 
resemblance to that of  the individuals being studied. Moreover, the assumption that 
hypotheses can be stated in a way that is independent of  the facts used to test them is 
questioned by Guba and Lincoln who argue that facts are facts only within a particular 
theoretical framework. While the presumption in science is that observation is a passive 
uninvolved receipt of  sensory information, Harvey (1992) argues that in fact science 
takes place within the context of  the scientists language, culture and theoretical 
perspective, which are necessary to enable science to be understood.  
A general assumption is that the acquisition of  scientific knowledge is linear and 
progressive and will eventually, through its methods, converge upon the truth. 
                                                 
3 Although my focus here is upon psychiatric medicine as it has historically been significantly influential for 
psychiatric and mental health nursing, the critique can equally be applied to clinical psychology on the basis of its 
scientist-practitioner model. 
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However, the possibility that the same set of  facts can equally support different theories 
undermines this assumption. Scientific theories are held to be tentative and tested in an 
effort to support or more correctly, fail to support a hypothesis. In this sense, hypotheses 
can never be proved or disproved absolutely, rather, when research provides regular 
support for the hypotheses derived from a particular theory, scientists will tend to 
accept the theory as useful (Neale & Liebert, 1973, p. 13). 
Busfield links science to psychiatry, not so much due to any appraisal of  its worth, but 
through its adoption as a professional ideology. Of  this, she states psychiatrists 
generally believe in the scientific, rational and humane basis of  psychiatric work, and 
justify their demands for power and autonomy in these terms (1986, p. 19). The claim 
to science is a potent rhetoric. For instance, Neale and Liebert state that because of  
their insistence on objectivity, the social sciences command a respect that philosophy 
and theology alone never did (1973, p. 6). 
The medical model is therefore privileged and powerful. Through the practice of  
medicine, the way people think about their bodies, minds, health and illness and come to 
decisions about other peoples health or illness, are all influenced (Busfield, 1986). This 
is most readily seen, for example, in the interaction between the field of  medical 
practice and industry, whereby the medical practitioner has the authority to decide if  the 
employee is to be labelled sick and therefore entitled to be paid while absent from work. 
Likewise, it is largely medical practitioners who decide if  an illness is present for 
insurance and legal purposes.4 
How medicine comes to determine what is an illness is therefore important. Busfield 
describes three features that are the focus of  medicine: (1) bodily processes, (2) a 
mechanistic conception of  the body, and (3) it is devoted to technology. The act of  
diagnosis (and its technology) is central to medical practice as it both explains the 
disease and (mechanistically) determines the treatment. The central focus of  clinical 
intervention is therefore on obtaining the correct diagnosis.  
In their handbooks on The Management of  Mental Disorders, Sumich, Andrews and 
Hunt (1995), state that the central function of  any mental health service is to treat 
people who have mental disorders, and further, that the aim of  any programme of  
                                                 
4 It is worth noting that clinical psychology, which likewise is founded on a positivist science, also has legal authority 
to label if someone has a mental disorder or not. 
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management is to change symptoms and reduce disabilities (1995, p. 2. Original 
emphasis). They go on to state that treatment will be most effective if  it is based on 
the correct diagnosis, not on the complaints (1995, p. 4). Hence, diagnosis is linked 
inextricably to treatment, but not necessarily a cure. The emphasis here is palliative. It is 
also removed from the persons subjective complaints through the (objectivist) 
mechanistic process and outcome.  
In psychiatry diagnosis does not necessarily equate to disease with its distinct, linear 
relationship between cause (germ) and effect (illness). Illness or disease in psychiatry are 
more accurately described as syndromes (Beumont, 1997; Busfield, 1986; Kaplan & 
Sadock, 1991). This distinction is important. Kaplan & Sadock define a syndrome as a 
group of  signs and symptoms that occur together and constitute a recognizable 
condition (1991, p. 214. Emphasis added). Signs are objective findings observed by the 
clinician, while symptoms are subjective complaints listed by the patient (Kaplan & 
Sadock, 1991, p. 214). Where a disease is a pathological change to anatomy, physiology 
or biochemistry (Beumont, 1997, p. 18) and can be directly observed, the pathology of  
psychiatric syndromes are hypothesised from observation of  clusters of  signs and 
symptoms that deviate from normative values. Because the same method is used to 
establish diagnosis in psychiatry as in physical medicine, there is a tendency to treat a 
psychiatric diagnosis as if  it were a disease, rather than its lesser status of  a syndrome. 
However, in the case of  psychiatry, deviations from the norm are measured against a 
psychosocial and ethical standard rather than deviations in anatomical or physiological 
structure (Szasz, 1970).  
Thus, what constitutes a recognisable condition has varied historically and culturally 
across time and place in accord with what is currently accepted as the range of  normal. 
Arguably, recognition of  abnormality of  the mind through the science of  psychiatry is a 
complex reification of  the social perceptions of  abnormality or stigma as a symptom of  
mental illness. For instance, prior to 1973 homosexuality was considered a mental 
disorder by the American Psychiatric Association, and therefore had a diagnostic 
classification in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of  Mental Disorders (DSM) and was 
similarly recognised as a disorder of  the mind by the World Health Organizations 
International Classification of  Diseases (ICD) prior to 1980.  
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Given the link between psychosocial and ethical standards, the psychiatric notion of  
mental illness, through a claim to the objectivity of  science, reproduces social norms in 
a manner that obscure its social origins and grounding in value judgements. As 
treatment is also inextricably linked to the diagnosis of  mental illness, treatment 
reinforces social norms. The impact is society-wide as other professions utilise the 
psychiatric notion of  mental illness; for instance, social workers, mental health nurses, 
lawyers, journalists, psychologists. 
Psychiatric legitimisation of stereotypes 
The profession of  psychiatry, and the practice of  clinicians in mental health or 
psychiatry, is arguably much more involved with ethics than perhaps any other health 
profession. I state this because it is through the clinical decisions made in everyday 
practice that what is normal and what is deviant thinking and behaviour, is explicitly 
defined. These boundaries of  normality or deviance are most immediately defined for 
whoever the clinician is communicating with at the time; often the patient, friends and 
family. However, as a collective group, mental health clinicians are a powerful definer 
and reinforcer of  these boundaries for all of  society. Thus, what it is that constitutes 
normal thinking and behaviour for women and men becomes defined, reinforced and 
reproduced, through the concepts and notions used by mental health clinicians. 
Arguably, much of  how clinicians come to understand the mental health problems of  
women, children and men is through research conducted within a conventional scientific 
paradigm using quantitative methods. Such data for instance, typically yields prevalence 
information about particular diagnoses on the basis of  age and sex showing difference 
between men and women across the lifespan (the degree of  similarity between the sexes 
is unimportant in this approach). Uncritical interpretation of  the data will tend to 
support dominant social norms that men are naturally like this and women are 
naturally like that. This data tends to reinforce the notion that there are womens 
problems and mens problems drawing upon the authority of  scientific method. 
Conclusions drawn from the statistical data are constructed in a manner that remains 
consistent with pre-existing dominant views, or stereotypes, of  women and men. Such 
conclusions are carried through to clinicians as objective evidence to support judgements 
of  deviance and normality in women and men on the basis that numbers and scientific 
method is unbiased. 
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The impact of  an uncritical acceptance of  dominant social norms regarding the sexes by 
psychiatric and other mental health clinicians is shown in a much reported study by 
Broverman et al. (1970)  who examined the impact of  sex-role stereotypes on clinical 
judgements. This study concluded that clinicians views of  health are no different to the 
stereotypes prevalent in society. They found that clinicians concepts of  a healthy adult 
did not differ from their views of  a healthy, mature (White) man, and that clinicians 
were less likely to attribute adult healthy traits to women. On this basis, the 
researchers speculated that 
For  a woman to be healthy,  f rom an adjustment v iewpoint,  she 
must adjus t to  and accept the behav iora l norms for  her  sex,  
even though these behav iors  are general ly  less soc ia l ly  
des irable and considered to be less heal thy  for  the 
general ized competent ,  mature adult .  (p.  6)  
Clinicians have considerable influence on social standards and attitudes. This early piece 
of  research lends support to an argument that acceptance of  stereotypes by mental 
health clinicians reinforce current dominant views of  women and men. The authority of  
psychiatry (and psychology), through its claim to medical science, legitimises stereotyped 
views by its ability to define what is unhealthy or abnormal thought and behaviour for 
the sexes.  
Gender bias in psychiatric diagnosis 
There is a sense of  circularity to the argument I have proposed here. Scientific social 
norms are merely an interpretation of  statistical data in a manner consistent with 
dominant beliefs about women and men. This finding in turn reinforces pre-existing 
clinical notions of  normality for women and men. Hence, clinicians make clinical 
judgements on the basis of  scientific conceptions of  normality and deviance, in turn 
legitimising the wider societys conceptions of  normality and deviance, thus completing 
the circle.  
The reproduction of  social norms through clinical practice can occur through a 
multitude of  mechanisms, one of  which is the act of  diagnosis. The diagnosis of  mental 
disorder is dependent on the assessment of  symptomatology; that is, the interpretation 
of  reported subjective experiences. The transformation of  the persons report of  their 
subjective experiences into the symptoms of  psychiatry is an active interpretation on 
behalf  of  the clinician, and not simply a passive receipt of  knowledge. The clinician is 
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required to consider how what is expressed matches with his or her learning about 
deviance from normative values. The active involvement of  the clinicians interpretive 
efforts undermines the assumption of  objectivity inherent in the labelling, or not, of  the 
persons experience as symptoms of  mental illness.  
Comparatively less reliance is made on clinical signs in the form of  laboratory tests in 
psychiatry compared to physical medicine as the aetiology of  mental illness is rarely 
established as a result of  anatomical or physiological pathology, but rather, hypothesised 
syndromally from deviant behaviour or thinking. Nevertheless, deviant behaviour or 
thinking might be considered accessible to objective observation. Observation however, 
involves an act of  interpretation whereby what is observed is made comprehensible 
through the clinicians language, theoretical perspective, and cultural norms. Even where 
clinical signs are available as laboratory tests, the clinician is also required to judge and 
interpret the observation within the context for which the test was requested. A brain 
scan showing some abnormality may or may not support a provisional diagnosis of  
mental illness. Such support for a diagnosis of  mental illness occurs only within the 
context of  a great deal more information; that is, a context against which the laboratory 
data is interpreted. 
Given that mental illness or disorder is broadly defined as a significant deviation from 
social norms with respect to a persons behaviour or thinking, what is considered to be 
deviant is dependent upon the clinicians normative expectations for women and men. 
In this regard Busfield (1982) suggests that: 
I f  fear ,  anx iety,  and emot ional sensi t iv i ty  are considered more 
appropr iate in  women than in men, then i t  is  not surpr is ing 
that  i t  is  women rather  than men who become overanx ious, 
fearfu l,  depressed, and so on.  Conversely,  i f  dr ink ing, drug 
tak ing, and sexual act iv i ty  are more acceptable among men 
than women, then we should expect to  f ind pathologies of 
these behav iours  among more men than women do.  (p.  57) 
Gender bias in treating mental health problems 
Development and implementation of  treatment programmes occurring without a 
critical consideration of  gender may also serve to reinforce inequities along a gender 
division. For instance, consider the communication of  emotion for women and men. 
Due to dominant beliefs regarding how a man conducts himself, expressions of  
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emotion are less likely to be elicited from men, if  elicited at all (David & Brannon, 1976; 
Warren, 1983). Explanations of  a problem in the form of  a rationale, rather than 
expression, may well be preferred by both the clinician and men presenting with an issue 
that is substantially emotional (Seidler, 1989). When feelings are expressed by men they 
are more likely to be interpreted as symptoms and excessively pathologised; and 
accordingly treated. Anger is one such example. While being regarded as natural, 
expressed anger from men is also feared due to its strong association with violence and 
aggression rather than being regarded as a normal aspect of  a range of  emotions 
available to both women and men (Novaco, 1994). Expressed anger may therefore be 
vigorously treated by psychotherapy and/or psychopharmacology with the aim of  re-
establishing control. A multitude of  treatment programmes exist to improve mens  
anger management; for instance, social skills programmes like the Aggression Replacement 
Training by Glick and Goldstein (1987). On the other hand, a lack of  affective 
expressiveness may well be met with minimal response by the clinician because it is seen 
as congruent with expected social norms for men and therefore interpreted as being in 
control of  his emotional state (Warren, 1983). Thus, depression may well be minimally 
treated for men.  
Gender bias in access to mental health treatment 
There are many and varied factors that influence why a man would or would not consult 
a mental health professional. Kessler et al. (1981) suggest help-seeking be considered as 
three stages: (1) recognition that the person has a problem, (2) belief  it is serious 
enough to seek professional help, and (3) the act of  seeking help. Taking each stage in 
turn, men may firstly not perceive there is a problem, or alternatively it might be denied. 
For instance, men may not report depression because it is incompatible with masculine 
socialisation  as men may experience depression as a more aversive condition than 
women because of  the values and behaviors associated with the male sex role (Warren, 
1983, p. 150). Feelings and behaviours such as crying, vulnerability, loss of  competence 
at daily tasks, and dependence are perceived as stereotypically feminine, self-indulgent, a 
failure, and weakness, and are therefore intolerable (Warren, 1983).  
The second stage of  help-seeking requires the discomfort or problem to be regarded as 
sufficiently serious to seek help. What is meant by sufficiently serious may well be 
different for women and men. Rational control of  the mind over the body tends to 
mean that mens understanding of  the body is much like that of  a machine and so 
  20
respond to it in this context (Pease, 1997; Watson, 1983). A fitting mechanistic 
colloquialism is that if  it isnt broken, then it doesnt need fixing. Research into men 
and sport, such as bodybuilding or rugby, shows that men will clearly sacrifice health 
status in an effort to achieve ideals of  masculinity, such as defeating pain, risk-taking, 
or inflicting violence (White, Young, & McTeer, 1995). The very fact of  injury, rather 
than being understood as detrimental to health or a sign of  ill-health, may also be 
construed as a valued symbol of  masculinity. Sufficiently serious may mean 
problems become noticeable only when exercising instrumental control over their daily 
lives is impaired (Pease, 1997). 
The third help-seeking stage, the act of  seeking help, may also be different for women 
and men. Mental health services may not be provided in a manner congruent with 
dominant forms of  masculinity and therefore discourage men who hold to these beliefs 
about themselves. Insofar as masculinity is understood to be consistent with economic 
productivity, being manly is generally associated with paid employment, services only 
available during business hours may be perceived as services for women rather 
than men (Adams, 1997). Mental health services may also be perceived as  womens 
services (i.e. for emotional problems) and therefore men who hold to notions of  
masculinity as no sissy stuff  (David & Brannon, 1976) will be discouraged from 
considering psychiatry as a source of  help. Adams has suggested that the nature of  this 
sort of  bind for men is one between sexism and homophobia, depending on the 
clinician being a women or a man. 
Mental health, mens violence and aggression 
Until recent years, discussion of  the mental health issues to do with the perpetration of  
violence appear to be largely restricted to forensic psychology and psychiatry, and hence 
viewed as pathology within the individual. The individual pathology hypothesis appears 
to be inconsistent with the endemic nature of  the issue; that is, that mens violence 
seems global and socially prevalent (Heise, 1994). Gilbert (1994) writes that male 
violence may even outrank disease and famine as the major source of  human suffering 
[and] if  one wanted to instigate one mental illness prevention programme, then 
targeting male violence would possibly be the single most significant one (p. 352). Male 
violence is a global phenomenon (Heise, 1994). There is an immense but disparate data 
supporting Gilberts assertion. Nonetheless, some studies suggest that male violence 
may be underreported. For instance, a recent New Zealand survey by Moris (cited in 
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Ministry of  Justice, 1999) found that 24% of  female respondents with a current partner, 
and 73% with recent partners, reported at least one incident of  physical or sexual 
violence from their partner. Of  these, only 8% of  women who disclosed abuse by a 
current partner, and 21% who disclosed abuse by recent partners, had informed the 
police. Heise cites reports showing 80% to 90% of  homicides are perpetrated by men. 
The Ministerial Committee of  Inquiry into Violence (Roper Report) (Roper et al., 1987) 
estimates child abuse in New Zealand to be in the order of  25 per 100,0005, and while 
some studies show children are physically abused by men and women at somewhat 
similar rates, child sexual assault is perpetrated predominantly by men (Wyatt & Powell 
cited in Heise, 1994). That much of  violence against women and children is seen simply 
as a part of  the natural right for men to dominate (Heise, 1994), clearly demonstrates 
that violence and aggression are embedded within masculine beliefs and culture, rather 
than disorders or illness located within individual deviant men. 
Violence and aggression are an essential aspect of  male identity, connected at many 
different points in social life. For instance, White et al. (1995) examined the connection 
between masculinity, combative sport and injury. Their research showed that both the 
commission of  violence and the resultant injury become means of  affirming masculinity 
by exemplifying mastery over the body. In combative sport, the masculine ideology of  
physical mastery and opposition to femininity are essentially connected to violence and 
notions of  risk and courage acted out and celebrated on the sports field. The defeat of  
pain becomes one means of  disciplining the body by the masculine mind at the cost of  
health. Combative sport sanctions and celebrates the act, as well as the effects of  
violence, by men. Much of  what it means to be a male is constructed upon violence and 
aggression. For instance, the act of  heroism in combative sport and war is a highly 
regarded form of  being a man. To view these very same acts of  violence and aggression 
as forms of  clinical pathology would not be possible without also questioning dominant 
forms of  masculine identity. Only when violence steps outside of  socially acceptable 
constraints is the act of  violence regarded as pathological. Issues of  violence and 
aggression embedded within masculine identity are not made problematic from the 
current psychiatric perspective that dominates the mental health field. The application 
of  psychiatric labels, meaning that one is sick, also can have the effect of  absolving 
the individual of  responsibility for his actions. The diagnostic label therefore serves to 
                                                 
5 This is likely to be a significant underestimate. See Kotch et al. (1993) for a more recent discussion of this issue. 
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confirm notions of  the uncontrollability of  violence and aggression by locating the 
cause as individual rather than social. However, it does so in such a way as to leave 
unchallenged, the privilege and status of  male violence. By locating the problem of  
unsanctioned violence and its treatment within a disease model, the social link between 
masculine identity and violence remains unproblematic. 
Violence and aggression are thought to be linked to suicide as an inward turning of  
aggression, and as an easily associated attribute of  masculinity, is readily accepted in the 
aetiology of  mens suicide. Many theorists have considered that suicide and homicide to 
have a common origin in violence (Cantor, 1993; Durkheim, 1897/1952; Gold, 1958; 
Henry & Short, 1954; Palmer, 1968). By and large these theorists view suicide either as a 
form of  violence or destructiveness turned inward toward the self  or as arising out of  
the social meanings of  violence, particularly that related to masculine identity. That is, 
ideas that originate in psychoanalytic theory or the psychosocial-cultural and political 
perspectives. 
Towards gendering mens mental health 
An underlying theme of  this chapter is that clinical intervention in mental health is a 
powerful influence in maintaining the existing social structure, and thus the gendered 
status quo within society through its authority to label what is deviant or abnormal. 
Equally, what is not deviant or abnormal is defined as appropriate to the sexes by 
default. Much of  psychiatrys influence comes as a result of  its status as a speciality of  
the medical profession that makes its claim to authority on the basis of  science. Equally, 
the scientist-practitioner model for clinical psychology exerts its increasing influence 
through a similar claim to science. The claim of  scientific objectivity in the practice of  
psychiatry is however, flawed. At many points in the process of  diagnosis and treatment 
clinical intervention in mental health is an act of  interpretation that is inextricably 
bound to the social context. Likewise, the argument of  scientific evidence supporting 
claims about the differences in womens and mens mental health is similarly socially 
situated. An uncritical approach to mental health intervention simply reflects and 
reproduces the dominant social gender structure. Through the professions that 
subscribe to the dominant theories about mental disorder and illness, notions of  mental 
disorder become commonly held ideas about the boundaries of  normality. 
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The discussion within this chapter has important implications for the examination of  
suicide as gendered. Themes I have raised here, such as the flawed assumption of  
objectivity in psychiatry, the gendered nature of  diagnosis, mens violence and 
aggression, and masculine identity, I shall carry through into an examination of  
suicidality. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
MENS SUICIDE AND SUICIDALITY 
Le Suicide (1897/1952)  was published by Emile Durkheim over a century ago and is 
regarded as marking the beginning of  modern research into suicide. Since then, a vast 
research literature on the subject has been produced in an effort to explain, predict and 
control this form of  death. One of  the most enduring features of  suicide data, at least 
in Western countries, has been the consistency with which the rate of  mens suicide has 
been higher than that for women. Insofar as suicide is socially situated, it seems likely 
that from this observation alone, suicide rates are impacted upon by the gender 
structure of  Western society. 
In order to discuss suicidality, I begin by defining suicide and then briefly overviewing 
major theories from the last 100 years. This overview is necessarily selective as this 
literature is immense. My intention is to open up to question the underlying 
assumptions that suicide, and hence, suicidality, is best regarded as pathology unaffected 
by gender.  
Defining suicide 
The terminology surrounding suicidal behaviour can become particularly complex 
within the clinical and research fields. There is therefore a need to clarify at the outset 
how I shall use these terms in the following discussion. I have listed many of  these in 
Table 1 (p. 25). 
Although at first glance, a definition of  suicide might seem self-evident, a definition for 
suicide that suites research and clinical utility has been the subject of  considerable 
debate. Colloquially, the Oxford English Dictionary definition of  the term suicide is 
an act of  taking ones own life, self-murder (Simpson & Weiner, 1989). However, 
establishing the fact of  suicide post mortem, for official statistics or for research 
purposes, has been fraught with difficulty (McIntosh, 2002; O'Carroll, 1989; Shneidman, 
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1985). This difficulty arises from the need to establish that death was intended. The issue 
of  intent is pivotal to much of  the debate for what defines a death as suicide. 
Particularly problematic is that intent is personal and private, and can only be inferred 
from circumstances surrounding the death (e.g. suicide note).  
In an everyday sense of  the word, suicide is generally understood to be a particular form 
of  death in which someone has consciously intended to bring about their own demise. 
As such a death is intended, those who have a significant relationship to the person, 
including clinicians, also frequently ask the question why? This questioning is often 
deeply personal and can raise spiritual, moral, and ethical issues that further complicate 
the grief  and sorrow accompanying the death of  someone who has been closely known. 
From the perspective of  mental health services, the issues of  intent and why are 
important to the understanding, treatment and prevention of  suicidal behaviour. 
Undoubtedly, an understanding of  the motivations for suicide and how this could be 
prevented is likely to be also important for friends, family, and others who had a 
significant relationship to the person. 
Table 1. Some key terms used to describe suicidal behaviour 
Nonfatal suicidal 
behaviour 
Usually a term used by clinicians to refer to any act that is thought 
to be part of an intended suicide. 
Near-fatal suicide 
(serious attempt, 
clinically serious, etc.) 
Same as nonfatal suicidal behaviour but the injuries present are 
evaluated as likely to have caused death without urgent medical 
intervention. 
Parasuicide Deliberate self-harm irrespective of the intention that risks death. 
Self-harm Any form of deliberate injurious behaviour. In practice, the label 
self-harming behaviour generally means the clinician believes 
the injury was not a conscious intention to die. 
Suicidal threat May be verbal or nonverbal but is evaluated as a communication 
of the possibility of suicide in the future.  
Suicidality (suicidal 
ideation, thought, 
behaviour, etc.) 
Thoughts, actions, or behaviours that are evaluated by clinicians 
to be indicative of potential suicide. May be self-reported or 
clinician evaluation.  
Suicide attempt Defined by the person as survival of activity they had consciously 
enacted to end their life. Some authors argue that high-risk 
behaviour could be included here. 
Suicide gesture A pejorative term used to define an effort that is thought (by 
clinicians or others) to have the appearance of an attempt to 
suicide. 
Suicide intervention 
(prevention, etc.) 
Any form of intervention (often claimed to be the province of 
clinical professions) to prevent death by suicide. 
Suicidology The study of suicide and its prevention. 
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Observing that suicide involves many people and the cultural context (e.g. parents, 
family, language, cultural heritage, etc.) Maris (1997) suggests that suicide might be 
better regarded as a social event rather than an individual one. Even the very meaning 
of  the word suicide is social. Citing Durkheim, Maris argues that social facts constrain 
individuals and therefore, individual traits are unable to explain suicide rates. Maris goes 
on to conclude that suicides result because of  social forces and pathologies acting in 
concert with individual characteristics some suicides are committed to preserve 
society, not to weaken it (p. 48).  
Theories of suicide and suicidality- 
Killing oneself  has been variously positioned by the different moral laws of  the era; for 
instance, it was not until the fourth century that St Augustine (354-430 A.D.) deemed 
that killing oneself  was forbidden and then later by St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 
A.D.), that it was a Christian mortal sin (Shneidman, 1985). In contrast, for the Greeks 
and Romans of  antiquity, killing oneself  was a means of  restoring honour (van Hoof, 
2000). The word suicide is of  comparatively recent origin, first used by Sir Thomas 
Browne in 1642 (Shneidman, 1985).  
What has become labelled as suicide has therefore been written about and subjected to 
various investigations for many centuries. In more recent decades, suicide has become 
increasingly a public health concern. In parallel with this increasing concern there has 
been a burgeoning literature seeking to explain and prevent suicide. Rather than the 
spiritual or religious intervention of  the middle ages, suicide is now seen as the province 
of  scientific research and intervention from a variety of  clinical professions. I 
summarise some of  the major theories below. This is not an exhaustive listing, but an 
attempt to summarise those theoretical approaches in suicidology that have been utilised 
within the clinical field. 6  
Emile Durkheim 
Originally setting out to demonstrate the application of  natural science methods to 19th 
century sociological problems, Durkheim developed what was to become a seminal 
work in the study of  suicide. Durkheim (1897/1952) defined suicide as being:  
                                                 
6 A number of attempts have been made to review this substantial field. For instance, see Lester (2000b). Why 
People Kill Themselves: A 2000 Summary of Research on Suicide for a comprehensive review of the scientific and 
sociological research literature on suicide since 1897 and Shneidman (2001) Comprehending Suicide: Landmarks in 
20th Century Suicidology for a selection of key works. 
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appl ied to a l l  cases of  death result ing d irect ly  or  ind irect ly  
from a pos it ive or  negat ive act  of  the v ict im h imself  [s ic ] ,  
which he [s ic ]  knows wi l l  produce th is resul t .  (p.  44) 
For Durkheim, suicidal behaviour is a measure of  the degree to which a society is 
integrated. The greater a society is integrated the less death by suicide will occur, so that 
the rate of  suicide varies inversely to the level of  social integration.  
Under adverse soc ia l condit ions,  when indiv iduals  soc ia l  
contexts  fa i l  to  prov ide them with the requis i te  sources of  
at tachment and/or  regulat ion at the appropr iate level  of  
intens i ty,  then psychological or  moral health is  impaired,  and 
a certa in number of  vu lnerable, su ic ide-prone indiv iduals 
respond by committ ing suic ide. (Hassan,  1995,  p.3) 
In Le Suicide, Durkheim developed an aetiological typology of  suicide that has 
continued to be used and debated through to today. He has argued that three main types 
of  suicide exist: egoistic, altruistic, and anomic. It is worth noting that he also developed 
a fourth, fatalistic suicide, but described this only briefly as a footnote. Due to the 
enduring currency of  Durkheims theorising, it is worth summarising his typology.  
Egoistic suicide is about excessive individualism. The individual is not sufficiently 
integrated into society and consequently depends only on themselves to decide 
appropriate rules of  conduct. The person is alone. To statistically demonstrate this 
Durkheim cites the different rates of  suicide for Catholicism, asserting that compared to 
Protestantism, the lower rate of  suicide for Catholics is due to the greater degree of  
invariability and solidarity that Catholicism demands. In contrast, with its greater 
emphasis on individualism, free will and learning, and therefore a lesser degree of  
common beliefs, the higher suicide rate for Protestants is attributed to a lesser degree of  
social integration. 
Altruistic suicide occurs when there is too great an integration of  the individual into 
society, so that the individual is lost and has no autonomous existence apart from the 
group or society. The individual has little value compared to the group. Duty or 
obligation may require the individual to die and will likely condemn the person if  they 
do not meet this expectation. Alternatively, suicide may be an option for the redemption 
of  shame and humiliation, such as the Japanese seppuku (as cited in Hassan, 1995). 
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Anomic suicide occurs as a result of  sudden change in the circumstances of  the 
individual resulting in a loss of  social regulation of  the person. Such a crisis occurs with 
dramatic changes in the economic cycle. A lack of  social regulation can occur with both 
a loss of  wealth and its consequent downward spiral in social class, or a sudden 
accumulation of  wealth and consequent sudden lack of  restraint upon social aspirations. 
However, anomie is not only of  economic origin. Changes in the individuals 
overarching form of  social regulation may result in anomie. Durkheim suggested that 
for men, this could occur through widowhood and divorce. Unlike some later writers 
who saw common psychological origins for both murder and suicide, Durkheim did not 
see suicide as a derivative of  homicide turned against oneself. However, he did see a 
common origin for the two forms of  death in the social cause of  anomie. For 
Durkheim, the explanation for a person committing homicide was primarily about 
individual morality. 
The fourth type of  suicide developed by Emile Durkheim was that of  fatalistic suicide 
which he thought to be due to excessive regulation. Fatalistic suicide may occur in 
circumstances such as slavery, where excessive physical or moral despotism is 
encountered and no hope of  escape is foreseen. 
Other writers have followed Durkheims sociological approach and theorising. For 
instance, Cavan (1928/1965) holds a similar view to that of  Durkheim  insofar as she 
relates suicide to social phenomena. Like Durkheim, she hypothesises a relationship 
between personal and social disorganisation and the incidence of  suicide. However, 
while Durkheim undertook a statistical approach, Cavan develops her hypothesis on the 
basis of  an analysis of  a multitude of  in-depth case studies, linking the psychological to 
the sociological as an important contextual influence. In a similar vein to Durkheim, 
Cavan emphasises the role of  social disorganisation. Douglas (1967) also followed 
Durkheim but took a different view critiquing Le Suicide by arguing in detail the 
necessity for attending to social meaning in the pathway to suicide, concluding that: 
The s tat is t ical -hypothet ica l approach fa i ls  to take in to 
cons iderat ion the fac t that  socia l meanings are fundamental ly  
problematic ,  both for  members of  the soc iety and for  the 
scient is ts  attempt ing to observe,  descr ibe,  and expla in their  
act ions. (p. 339)   
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Like Cavan, Douglas argues for the construction of  a theory of  suicidal actions through 
intensive observation, description, and analysis of  individual case studies. Douglas 
however, goes further than Cavans attention to social context, taking the position that  
before assuming that suicide statistics can be understood, such careful observation and 
description is necessary in order that the situated meaning of  suicide is understood 
before an abstract understanding may be obtained. That is, suicide needs to be 
understand firstly as a socially situated and meaningful phenomena.  
While Durkheim was a strong early influence for the sociological view of  suicide, the 
psychoanalytic theories of  Freud also had an important and similarly early impact on 
clinical intervention for suicidal individuals. 
Sigmund Freud and Karl Menninger 
In Mourning and Melancholia Freud (1917/1925) saw suicide as hostility directed inward 
against the ego. Suicide is the result of  aggression turned inward against an introjected, 
ambivalently cathected love object (Kaplan & Sadock, 1991, p. 555). Hostility, once 
directed toward another person, who is also usually close to the person concerned and 
to whom they are now unable to openly express their hostility, is now directed against 
the self.  
However, Freud did not elaborate the detail of  suicide, this was taken up later by 
Menninger in his work Man Against Himself (1938). Menninger proposed that suicide 
arose out of  the interaction of  eros (life-instinct) and thanatos (death-instinct) in a 
particular circumstance. According to Menninger normal development of  the 
personality is a process whereby these two forces, originally directed inward and 
concerned with the self, become progressively directed outward toward other objects. A 
failure of  normal development is an incomplete turning outward of  these two forces. 
Suicide becomes possible when the destructive (thanatos) and constructive (eros) 
impulses fail to be directed outward and instead are forced inward toward the self. If  the 
destructive impulse is overwhelming then suicide can occur.  
From the psychoanalytic perspective of  Menninger there are three components (or 
three wishes) within the suicidal act. Firstly, there is the wish to kill; that is, the murder 
of  the self  by the self.  Secondly, there is the wish, or desire, to be killed. Thirdly, there 
is the wish to die. In suicide, the wish to kill, or murder, is unable to be directed outward 
to an object, but becomes turned inward through introjection. The distinction between 
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wishing to die and wishing to be killed or murdered lies in the necessity for some form 
of  violence in the latter, whereas wishing to die can be a passive surrender of  the self. 
Andrew Henry & James Short and Martin Gold 
Henry and Short (1954) proposed a theory of  external restraint to explain homicide and 
suicide. They tested this hypothesis against the cyclical nature of  economics. According 
to Henry and Short external restraint exists in two forms: horizontal and vertical. 
Horizontal restraint equates to the strength of  a relational system such as marriage, 
while vertical restraint equates to a relationship of  subordination to authority. Their 
hypothesis was that the reactions of  both suicide and homicide to the business cycle 
can be consistently interpreted as aggressive reactions to frustration generated by the 
flow of  economic forces (p. 14-15). Their view is that the cyclical nature of  capitalist 
economies causes frustration due to interference in achieving goals. However, they 
assert that status rank differentiates between the two outcomes of  aggression. From 
their study, they offer the conclusions that: firstly, a positive relation exists between 
suicide and status and a negative relation between suicide and strength of  the relational 
system and secondly, that there is a negative relation between homicide and status and 
a positive relation between homicide and strength of  the relational system (p. 17). 
Furthermore,  
When behav iour is  subjected to strong external restra int  by  
v ir tue e ither of  subordinate status  or  intense involvement in 
soc ia l  re lat ionships wi th other  persons,  i t  is  easy to b lame 
others when frus trat ion occurs.  But when the external  
restra ints  are weak, the self  must bear  the respons ibi l i ty  for  
frus trat ion. (p.  18) 
Gold (1958) extended the work of  Henry and Short by hypothesising a preference for 
homicide or suicide based on childhood socialisation and class. On the basis of  his 
research he hypothesised that working class socialisation results in a tendency for 
homicide that he attributes to early experiences of  physical punishment and aggression 
in working-class families, whereas the early experience of  middle class families instead 
produce a tendency for suicide. 
Jean Baechler 
Baechler (1975/1979) produced a typology of  suicides hypothesised on the basis of  the 
meanings of  the individuals suicide, echoing the earlier work of  Douglas. Like Douglas, 
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Baechler offers a different definition of  suicide to that of  Durkheim, reflecting their 
different orientations to the social and psychological. Baechler states that suicide 
denotes all behavior that seeks and finds the solution to an existential problem by 
making an attempt on the life of  the subject (p. 11). He emphasises that suicide is a 
solution to bear on a problem (p. 443) grounded in a lifelong pattern of  responding to 
adversity.  
Baechler hypothesised four types of  suicide that clustered together eleven different 
underlying meanings of  suicide set out in Table 1, below.  
 
While the personality is central to Baechlers analysis, as it was earlier for Freud and 
Menninger, Baechler is concerned to understand suicide as individually meaningful 
within the historical context of  the person concerned. Baechlers typology emphasises 
an individuals rationality toward her or his own suicide and provides a means for others 
to comprehend the action. This is a theme that was also of  concern for Shneidman.    
Edwin Shneidman 
Edwin Shneidman is regarded as the founder of  the discipline of  suicidology, creating 
the American Association of  Suicidology in 1968 with the aim of  developing an inter-
disciplinary field of  suicidology and providing a professional journal, Suicide and Life-
Threatening Behavior (Leenaars, 1993).   
In an early classificatory approach to suicide, Shneidman (1968) conceptualised suicide 
as egotic, dyadic, and ageneratic; in turn, focussing on intra-psychic and social issues, 
and issues around the loss of  belonging. In a later work Shneidman attempts to produce 
a clinically useful definition of  suicide arguing for far less concern for classification and 
more emphasis on developing clinically useful understanding (1985). To this end he has 
developed the following definition of  suicide: 
Table 2. Baechlers (1975) suicide types and their 
underlying meanings. 
Suicide type Underlying meanings 
Escapist suicides  Flight, grief, punishment 
Aggressive suicides Crime, revenge, blackmail, appeal 
Oblative suicides Sacrifice, transfiguration 
Ludic suicides Ordeal, game 
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Current ly  in  the Western wor ld, su ic ide is  a consc ious act  of 
se lf- induced annih i lat ion, best  understood as a 
mul t id imens ional  mala ise in a needfu l ind iv idual  who def ines 
an issue for  which the suic ide is  perceived as the best 
so lut ion. . .  in  an ambivalent  ind iv idual.  (Shneidman,  1985, 
p.  203 & 227) 
The addition of  the qualification of  ambivalence has become clinically significant 
(Cardell & Horton-Deutsch, 1994; Shneidman, 1988) for it describes a point where the 
individual is between dichotomous thoughts and feelings; at this point caught between 
hostility and love, wanting to die and wanting to be rescued, to cut ones throat and yet 
call for help. Shneidmans definition asserts that while the perceived current best 
solution is suicide it is not the only solution. Ambivalence describes the state of  mind 
whereby the person may choose to live if  a better solution is found. Elaborating further, 
Shneidman (1985) has described ten common characteristics to all suicides which can 
then be clustered into six aspects of  suicide: situational, conative, affective, cognitive, 
relational, and serial. These are summarised in Table 3, below. 
 
Shneidman (1992) later produced a clinically useful model that he calls the cubic model 
of  suicide. This model, in the geometric shape of  a cube, has three visible faces, each of  
which is divided into five increments so that each face is divided into rows and columns. 
The three faces of  the cube are called pain, perturbation and press. Pain arises out of  
thwarted psychological needs. Perturbation includes perceptual constriction and the 
need for action. Press refers to that which presses in on the person. These faces are each 
Table 3. Shneidmans (1985) ten common 
characteristics of suicide. 
Aspects of suicide Common characteristics 
Situational Unendurable pain 
 Frustrated psychological needs 
Conative Purpose is to seek a solution 
 Cessation of consciousness 
Affective Hopelessness and helplessness 
 Ambivalence 
Cognitive Constriction 
Relational Communication of intent 
 Aggression or escape 
Serial Life-long coping patterns 
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then divided into five rows and columns. Therefore, the cubelet at 5-5-5 has maximum 
pain, maximum perturbation, and maximum press. According to this model, only people 
in cubelet 5-5-5 are at risk of  committing suicide. It is important to note that 
Shneidman also points out that not everyone at 5-5-5 commits suicide, stating he or 
she may commit homicide, go crazy, become amnesic, or destroy a career; but in this 
conceptual model no one commits suicide except those in the 5-5-5 cubelet 
(Shneidman, 1992, p. 11). The model aims to focus clinical intervention on the three 
components of  psychological pain, perturbation and press. Accordingly, immediate 
clinical intervention needs to focus on shifting the person out of  the triple-5 cubelet; 
even just a little movement will prevent suicide. 
The notion of intention 
The concept of  intent is a key issue for labelling what is, and what is not, suicidal. 
However, the term is rarely defined in the literature and tends to assume certain 
understandings depending on the disciplinary field in which it is being used.  
Hjelmeland and Knizek (1999) suggest that part of  the confusion lies in differences of  
perspective between a phenomenological-subjective explanation to the scientific-
psychological explanation of  behaviour. Buss (cited in Hjelmeland & Knizek, 1999) 
argues that generally subjects explained their actions in terms of  reasons rather than 
causes. Reasons imply that the explanation of  the act lies in the expected future 
(teleological) whereas causal explanations imply the explanation lies in the past. 
Hjelmeland and Knizek (1999) argue that distinctions must therefore be drawn between 
motives, intentions and reasons. Motives are more closely associated with causal 
explanations and the perspective of  the observer, while reasons are more closely 
associated with intentions and is likely to be from the suicidal persons perspective. 
Related to the notion of  intent is the term attempted suicide. An attempted suicide is 
generally applied to an individual who is thought to have tried to commit suicide and has 
survived. This definition has at least two essential components to it: a behaviour causing 
injury, and an intention of  self-destruction. Such a definition attempts to distinguish 
suicidality from hazardous but deliberate behaviour. The key issue in drawing this 
distinction therefore is to ascertain the intent of  death.  
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However, Diekstra (1989b) suggests this may be a complex issue. On the basis of  a 
study of  self-reports following overdosing, Diekstra suggests motives in non-fatal 
suicidal behaviour may include the following three motives: 
 Cessation (death, stopping conscious experience now and forever);  
 Interruption (to interrupt conscious experience for a while, to sleep, not to 
feel anything for a while); and 
 Appeal (to mobilize or change others).  
Diekstra goes on to argue that a significant proportion of  nonfatal suicidal behaviour 
would be some combination of  these three motives. He also argues that behaviour 
constituted by interruption or appeal would be more accurately labelled deliberate self-
harm rather than attempted suicide as there is not a conscious intent to deliberately 
bring about ones own death. The tenth revision of  the International Classification of  
Diseases (ICD) (World Health Organization, 1993) adopts this approach using the label 
intentional self-harm. In contrast, the earlier ICD-9 (World Health Organization, 1975)7 
did not address nonfatal suicidal behaviour. These distinctions are important in the 
context of  current clinical practice as the response to someone attempting suicide is 
viewed as warranting greater urgency than someone evaluated as inflicting deliberate 
self-harm.  
If  the distinction between the categories of  attempted suicide and deliberate self-
harm revolve around the notion of  intentionality, then the interpretation of  behaviour 
is a key issue for clinicians (and others such as coroners, epidemiologists, etc.). While 
this issue has been emphasised in reviews of  the quality of  statistics on suicide 
(McIntosh, 2002; O'Carroll, 1989; Shneidman, 1985), it has also been an issue for 
clinicians and for clinical research. 
At first glance, it would seem that to determine the purpose of  a persons injurious 
behaviour, the person could simply be asked. However, while the nature of  the injurious 
behaviour may be ascertained through any number of  means, such as reports by others, 
Stengel (1969) has suggested that not everyone will wish to accurately report their 
intention of  suicide for reasons of  guilt or shame. Indeed, an attempt to suicide may not 
be reported at all in order to prevent the thwarting of  a further attempt. Further 
complicating the issue of  intent for Stengel and others (Farber, 1968; Maris, 1981) is the 
                                                 
7 The later clinical modification of ICD-9 (ICD-CM) (World Health Organization, 1978) provided additional E-codes 
under the label suicide and self-inflicted injury. 
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apparent variability in the degree of  intent at self-destruction. They hypothesise that 
some people deliberately create the appearance of  an attempt to end their lives while 
their real intention is to survive. This argument is used to privilege the clinicians (or 
researchers) interpretation over the explanation of  the injured person. Of  course, this 
argument presumes that the clinical interpretation of  the self-inflicted injury is an 
accurate proxy for the private thoughts and meanings of  the (possibly) suicidal person.  
Some writers have proposed that an alternative approach to dealing with the issue of  the 
person being not quite genuine (Stengel, 1969, p. 77) is to judge the degree of  
intention upon an assessment of  the lethality of  the method being used by the person. 
Such judgements are made on the basis that the lethality of  method equates to levels of  
intent (Shneidman, 1985). For instance, gunshot is seen as indicating a greater level of  
intent than self-poisoning. The conclusion from the degree of  lethality approach is that, 
if  the overall method is judged to have a low risk of  death then low levels of  intent can 
be safely assumed. However, rather than an indicator of  intent, self-poisoning presents a 
greater amount of  time for discovery and opportunity to medically intervene than 
gunshot (Marks & Abernathy, 1974; McIntosh, 1992). As a consequence, the person 
may then be seen as not really intending to suicide and instead is seen as being 
manipulative or attention-seeking (Lester, 1972). The labels of  manipulative and 
attention-seeking are frequently used pejoratively and are considered to be character 
flaws in the person, and on this basis may result in the diagnosis of  personality disorder.  
A further consequence of  the lethality of  method hypothesis is the conclusion 
frequently drawn in research and clinical settings that males are potentially more suicidal 
than women, as males tend to use more lethal methods (Buckley, Dawson, Whyte, 
Hazell, & et al., 1996; Carter, 1997; Ikeda et al., 2001; Kral & Sakinofsky, 1994; Lester, 
1996; Rich, Ricketts, Fowler, & Young, 1988). However, Marks and Abernathy (1974) 
critique the equating of  lethality of  method to intentionality. Firstly, they make the 
observation that all the methods used by completers [of  suicide] are deadly (p. 5. 
Original emphasis). Secondly, that what is being evaluated by this approach is actually 
the time span available for possible intervention, rather than the degree of  intent. On 
this basis they suggest that choice of  method is instead, a consequence of  the 
constellation of  values, beliefs, and social pressures (p. 10). The socio-cultural 
hypothesis proposed by Marks and Abernathy suggests that instead, different choices of  
suicide method are made by women and men according to their social and cultural 
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context, rather than varying degrees of  intent. Additionally, Kushner (1985) argues that 
acceptance of  the lethality of  method hypothesis has led to a distortion of  official 
statistics through a determination of  suicide being made on basis of  method, in lieu of  
knowing intent. Kushner argues that it is therefore likely female suicide deaths may in 
fact be underdetermined, and likewise, male nonfatal suicidal behaviour has been 
underreported. 
From the socio-cultural perspective, several further problems arise from the equating of  
lethality to levels of  intent. Firstly, there is a focus in research and clinical settings on the 
fatal outcome (suicide) to the exclusion of  the range of  self-destructive behaviour and 
thought (suicidality). The language surrounding this focus positions a fatal outcome as a 
successful behaviour and a nonfatal outcome as an attempted or failed suicide. 
Terms used to describe nonfatal suicide outcomes, such as: failed attempt, not 
serious, manipulative behaviour, and suicidal gesture, are all pejorative terms that 
are value judgements labelling the person as having fallen short of  some valued status. 
On the other hand a fatal suicidal outcome is positioned as an achievement or success. 
By way of  comparison, Lester (1989) argues that if  we were to focus on the full range 
of  self-destructive behaviour, the statistical norm would be survival and a fatal outcome 
becomes statistically deviant. Lester further suggests that such a perspective would 
regard the nonfatal outcome positively as an adaptive behaviour that permits survival 
and should therefore be regarded as successful.  
Secondly, given the distrust of  the persons self-report inherent in the lethality of  
method hypothesis, pejoratively labelling nonfatal outcomes as not serious, manipulative, 
an attempt, attention seeking, failed, and so forth, tends to minimise the critical 
assessment of  future risk of  harm (Clark & Fawcett, 1992).  As 25% of  fatal suicidal 
behaviour is preceded by nonfatal suicidal behaviour (Maris, 1981), such language 
disguises the increased risk of  harm.8 As well, such pejorative language discounts the 
subjective distress and pain experienced by the person making a respectful working 
relationship with the person unlikely. 
Thirdly, clinicians influence how others come to understand the behaviour of  
themselves and others (Busfield, 1986; Clarke, 1991). Such stigmatising language will 
                                                 
8 It is worth noting here that Stengel (1969), and more recently, Diekstra (1989a) suggest a higher range of 30 to 
40%. 
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reinforce any existing negative perspective of  themselves as well as reinforcing negative 
stereotyping by others. The experience of  stigmatising language may inadvertently 
contribute to increasing the risk of  suicide. That is, if  a nonfatal outcome is perceived as 
less socially acceptable than a fatal outcome, then the choices available for survival 
become restricted (Linehan, 1973).  
Kushner (1985) argues that the basis for differential beliefs about womens and mens 
suicidality is deeply historical. He notes that the dominant perception of  the nineteenth 
century was that women cling to life because her courage [to kill herself] is apt to 
fail and men suicide due to external pressures while women suicide due to inner 
troubles. Kushner is suggesting a link between the different social spaces women and 
men were expected to occupy in 19th century society. That is women were expected to 
occupy private domestic social spaces and whereas men were the dominant figures in 
public space. That these beliefs remain current suggests a well-established stereotyped 
association between the social expectations for the sexes and fatal suicidal behaviour. 
Hence, mens suicide becomes construed as some sort of  heroic solution to 
insurmountable pressure (Canetto, 1992). However, the term failed suicide is easily 
associated to the failed courage of  women, and hence, does not meet the stereotypical 
masculine standard. 
Similarly, Sanborn (1990) and Canetto (1994, 1995, 1997, 1998) assert that surviving 
suicidal behaviour may be unacceptable for men. Dominant forms of  masculinity are 
defined as the negative of  femininity; that is, masculinity is not-feminine (Connell, 1995; 
David & Brannon, 1976; Pease, 1997). For men who hold strongly to the not-feminine 
view of  masculinity the option of  surviving an attempt to kill himself  is severely 
constraining. Perhaps as importantly, this may also prohibit the acceptability of  
acknowledging and dealing with suicidal thinking. Warren (1983) takes a similar view in 
her review of  mens depression, arguing that much of  the behaviour, ideas and feelings 
associated with depression are also associated with femininity. Where dominant forms 
of  masculinity are associated with strength, control, and rationality; the experience, ideas 
and behaviours characteristic of  depression (e.g. crying, confusion and lethargy) are 
associated with being emotional, a lack of  control, and weakness. These characteristics 
of  depression are easily associated with femininity from the perspective of  men who 
subscribe to the not-feminine view of  being a man. One possible conclusion to be 
drawn from this argument then is that for men who subscribe to a strongly not-
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feminine (or to use David & Brannons [1976] words, no sissy stuff ) view of  
masculinity, having ideas about suicide and experiencing symptoms of  depression may 
be so disturbing that awareness of  symptoms, including thoughts of  suicidality, must be 
rejected in order to retain their sense of  being a man. Such a denial of  the experience of  
depression prevents all possibility of  communication and consequently excludes the 
acceptability of  support and intervention.  
The relationship between non-fatal and fatal suicidality 
Reading the literature on suicidal behaviour, one encounters a debate about the 
relationship between non-fatal (including deliberate self-harm) and fatal suicidal 
behaviour. From my reading of  the literature four broad positions emerge. Firstly, 
suicidal behaviours are understood as symptoms of  mental disorder; secondly, nonfatal 
and fatal suicidal behaviour are viewed as two separate but possibly related populations; 
thirdly, that nonfatal suicidal behaviour and suicide are all different aspects of  a 
continuum of  self-harm; and fourthly, an emerging position that self-destructiveness is 
best understood through the cultural and gender meanings of  the person as part of  how 
the person makes his or her world meaningful.  
This latter position offers a critique of  the first three, which tend to be premised on a 
traditional scientific worldview and hence, tend to be medicalised and consequently 
viewed as mental illness or disorder. I shall briefly overview the first three positions 
before turning to the latter sociocultural position in more detail. 
Mental di sorder 
Neame (1997) argues that suicide must reflect a mental disorder, on the basis that to kill 
oneself  one has to overcome the basic instinct to survive. From Neames standpoint, 
suicide is never a normal or rational choice (p. 14). The link between a diagnosis of  
mental illness and suicidality becomes tautological. To be suicidal means one must be 
mentally ill or disordered because it is irrational. It follows from this position of  
irrationality that the individual can be presumed to have no capacity to seek help as 
seeking help is a rational choice, it almost totally excludes the seriously mentally ill 
(Neame, 1997, p. 5). Furthermore, it assumes behaviour is without meaning on the basis 
that the person is not rational. On the basis of  Neames argument it makes little sense to 
engage in a relationship with a suicidal person as any communication, like their 
behaviour, is meaningless. This position ignores studies of  suicide that show a multitude 
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of  reasons for killing oneself; for instance the theorising of  Jean Baechler or the more 
recent work of  Edwin Shneidman (1998). It also ignores the multitude of  people who 
seek out help on the very basis that they feel suicidal (Barnes, Ikeda, & Kresnow, 2001; 
Kessler et al., 1981).  
Arguably, in recent years suicide has increasingly become understood to be a symptom 
of  a mental disorder. This is the position taken by recent New Zealand guidelines for 
the Assessment and Management of  People at Risk of  Suicide (New Zealand Guidelines 
Group, 2003). A formidable array of  evidence in support of  the mental illness notion 
of  suicide can be found in epidemiological studies and psychological autopsies 
(Barraclough, 1985; Berman, 1993; Brent, 1989; Clark & Horton-Deutsch, 1992; 
Durkheim, 1897/1952; Klerman, 1987). Tanney (1992) sums up the status of  the mental 
disorder hypothesis, saying that  
The conc lus ions are unequivocal:  (1)  Menta l  d isorders  are 
more common in populat ions of  persons complet ing suic ide, 
and (2)  suic ide and suic idal behav iors occur much more 
frequent ly  than expected in  populat ions of psychiatr ic  
pat ients.  (p. 287) 
Tanney concludes further, that the affective disorders are those most commonly 
associated with suicide followed by schizophrenia, while organic disorders have little 
association. However, he also cautions that association with mental disorder is not the 
same as a direct link to suicide (Tanney, 2000). Nonetheless, he estimates the increased 
risk of  suicide for persons with active mental disorders converges around 7 to 10 times 
that of  the general population (2000, p. 339). Similarly, other writers report that 
probably less than 1% of  people who suicide did not have a diagnosable psychiatric 
disorder at the time (Fremouw, de Perczel, & Ellis, 1990). In a variation of  the role of  
mental disorders, Maris (1981) makes a distinction between trigger factors and the more 
remote causes for fatal or nonfatal suicidal behaviour stating that 
Depress ion and hopelessness were s t i l l  most impor tant  as 
precursors of completed suic ide,  but  phys ical problems, 
general  in terpersonal problems, and work  problems al l  
seemed to be s l ight ly  more important  as  s i tuat ional precursors  
than they were as major causes. For  the nonfata l  su ic ide 
at tempters , depress ion and hopelessness were the most  
impor tant  s i tuat ional precursors , with general interpersonal  
problems a c lose second. (p. 274) 
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Studies using the psychological autopsy method have also proposed a strong 
relationship between suicide and mental illness (Berman, 1993; Brent, 1989; Clark & 
Horton-Deutsch, 1992). On the basis of  his findings in a study of  100 suicides, 
Barraclough (1985) argued for a medical approach to suicide. He found that 93 of  those 
who died by suicide were diagnosed mentally ill and of  those, 83 would fit criteria for 
diagnoses of  depression and alcoholism. He also notes that 75 had seen a doctor in the 
previous month.   
A large body of  research exists that lists variables correlated to fatal and nonfatal 
suicidal behaviour that appears to support the link between depression and suicidal 
behaviour (Tanney, 1992). However, as suicidality is one of  the behavioural criterion for 
a diagnosis of  major depression (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), this 
association should be unsurprising and seems to be somewhat tautological. 
Cognitive psychology theorises a relationship between suicidal behaviour and the 
cognitions of  depression. According to Rudd (2000) cognitions are the private meanings 
assigned by the individual that consist of  the meaning-making structures termed 
schemas. There is a linear, reciprocal and deterministic relationship between cognitions 
and outcomes. According to Freeman and Reinecke (1993), 
The re lat ionship between ear ly  negat ive exper iences and 
current symptomatology is  not through the invocat ion of a 
descr ipt ive personal i ty  structure,  but is  mediated by the 
act iv i ty  of  spec if ic  assumptions and schema. These bel ie fs are 
understandable wi th in each indiv idual s personal meaning 
system, and a lthough h ighly personal and id iosyncrat ic ,  are 
avai lable to consc ious awareness. The cogni t ive therapy 
model postu lates  that  depress ion may be seen as a 
manifes tat ion of these endur ing bel ief  systems,  assumpt ions, 
and schema. (p. 18) 
Building on cognitive theory, Rudd uses a specific elaboration of  Becks (1996) modal 
theory of  psychopathology in which he proposes a cognitive-behavioural model that 
integrates psychotherapeutic approaches to suicidality in which he takes the approach 
that views cognitive therapy as mediational. That is, Rudds model is premised on seeing 
the individual as living in a dynamic context, with reciprocal influence, interaction, and 
interdependent outcome (Rudd, 2000, p. 21).  
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Although there appears to be a strong statistical association of  mental disorders with 
suicide, Diekstra (1989a, 1989b) concludes that the current evidence suggests suicide 
has complex causes rather than any single responsible agent or disorder. Diekstra (1998) 
states further, that although mental illness is clearly a risk factor, and a non-specific one 
since it crosses many disorders, why it is a risk factor remains yet to be explained. 
Suicidal i t y as  a continuum of  se l f -harm 
There is an ongoing debate in the literature as to whether there is, or is not, a 
relationship between fatal and nonfatal suicidal behaviour; that is, whether they 
represent two different populations. Those who argue for theorising two separate 
populations with little or no relationship, do so mostly on the basis of  population-based 
statistical comparison. For instance, in their review of  the literature, Hawton and 
Catalan (1987) conclude that the rates of  attempted suicide and suicide vary 
independently of  each other. Tanney (2000) agrees, arguing that nonfatal suicidal 
behaviours have a characteristically different set of  diagnoses. Maris (1992) also reports 
research showing that suicide attempts are a poor predictor of  future suicide as only 10 
to 15% of  people who attempt suicide go on to kill themselves. However, the same data 
cautions that, of  those people who commit suicide, 30 to 40% have made prior attempts 
(Maris, 1981).  
Other researchers proceed from the premise that suicidal behaviours are but one end of  
a continuum of  self-harm. From this perspective, a common element exists connecting 
non-fatal behaviours to those that end in an intended death. For instance, like 
Shneidman, Farber (1968) also draws on Freuds notion of  ambivalence, hypothesising 
that within a suicidal state the person experiences a kind of  existential ambivalence; that 
is, they exist in a contradictory state of  to die or not to die (p. 7). The psychoanalytic 
perspective also differs to that of  epidemiologists in that the starting point is a detailed 
examination of  the individual rather than that of  populations. From the psychoanalytic 
perspective self-mutilation is a psychological process that parallels suicide in so far as it 
is hate directed against an external object turned back upon the self  and reinforced 
with self-punishment (Menninger, 1938, p. 233). Like Farber and Shneidman, this 
process is also thought to do with both the past, present and future, and has deep 
symbolic and real values: 
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Self-mut i la t ion9 a tones or propi t ia tes  by sacr i f ice for  the 
aggress ive acts  and wishes of the past,  and i t  also prov ides 
an ant ic ipatory  protec t ion as i f  to fores ta l l  fu ture punishment 
and permit  fur ther indulgences by the advance payment  of a 
penalty .  (Menninger,  1938, p.  284) 
The relationship of  self-mutilation to suicide within the psychoanalytic thesis is that 
self-mutilation is a form of  suicide in which death is averted; albeit at times at great cost 
to the person. Within the personality, the life and death instincts are not necessarily in 
harmonious balance. To avert death, eros must overcome thanatos. Menninger considers 
self-mutilation as the death of  a part of  the self, in order that survival is made possible 
through a sacrifice of  a part of  the body; as a substitute for killing the self. 
Frankl (1984) casts the issue of  suicidal thought into a question of  existential meaning. 
Frankls use of  the term meaning is paradigmatically different to how it is used within 
cognitive theory. In cognitive theory (such as Rudd, previously discussed), meaning is to 
do with logical-rationality and as a consequence the meaning of  a behaviour can be 
discovered through scientific method. However, meanings can involve human qualities 
that go beyond that of  the empirical world, such as the ability to self-transcend, to 
observe the self  in a detached manner, and to draw upon our noetic10 dimension 
(Long, 1986, p. 97). Frankl views the normality of  life as full of  different tensions, 
suffering, or of  crises. In fact he suggests they are ever-present as a fact of  human 
existence. Life or living is assumed to include what he terms the tragic triad of  pain, 
guilt, and death. From Frankls perspective it is not enough to simply have the means to 
live, but necessary to have something to live for. In this sense, lives are lived toward an 
intention or purpose.  
A purposeful or intentional living changes the tragic triad by: (1) turning suffering into 
a human achievement and accomplishment; (2) deriving from guilt the opportunity to 
change oneself  for the better; and (3) deriving from lifes transitoriness an incentive to 
take responsible action (p. 162). There are three major paths to creating meaning in life 
according to this view: (1) creating a work or doing a deed; (2) by experiencing 
something or someone; and (3) by the attitude we take toward unavoidable suffering (p. 
                                                 
9 Karl Menninger uses the term self-mutilation rather than the term self-harm. To the extent that self-harm is a 
deliberate and purposeful injury inflicted upon the body by the self, I believe the terms can be considered 
synonymous. 
10 From the ancient Greek noös, meaning mind or soul (Gadamer, 1996). 
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133). On this third part, Frankl states that it is not necessary to suffer in order to find 
meaning, this would be masochism; but when unavoidable, it is what one makes of  the 
experience that is important. 
From his observation and experience of  living through the concentration camps of  
Nazi Germany, Frankl saw in others that moment when meaning orientation had 
subsided, and consequently the seeking of  immediate pleasure [e.g. a secreted cigarette] 
had taken over (p. 164). In the context of  the concentration camps it was a signal that 
death was accepted and perhaps desired. Frankl attributes much of  the current-day 
depression, aggression, addiction and suicide to an existential vacuum, a feeling of  
emptiness and meaninglessness (p. 166). 
In Frankls form of  existential analysis, logotherapy, a spiritual dimension (noös) is 
brought to the physical and psychological aspects of  being human. Suicidal thoughts are 
seen to arise out of  a loss of, or inability to find a meaning for living. Suicide occurs, not 
so much as a loss of  hope, but as a loss of  the ability to find meaning or purpose to life 
(Long, 1997). Suicide, suicidal thought, nonfatal suicidal behaviour, and so forth, are not 
seen as separate phenomena from this perspective but as behaviour arising out of  the 
persons own circumstances and is meaningful within their worldview. Although Frankl 
draws links between the social and suicidality through the centrality of  meaningfulness 
to living and dying, how it is that cultural and gendered understandings contribute to 
meaning remains invisible.  
Suicidal i t y as  gendered 
In the early 1970s Linehan (1971) proposed that the differences between women and 
mens rates of  suicide and choice of  method could be explained as an outcome of  sex-
role expectations. In a study of  college students that examined attitudes toward suicide 
and attempted suicide, Linehan found that, consistent with the expectations of  sex-role 
theory, suicide was more often regarded as a masculine act than attempted suicide. 
Marks and Abernathy (1974) proposed a socio-cultural perspective, arguing that using 
the lethality of  method hypothesis to explain the difference in female and male suicide 
rates is misleading. They point out that both sexes actually use the same methods, but 
differ in the proportion. They re-examine the relationship between intent and method 
through a socio-cultural perspective asserting that 
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An indiv idual is  subjec t to  soc ia l and cul tura l  norms that help 
h im[s ic]  def ine acceptable and nonacceptable forms of 
behav ior ,  inc luding methods of  se l f-destruc t ion  these norms 
are in ternal ized and,  to vary ing degrees, re lat ive ly cons is tent 
wi th other values and bel iefs ,  such as bodi ly  appearance, 
avoidance of pain,  assumed ef fect iveness of method,  and 
moral  and re l ig ious conv ict ions. (1974, p.  10) 
From the socio-cultural perspective of  Marks and Abernathy, a relationship would be 
expected between particular methods of  suicide and:  
 the persons evaluation of self,  
 the persons knowledge of methods,  
 the persons familiarity with these methods,  
 the persons personal and social acceptability of these methods, and  
 the actual availability of these methods.  
 
More recently, a focus on the socio-cultural dimension of  suicidal behaviour has led to 
consideration of  what part the sex role of  men might have in suicidal behaviour. For 
instance, Canetto (1991) compared substance abuse to the rate of  suicide attempts. 
While both are life-threatening behaviours and encompass a range of  conscious self-
destructive intent, impulsivity and appeal for help, there are different outcomes for 
women and men. While men usually have increased rates of  drug and alcohol abuse, 
women have increased rates of  overdosing (Battersby, O'Mahoney, Beckwith, & Hunt, 
1996; Hall, 1996; Nightingale, Beatrais, Joyce, & Mulder, 1994; Paton-Simpson, 1999). 
Canetto and others have argued that gender roles are a key factor to understanding the 
different outcomes for women and men (Canetto, 1991, 1995; Chesler, 1972). They 
argue that stereotypical masculine gender beliefs lead to non-fatal suicide attempts being 
considered feminine because they are seen to be the result of  personality problems, 
implied helplessness, indecisiveness; additionally, an expectation of  rescue may mean 
that surviving suicide is equated to failed masculinity. Such understandings of  what an 
attempted suicide or failed suicide may mean, could lead to men taking greater care 
to ensure a fatal outcome (White & Stillion, 1988).  
On the other hand, alcohol and substance abuse may be easily accessible and socially 
acceptable for men (Canetto, 1991; Griffiths, 1993; Hill, 1999; James & Saville-Smith, 
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1994; Paton-Simpson, 1999). If  we subscribe to Menningers view that deliberate self-
injury is a form of  sacrifice (of  a part of  the body) in lieu of  suicide, drug and alcohol 
abuse may be seen as options to avoid death while also managing to conform to socially 
acceptable behaviour for men. Support for this view may be seen in the strong statistical 
correlation with suicide, alcoholism and substance abuse (Lester, 2000a, 2001; 
Nightingale et al., 1994). 
Gendering mens suicidal behaviour 
The review of  suicide and suicidality in this chapter shows that suicide and suicidality 
have complex causes. It is argued here that both are essentially human acts which 
require a consciousness to conceive of  the purpose of  death and move toward bringing 
it to fruition. From this perspective each person and each community will understand a 
persons suicide differently. Kerkhof  and Diekstra (1995) have suggested that there are 
multiple pathways to suicide and not every pathway necessarily ends in suicide. A 
fruitful approach to suicide prevention might be found by focussing on the pathways 
rather than attempting to isolate a single variable. In contrast to the reductionist 
approach, a significant contribution to the understanding of  suicidal behaviour may 
then be made through theoretical frameworks that attend to the dynamics within the 
complex social contexts and meanings in which people live and die. It is likely therefore 
that different understandings are attributed to suicide in differing cultural contexts. For 
example, suicide may be culturally meaningful as a means to restore honour, or as a 
courageous act in the face of  external stress, or to cover up personal dishonour, or 
regarded as a blasphemy against God, or as a result of  a (Western) medical condition 
such as depression, or a means to go to a higher form of  existence, and so forth.  
Different approaches to theorising suicide and suicidality have been canvassed here that 
preserve complexity, meaning, and social context. While the sociological approach, 
exemplified by Durkheim, considers issues of  social structure, such a perspective 
minimises the agency of  the individual by focussing upon larger social groups. For 
instance, the central premise of  Le Suicide is the relationship of  the individual within 
society. As a sociological theory, Durkheims typology of  suicide has been a valuable 
contribution towards explaining suicide. Other more recent writers support Durkheims 
sociological approach. In Suicide Explained, Hassan (1995) argues for the consideration 
of  social factors in the explanation of  suicide, basing his research on an extensive 
review of  Australian data. He echoes Durkheim stating that 
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In  soc ia l theory suic ide is  v iewed fundamental ly  as a product 
of  the nature of the relat ionship between the indiv idual and 
soc iety.  The relat ive degree of  regulat ion, contro l,  iso lat ion 
and oppress ion of  ind iv iduals in soc iety are among the pr imary  
causes of vary ing degrees of  su ic ide in  d i f ferent soc iet ies.  (p. 
156) 
Hassan (1995) concludes that a sociological analysis of  Australian data reveals that the 
aetiology of  suicide is that about half  of  the suicides were primarily anomic [and] 
the other half  were primarily egoistic (p. 161). In addition, he concludes relational, 
instrumental, and health problems, are the major circumstances preceding suicide. Of  
note is that in Hassans interpretation the data demonstrates the significance of  
symbolism and social forces in suicide, saying that 
The empir ica l ev idence examined in th is volume shows that  
su ic idal behav iour ,  l ike other forms of soc ia l  behav iour,  has 
impor tant  symbol ic content  and in the f ina l analys is  i t  is  
shaped by the same soc ia l  forces which inf luence and regulate 
the other general pat terns of  soc ia l l i fe .  (p.  162) 
The psychoanalytic perspective provides a much more dynamic and complex process to 
suicide than the objectivist and deterministic worldview of  positivist science upon 
which psychiatry and clinical psychology are grounded. However, by focussing on 
individuals, the psychoanalytic approach of  Freud and Menninger fail to problematise 
social structures and the environment that influences each individuals suicidality. 
Additionally, by hypothesising mental structures of  the personality, psychoanalytic 
language is itself  objectivist and deterministic leaving little latitude for personal agency. 
As a result, personal meanings become pathologised through a language that assumes 
what it has labelled as normal development is a universal standard.  
Shneidman also remains clearly focussed on the individual. However, rather than 
emphasising cause, he places an emphasis on need. His description of  the common 
characteristics of  suicide (Table 3, p. 32) defines problems and needs in terms of  
thinking and behaving. This approach is not dissimilar to the cognitive-behavioural and 
medical views of  suicidality. Whilst he provides a clear path for intervention, it is limited 
by its universalism; being suicidal is reduced to ten different components which are 
regarded to be the same for all regardless of  age, sex, class, and so forth.  
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Arguably the current dominant form of  understanding, or attempts to understand 
suicide, in Western societies is that suicide is a result of  mental illness, and consequently 
ultimately comprehendible and preventable through the efforts of  medical or 
psychological science. This view is influential across all clinical disciplines within mental 
health services who have a role to manage suicidal people. This view has the individual 
as its focus rather than society and takes a mechanistic (and objective) view rather than a 
concern for meanings derived in the context of  social relationships. 
Each of  these positions discussed in this chapter provide a useful way of  explaining 
suicidal behaviour, and each has its limitations. Except for the existentialist perspective 
(e.g. Viktor Frankl) each of  these theoretical positions seek a causal explanation by 
looking to the past. As Hjelmeland and Knizek have argued, this is consistent with the 
psychological-scientific position of  observation. On the other hand, a teleological 
explanation of  suicidal behaviour looks to the future asking what is intended? and as a 
consequence, the private thoughts and meanings of  the individual are important to 
understand their suicidal behaviour. A scientific explanation of  suicidal behaviour then 
can only provide only a partial understanding of  a persons suicidality; it cannot answer 
the question Jean Baechler (1975/1979) set out to answer: what are people doing when 
they set about ending their lives? (p. 443). As a human answer to a human problem, 
Baechler hypothesises it is a solution brought to bear on a problem (p. 443). In this 
sense, suicide is ultimately meaningful to the person. How men come to act the way they 
do requires an understanding of  historical experience, relationship to the present 
context, a view of  the future, and the personal meaning of  life and death. Importantly, it 
also includes a sense of  morality and ethics; being questions of  how things should be 
and how he is prepared to live and act. These questions are meaningful only in a social 
context and involve an appreciation of  how being a man exerts an influence over 
expectations and experiences. 
Positivist theorising of  gender as sex-roles is insufficient for an adequate exploration of  
the relationship of  masculinity to suicidal experience. Furthermore, building on the 
work of  feminist theorists, positivist theorising on gender has now been 
comprehensively critiqued as being static, unable to explain diversity, failing to examine 
power relationships, unable to grasp social meaning and history, or mens relationships 
to institutions and technology, and does not provide a means to theorise change 
(Connell, 1995; Kimmel, 2000; Mac an Ghaill, 1994; Seidler, 1994). Moreover, a 
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theorising of  masculinity for the purpose of  this study will need to be congruent with 
the position on mental health nursing argued earlier as meaningful and socio-culturally 
situated and therefore requires an approach somewhat more criticalist in orientation 
rather than that of  a positivist social science. This is the subject taken up in the 
following chapter.  
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C h a p t e r  4  
MASCULINITIES 
The position I have outlined earlier is that what is understood as normal or abnormal 
(e.g. mental illness), is an interpretation situated within a social context. Moreover, I 
have argued that claims to an objective science leave existing gender constructs 
unproblematised. Premised on science, clinical intervention in psychiatry and mental 
health acts to police the boundaries between current norms and that which is 
inappropriate. As a taken-for-granted and universal norm, masculinity is both unseen 
and unchallenged. However, to ask the question of  masculinity in mental health issues 
demands masculinity to be made visible. To do this requires a theorising of  masculinity.  
The position I have developed in the previous chapters is an explicit rejection of  the 
essentialist or mythopoetic position on men and masculinity that has been adopted in 
recent years by some writers and researchers (e.g. Biddulf, 1995; Bly, 1990; McCann, 
1999). The essentialist position holds that there is a fundamental (that is, essential) 
core to mens character that has always been part of  being a man, whilst the 
mythopoetic position is both a political and a therapeutic-spiritual movement (Fee, 1992; 
Hearn, 1992; Kimmel & Kaufman, 1994). The central assumption of  the mythopoetic 
vision is an ontological essential difference between women and men (1994, p. 269). 
The essentialist and mythopoetic movement is concerned with addressing what is 
perceived to be a loss of  manhood generally assumed to begin with a loss of  
fathering (Biddulf, 1995; McCann, 1999).  
An essentialist position has enabled some writers to argue that a variety of  social 
problems involving young males, including mental health problems, to be explained as a 
loss of  fathering or other male role model (McCann, 1999); thus enabling an anti-
feminist discourse and closing off  a critical self-reflection by men. The question of  
how being a man might affect and influence their expectations and experiences, in a 
multitude of  settings (Whitehead, 2001, p. 352) does not get asked. The mythopoetic 
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and essentialist responses therefore seem to be less about self-awareness and instead a 
response to a perceived threat to mens power, privilege and control over women and 
children. Hence, it is intended to retain the status quo. 
To the extent that there is an absence of  critical self-reflection by men, health and 
power remain entwined and unseen. While there is a well-established feminist literature 
examining mens power at the expense of  women and womens health, it is only recently 
that some effort from men has been directed toward examining the impact of  
masculinity upon mens health. Much of  this effort has been built upon the work of  
feminist scholarship.  
A rejection of  essentialist notions of  masculinity introduces the idea that masculinity 
has a history and social structure. One of  the earliest theorising, linking masculinity and 
psychological dis-ease has been Freud whos writings have prompted prolific discussion, 
debate and further theorising.  
Freud on masculinity 
Although Freud did not write a theory of  masculinity, Connell (1994) points out that his 
thinking on masculinity can be traced through his writings, in particular the Three Essays 
on the Theory of  Sexuality (Freud, 1905/1986), as well as the Rat Man  (Freud, 
1909/1955) and Wolf  Man (Freud, 1918/1955) case studies. Freuds writings 
hypothesise that heterosexuality and masculinity are formed through the oedipal 
complex in which, at an early age, the boy is confronted by his fathers competition for 
the attention and affection of  his mother. In successful resolution of  this crisis, he 
separates from his mother to eventually identify with his father (i.e. the aggressor). In 
doing so, this also enables the boy to (symbolically) have a sexual union with a mother-
substitute (Kimmel, 1994). Through a Freudian model, masculinity is irrevocably tied to 
heterosexuality, independence, and fear; that is, the fear of  (symbolic) castration  the 
fear of  being cut off  from his mother. Freud also ties masculinity to separation from the 
mother. Psychosexual development requires separation from ones mother as a male as 
an essential and ongoing proof  of  manhood (David & Brannon, 1976).  
Both Victor Seidler and Bob Connell draw upon Freud to support the argument that the 
dominant conception of  masculinity is based upon a separation from the feminine. 
Seidler draws upon Freud to connect desire and control to masculine identity, describing 
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the oedipal crisis as a time where boys learn to crush their feelings of  need, 
dependency, and emotionality to achieve a masculine identity (1987, p. 98). Hence, the 
denial of  these feelings and desires establishes male identity (Connell, 1983). Freuds 
description of  male psychosexual development is not one of  steady progression, but a 
conflict-ridden process in which sexuality is formed and reformed in a state of  tension 
between the masculine and feminine self  (see for instance, the Wolf  man case study). 
Seidler (1987) argues that paradoxically, learning to repress these feelings and basing a 
sense of  masculinity on this denial, leaves boys in a continuous struggle with 
themselves, always fearful of  revealing the femininity that they are denying within 
themselves. The preferred resolution then is to utilise reason as protection from an 
emotional world that is unfamiliar and not well understood. In learning to value 
independence, men have difficulty showing and exploring their emotional needs as it 
raises questions of  dependency made even more profound by a separation from the 
feminine (Seidler, 1997).   
Constructing masculinities 
By removing the notion of  a deterministic relationship between sex and gender, we can 
acknowledge the agency of  the person in the creation of  gender. That is, irrespective of  
how a persons gender becomes a reality, the person is actively involved. Gender can 
therefore be said to be accomplished by people; hence, people do gender (West & 
Zimmerman, 1991). This premise means that merely because a man observes he has a 
penis he does not then passively accept a prescribed (and proscribed) social existence or 
role in accord with his culture. While a point of  difference may be noted, the social 
meaning of  the body becomes worked through in relation to the social world in which 
he lives. As Kessler and McKenna (cited in, West & Zimmerman, 1991) have noted, 
genitalia are conventionally hidden, and it is the presumption that they are there that is 
the basis for public categorisation of  a persons sex. Although it is individuals who do 
gender, the enterprise is fundamentally interactional and institutional in character 
doing gender is unavoidable (West & Zimmerman, 1991, p. 23-24).  
While this position acknowledges individual agency in how a man may wish to see 
himself  and how he socially exists, it also draws attention to the interactional space in 
which gender is accomplished and as a consequence, individual agency is not unlimited. 
Having stated that choices exist, they may not however, be readily accessible. Choices 
for gender accomplishment can be made more or less accessible by others through 
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various strategies, such as: the use of  stigma, stereotyping, knowledge, religious and 
cultural expectations and obligations, fear, persecution, and legal prohibition. Ultimately, 
the use of  overt violence continues to be a mechanism of  social constraint. For 
instance, in a study of  male school students by Town (1998), some of  the gay men he 
interviewed described a strategy of  managing their fear of  homophobic persecution at 
school by maintaining a façade of  heterosexuality; that is, engaging in sex with women 
as well as participation in assaults on boys who were identified as being feminine and 
therefore assumed to be homosexual. Towns interviewees show that  heterosexuality or 
homosexuality11 are not objective facts to which they variously conformed, but are 
subjective experiences of  self  that may or may not be consistent with observed 
behaviour or even self-report; particularly as circumstances may mean that to come 
out is unsafe. As an attribution of  gender identity is made by the individual as well as 
others, it is entirely possible that there can be an inconsistency between how others see 
us compared to how we experience ourselves. Put another way, how we are seen 
objectively may not be the same as how we experience ourselves subjectively.  Drawing on 
a poststructuralist perspective, hetero- or homo-sexuality are therefore not biological 
things, but ideas and meanings that relate to the body and have material effects on the 
body.  
The view that masculinity is socially constructed holds that what we call masculinity is 
not a thing in the material sense, but an idea constructed out of  beliefs about what 
constitutes being a man. Connell (1996) progresses this conceptualisation of  
masculinity by defining gender as a configuration of  social practice. He does not set out to 
suggest that such a configuration of  practice is passively received but that gender is a 
social practice that constantly refers to bodies and what bodies do (p. 159). Although 
the body is the point of  reference for this definition, gender is not derived in a 
deterministic way from the observation of  anatomy or any other biological status. 
Instead, Connell argues that masculinity should be seen as a life-long personal project 
rather than a stable object of  knowledge (p. 33).  
Connell argues that gender needs to be understood as a body-reflexive practice because 
bodies are both agents and objects of  social practice (p. 159). As an agent, for 
example, a body can act to do violence, or provide comfort to another. As an object, a 
                                                 
11 Although I speak here in polar terms of homosexuality or heterosexuality, the discussion could easily refer to any 
number of sexualities, including but not limited to, bisexual, intersexual and transgender.  
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body can be the site of  social practice and be dressed, injured or be cared for. Such 
events do not occur in isolation but take place within a pre-existing social structure. 
Take boxing and nursing as two different examples. The social institution of  the sport 
of  boxing is predominantly a practice of  males, where males injure other males and are 
also in turn, have injury done to them. The institution of  nursing remains 
predominantly a practice by women where nurses (amongst other activities) have regard 
for and provide physical and emotional care for people who are patients. Where this 
is disrupted, say by men doing nursing, the term nurse becomes qualified and people 
will refer to the male nurse precisely because the norm for nurse has an expectation 
of  women. Similarly, the reverse applies in boxing. That men predominate in boxing and 
women predominate in nursing shows gender produced and re-produced within the 
existing social and institutional structures of  sport and nursing. These examples also 
show social constraints operating against women in boxing and men in nursing, are 
never quite fully overcome. 
Historically emergent masculinity 
Seidler argues for an understanding of  masculinity as an historically-emergent 
experience (1989, p. 3). According to Seidler (1989, 1994), many accepted traditions 
have arisen out of  a rationalist inheritance formed in the Enlightenment.12 The public 
world of  men was identified with reason and morality set in opposition to the 
superstition and religious dogma that preceded it. He argues that it was during this time 
when the power of  religion to control intellectual life began to give way to individualism 
and the scientific view of  the world that the cultural prerequisites for modern forms of  
masculinity were set in place. It is Seidlers (1989, 1994, 1997) contention that it is from 
within Kantian philosophy and the Protestant Reformation13 that current conceptions 
of  masculinity have emerged. This history has been made invisible through a 300 year 
long process of  normalisation and naturalisation of  the masculine character now 
embedded in modern society.   
                                                 
12 The Enlightenment (also known as the Age of Reason) marks the beginning of the Modern Age for the Western 
world. The Enlightenment covers the two centuries from approximately 1600. In this time, the deeply religious 
Renaissance (approx. 1450 to 1600) world was attacked and replaced by a mechanistic worldview of science (Leahey, 
1987). 
13 The period of the Renaissance includes the Protestant Reformation. The Reformation is the 16th century religious 
revolt that split the Christian Church in Western Europe into Protestants and Catholics. It occurred against a 
background of social unrest and effectively began when Martin Luther nailed his Theses to the door of Wittenberg 
Cathedral in 1517 challenging the Roman Catholic hierarchy seeking to de-emphasise ritual, the priesthood, and the 
authority of the Pope (Leahey, 1987).  
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Seidler argues that within the Enlightenment reason was claimed by men, and 
regarded as separate to the emotional world. Reason was defined by Descartes (1596-
1650) and then Kant (1724-1804) as setting humanity apart from and superior to nature 
(Seidler, 1994), or as Stern (1965/1985) phrases it, the subject must leave the stage of  
the world so that the world can be mathematically elucidated (p. 76). Cartesian dualism 
was a prerequisite for positivist science, separating the observing and the observed, 
bringing about the possibility for scientific objectivity. For Kant, morality was a matter 
of  internal reasoning, and as such, questioned the traditional relationships of  power and 
authority of  the Church. No longer did religious authority define right and wrong and 
how to live, individuals could now do this through their own capacity for reasoning. 
However, when power held by the Church (who were men) gave way to reason, men did 
not lose power, rather men appropriated reason as their own. It is upon the capacity to 
reason that the basis for men to position themselves as superior to the natural world of  
beasts has been formed; and as women and children have been defined as closer to 
nature, it is through men that they are able to anchor themselves in the new world of  
reason and science (Seidler, 1989, p. 14).  
According to Seidler, the Age of  Reason (Enlightenment) institutionalised a new 
relationship between reason, science, progress, power and masculinity, and frequently 
did so through violent means (such as the witch trials of  Europe and North America).14 
Using his insights into the world of  the military physicists Easlea (1987) connects 
science, masculinity and power in a profound way to nuclear arms. He points to the 
exclusion of  women from science as temperamentally unsuited to the aggressive, 
competitive nature of  scientific endeavour that locates greater masculine value on 
hard and objective science than the creative, intuitive and emotion-linked softer 
subjective sciences. Similarly, the pervasive notion of  the conquest and mastery over 
nature and the view of  nature as matter that has no inherent value other than what 
science gives it. Easlea uses language familiar to scientists to describe the scientific 
investigation of  nature in terms that deliberately invoke the image of  rape, asserting that 
hard science attacks, probes and penetrates to reveal her secrets in an 
endeavour resulting in the military paternity of  weaponry. 
                                                 
14 See for instance, Midlefort (1981) for brief explanation of this period in history. 
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It is through reason that men often make a claim to rightness and frequently do so 
through the instrumental use of  language (Seidler, 1989) on the basis that it is only 
through reason that claims to truth can be made. Agreeing with Seidler, Pinar (1997) 
asserts that reason is political and gendered. Reason is the regime in which and through 
which, our voices are raised, the medium we are coded as intelligible or not (p. 93). It 
can then be argued that equality can be granted to others if  mens claims are considered 
rational (Seidler, 1989). Based on rational terms, issues of  justice, equity and fair play are 
able to be problematised, and as problems these issues are shifted to a rational 
worldview able to be solved through reasoning. Through an Enlightenment inheritance 
men assume that experience can be constructed according to how it is thought things 
ought to be. It then becomes difficult to acknowledge emotions and feelings that go 
against these images (Seidler, 1994). In a rationalist worldview, the intention of  an act 
becomes crucially important for men. For instance, it is the intention of  an act to which 
men turn when evaluating if  what is happening in their relationships is right or wrong, 
rather than anything to do with the personal feelings or the subjective experience of  
partners (or even mens own feelings for that matter) (Seidler, 1994). Shifting the issue to 
a worldview of  reason denies the legitimacy of  the other persons experience (and mens 
own experience). This in turn frequently provokes a response of  hurt and confusion; 
which are emotional experiences men then seek to further distance and devalue. 
In dealing with problems of  justice, equity, and fair play, anxiety arising out of  
ambivalence is not easily dwelt upon as there is an imperative to decide what is right and 
then act. The anxiety arising out of  ambivalence or indecision is relieved by reaching a 
decision through the autonomous reasoning of  the mind that exists as separate but 
within the corporeal self. This can lead men to reject, discount, or minimise the points 
of  view of  others as unreasonable, emotional, or irrational. Emotional life, being of  the 
natural realm, is to be distrusted as it can lead men away from reason. Being closer to 
nature, emotions and feelings are seen as signs of  weakness, as these things of  nature 
are meant to be under control; we fear that if  we allow our softer feelings to surface, 
we shall never be able to regain control of  ourselves (Seidler, 1989, p. 161). This makes 
it difficult for men to take note of  emotional needs of  themselves and others. 
Emotions, being part of  the natural world, are distanced and devalued; feelings are 
distanced, devalued and subordinated through mens instrumental use of  language and 
the pre-eminence of  reason.  
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The distancing of  emotion and privileging of  reason presumes a Cartesian dualism of  
mind and body in which the body belongs to the natural world. Belonging to the natural 
world, the body is devoid of  meaning and value other than what human thinking assigns 
it. That is, we attribute meaning to or discover the meaning of  the body. It is only in the 
tasks the body can be caused to accomplish that the body has meaning. From this 
mechanistic position, the body, like the natural world, can be used as we see fit. It is 
there to be controlled, as that is the process through which the body (and the natural 
world) becomes valued. It is mens relationship to their bodies, as if  separated in the first 
instance, that is so important to masculine gender practice and consequent health 
outcomes.  
Duroche (1990) argues that the Enlightenment marks a time in history where bodily 
experience, and the bodys perception, changed to serve or support other social changes. 
How the body is perceived and how the body perceives the world through bodily senses, 
is not fixed but a product of  history. For instance, he argues that prior to the 19th 
century there was an emphasis on strong and close, often deeply intimate, male 
friendships replaced later by a muting of  the emotions, a transforming and often 
dulling of  male perceptual awareness, and an increasing homophobia (1990, p. 172). 
The expressiveness of  Romanticism began to be increasingly associated with the 
feminine as part of  a redefinition of  masculinity. In this sense there was an intellectual 
move by men to negate or transcend the body; to get out of  the body [and] into the 
head (1990, p. 174).  
A transcending of  the body also involved a privileging of  some senses over others 
(Duroche, 1990). The sense of  sight became ranked highest and was associated with 
assertion, while smelling, hearing, and tasting came to be considered as passive and 
receptive. Sight also came to be considered as a masculine sense through its 
association with distance, cognition and abstraction, whereas the ability to distinguish 
flavours and fragrances were considered to be feminine. The social meaning of  bodily 
perception shifted, congruent with the turn toward science. 
Discussing the hearing of  sound, Duroche also draws on the work of  Attali to argue 
that whilst men hear subtle differences in the mechanical noises of  car engines, which 
our wives rarely hear, the noises that children and other people make are blocked out 
whilst they read the newspaper (cited in Duroche, 1990, p. 176). It is an argument that 
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suggests that men have been socially trained, or disciplined to attend to certain sounds, 
so that some sounds are not heard or are dismissed as noise. Similarly, he argues that 
beliefs about smell have also changed. While the pathogenic nature of  smell had been 
disproved, there began an association between the crowd and a putrid smell, and a 
connection with lack of  (male) public space that encroached on an increasing awareness 
of  himself  as an individual. Duroche traces an historical path that first deodorised 
public space and then later, private and domestic spaces. Not only has the mind been 
separated from the body through the scientific turn of  the Enlightenment, but gradually 
the bodys senses have become socially constructed to support a decorporealised sense 
of  a masculine self.  
Seidler (1989) argues that as the Enlightenment has cast the body as a natural object and 
therefore to be controlled by the mind, the prerequisites were set for deep divisions 
between men and their bodies. The body, being the corporeal thing that men exist 
within, has emerged as the most immediate natural object to be dominated and 
controlled; that is, self-control. In a very immediate and omnipresent sense, self-control 
enables men to be positioned as superior to nature. Uncontrolled emotional experience 
has become equated to a descent into the natural realm and a loss of  control; a phrase 
frequently heard as a rationale for violence after the fact. Indeed, Seidler argues that it is 
frequently the fear of  losing control that accounts for the instrumental nature of  mens 
actions as well as the power of  theories which marginalize emotional life (p. 44). The 
imperative to be in-control has shaped the nature of  mens relationships with women 
and children. Through instrumental use of  language, emotional distance, women and 
children can be positioned at a distance, as objects closer nature, to be controlled and 
subordinated. Similarly, Phillips (1986) saw evidence of  this in a large-scale study of  
mens relationships. As a result of  his observations he comments that wives were rarely 
regarded as friends, and that most interview responses about women generally were 
gratuitously hostile (p. 331). Women were positioned by men as natural objects; for 
instances, as a prize in competition with other men, or as possessions to be displayed. In 
part, he concluded that: 
Most marr ied men have l i t t le  phys ical or  psychological contact  
wi th their  wives. They ta lked of  their  wives largely  as  
possess ions proc la iming their  v ir tues as cooks, inter ior  
des igners , or  ch i ld development spec ia l is ts  Most  
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respondents  repor ted they had l i t t le recreat ional  or  soc ia l  
contact  with their  fami l ies . (p. 331) 
While an enlightenment inheritance has equated emotion to nature and set it in 
opposition to rationality, Hearn (1987) has pointed out that this has not mean that 
emotion goes unrecognised. He states that men are actively involved in the selective 
control of  the emotions of  themselves and others (p. 139). For instance, men in well-
established male-dominated professions deal specifically with emotions as a career 
choice (e.g. psychiatry, psychology, mental health nursing, etc.). Hearns argument, 
however is that control characteristises these professional relationships. That is, being 
professional means being in control. Being emotional can undermine claims to 
rationality and consequently calls masculinity into question. Emotions are talked about 
rather than expressed. An important distinction arises therefore between mens emotions 
and mens emotional needs. To assert that control is a central issue in mens emotional 
lives, men necessarily have to deal with emotions. As the traditional masculine role is in 
part, defined as self-reliance and a rejection of  vulnerability, a lack of  independence and 
control becomes associated with femininity. To acknowledge a need for approval, love, 
nurturance, and unconditional acceptance, then could risk a claim to masculine identity. 
Stern (1965/1985) casts this in terms of  love and power as a moral antithesis. That is, to 
love is to relinquish power over another. 
Mens relationship with men, while frequently held up as the important and treasured 
mateship, is perhaps, paradoxically, the greatest potential threat to a claim to masculinity 
through risking an association with homosexuality (Kimmel, 1994; Plummer, 1999). As 
Kimmel (1994) put it, the great secret of  American manhood is that We are afraid of  
other men (p. 277. Original emphasis). As something that pervades all of  mens thinking 
and doing, fear and denial of  the emotional world inevitably shapes all relationships to 
such a degree that homophobia is the foundation on which masculinity itself  is 
constructed (Kimmel, 1994; Plummer, 1999; Stoltenberg, 1992). 
Hegemonic masculinity 
Drawing on Gramscis concept of  hegemony, Connell has introduced the term 
hegemonic masculinity (1995) to describe the notion of  masculinity that is socially 
exalted and to which other forms of  masculinity are subordinated. According to 
Connell, hegemonic masculinity is:  
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The conf igurat ion of  gender pract ice which embodies the 
current ly  accepted answer  to the problem of the legit imacy of  
patr iarchy, which guarantees (or,  is  taken to guarantee) the 
dominant pos i t ion of men and the subordinat ion of  women.  
(1995,  p. 77) 
That is, hegemony is about the winning and holding of  power and the formation (and 
destruction) of  social groups in that process (Donaldson, 1993, p. 645). Hegemony 
involves imposing the definition of  terms and understandings, ideals, moralities, and 
issues that are deemed to be legitimately debated (Donaldson, 1993). The establishment 
and maintenance of  hegemony then, requires mobilisation of  ideological resources in 
order for people to accept that the current hegemony is natural, ordinary, 
common sense, and normal. A vast and diverse number of  institutions and social 
sites are involved in this endeavour (Beynon, 2001); for example, work (Collinson & 
Hearn, 2001; Kerfoot, 2001), family (Morgan, 1994), advertising (Hill, 1999; Lövdahl, 
Riska, & Riska, 1999), organised sport (Bryson, 1987; Fougere, 1987), friendships 
(Messner, 2001; Seidler, 1992), psychiatry (Busfield, 1982; Chesler, 1972), film (Donald, 
2001; Nicholls, 1999), the Family Court (Ellard, 1999), prison (Toch, 1998), and schools 
(French, 1999; Mac an Ghaill, 1994; Mills, 2001). Hegemony is therefore a complex 
process whereby one social group (in this case, men) maintain[s] consent for its rule 
through both domination and intellectual and moral leadership, which is taken for 
granted because it defines social understandings (Phoenix & Frosh, 2001). 
The importance of  Connells use of  the concept of  hegemony is that it makes visible 
the processes by which male domination is effected by all men without all men explicitly 
subscribing to it. He argues that this is more often a collective project to which 
individual men rarely need to overtly defend in any self-conscious way (Connell, 1995). 
Silence then becomes sufficient to support the status quo (Kimmel, 1994; Rutherford, 
1992). Hegemony is therefore, not necessarily established by force, although at its most 
brutal it is predicated on raw coercion (Beynon, 2001, p 16) but is rather, a strategy that 
can be seen in large cultural movements and social networks as a collective practice 
(Connell, 1990, 1991) and is visible in the associated practices, relationships and 
supporting projects (Campbell, Law, & Honeyfield, 1999, p. 169). While this does not 
require individual men to accept and embody hegemonic masculinity, all men obtain a 
benefit from the patriarchal dividend (Connell, 1996, p. 162). Hegemonic masculinity 
is therefore not a type but is the most honored or desired in a particular context 
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(Connell, 1995, p. 77). In this sense it is fluid, historically mobile, multiple, and 
contestable. Hence, Connell argues that hegemonic masculinity is only ever the currently 
accepted strategy for (heterosexual) male power (Connell, 1995). 
Hegemonic masculinity exists in relationship to other forms of  masculinity and in 
relationship to women. These relationships, being about power, are ones of  domination 
and subordination (and therefore also become visible as sites of  resistance). While 
gender is the way in which social practice is organised, it is not a singular structure. 
Connell (1987, 1995) proposes a three-fold model of  gender relations: (a) power 
relations, (b) production relations (division of  labour), (c) cathexis (emotional relations); 
to which he later adds a fourth (d) symbolism (Connell, 2000).  Although he describes 
this as a structure of  relations he cautions against perceiving this as an orderly system 
that operates in such as way as to make a unitary whole. Instead, using an orchestral 
metaphor, he suggests it is an historical composition of  many composers with a less 
than perfect meshing of  the four elements (Connell, 1987).  
Power relations 
The major axis of  power in the Western gender order is the subordination of  women by 
men (Connell, 1995). Feminist scholars have named this as patriarchy (e.g. Walby, 1989).  
Connell conceptualises power as a reality of  peoples lives embedded in practice, and as 
a consequence, is something that is struggled with, and through this struggle it is 
experienced as a material reality that impacts on or constrains bodies as a body-
reflexive practice. The material effects of  power are not experienced in the same way by 
all men:  
I f  author i ty  is  def ined as legi t imate power , then we can say 
the main ax is  of the power s tructure of  gender is  the general  
connect ion of  author i ty  with mascul in i ty .  But  th is is  
immediate ly  compl icated, and par t ly  contradicted,  by a second 
ax is:  the denia l  of  author i ty  to  some groups of  men,  or  more 
general ly  the construc t ion of  hierarchies  of author i ty  and 
central i ty  with in the major  gender  categor ies . (Connel l ,  1987,  
p.  109) 
Here, Connell points to a complex, multi-layered system that while granting power to 
men generally also imposes a hierarchy of  power between different groups of  men. 
While exemplars of  manhood hold out images of  power and control, the relations of  
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power between groups of  men also mean that men also experience a contradiction of  
powerlessness in their lives (Kaufman, 1994). Connells (1990) case study of  a champion 
Australian iron man15 shows that even those who are held out as exemplars of  
hegemonic masculinity experience powerlessness; in the case of  the iron man champion, 
this took the form of  constraints on his behaviour and the limits placed on his 
aspirations and lifestyle from the image required by his sponsors. By definition, heroes 
and exemplars that meet the exalted qualities of  hegemonic masculinity are likely to be 
very small in number and even then, as Connells iron man shows it is more likely to be 
only a partial achievement. Kimmel (1994) agrees, drawing on David and Brannons 
(1976) well-known description of  the male sex role, suggesting that the rules of  
manhood are constructed so that: 
Only the t inies t f rac t ion of  men come to bel ieve they are the 
b iggest  of wheels,  the sturd ies t of oaks, the most v iru lent 
repudiators of  feminin i ty ,  the most dar ing and 
aggress ive.(p.  138) 
Production relations 
Production relations refer to the gendered division of  labour in the home, industry, and 
the accumulation of  wealth that overwhelmingly favours men over women (Connell, 
1995). Connell argues that the connection between capitalism and patriarchy is 
constituted out of  the opportunities for power and profit created by gender relations 
(1987, p. 104). From this perspective, instead of  examining the sex division of  labour, 
an examination of  production relations seek to show the re-production of  masculinity 
and femininity in economic activity (including the family). For instance, that the 
language of  business management is replete with masculine terminology reflects the 
particular interpersonal style that is expected, which in turn, reconstitutes the domain of  
a particular masculinity within the organisation of  production.  
In another area of  industry of  particular interest to this study, that of  nursing, the same 
deep-seated gendered nature of  production may also be seen. Again, Connells 
argument draws attention to the femininities and masculinities involved in the 
organisation of  the industry rather than whether or not women or men perform 
nursing work. That the profession of  nursing has a deep-seated gender structure can 
be seen, for example, in the way in which nursing is positioned against medicine through 
                                                 
15 A specialty of surf sports. 
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a variety of  mechanisms; for example, the laws and institutional hierarchies providing 
for medical authority over what nurses can or cannot do, the generally lower levels of  
salary, a media depiction of  women in daytime medical soaps as professionally and 
sexually subservient to male medical practitioners, and the strong association of  
homosexual masculinities with male nurses.  
Relations of cathexis 
Cathexis, or desire, is a term that draws upon the Freudian meaning of  emotional 
energy attached to an object (Connell, 1983). Connell argues that those practices 
surrounding desire are an aspect of  the gender order. From Connells position, all social 
relationships have an emotional and possibly erotic dimension, and to the degree that 
ones relationships are organised on this basis constitutes the structure of  cathexis 
(1987, p. 112). He points to the laws and taboos attached to age of  consent, incest, and 
homosexuality, as examples of  some of  the most obvious social organisation on the 
basis of  relations of  cathexis that occurs through the prohibition and sanctioning of  
certain activity. An Enlightenment (and Seidler would argue, also Protestant) history has 
positioned mens sexuality as a temptation back to nature and hence, a threat to reason 
(Seidler, 1987). Associated with immorality and sin, sexuality has become a great source 
of  unease for men.  
In a study of  mens submissions to the Australian Family Court, Ellard (1999) has 
argued that for men, an ability to demonstrate a material connection to the family is a 
public confirmation of  sexual identity, power, and possession of  property. An inability 
to publicly show this connection is likely to be experienced as emasculating. As Kimmel 
(1994) has argued, it is from other men that men fear the humiliation of  being perceived 
as not-masculine. Additionally, Foucaults (1975/1979) notions of  discipline and 
surveillance suggests that this evaluation becomes internalised as if they stand before 
the gaze of  other men; and in this sense, men become disciplined as men.  
Relations of symbolism 
Gender symbolism, particularly that portrayed in the mass media, reflects and reinforces 
depictions of  women and men. Such gender symbolism is pervasive and global. Media 
portrayal depicts masculinities and femininities as dichotomous rather than analogous. 
Advertising takes advantage of  the current dominant beliefs of  men and women to 
promote their products. Images of  men and women are represented in a diverse media, 
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such as literature (Sear, 1999), beer advertisements (Campbell et al., 1999; Hill, 1999),  
pharmaceutical advertising (Lövdahl & Riska, 2000), cinema (Nicholls, 1999), style of  
clothing (Comaroff, 1997), linguistic practice (Holmes, 2000), heroic achievement 
(Morin, Longhurst, & Johnston, 2001), and political resistance (Peteet, 2002).  
Connell theorises masculinities as organised in a hierarchy in which all men gain from 
male power, using the term patriarchal dividend to describe the benefit it obtains. 
However, as a hierarchy concerned about power, it is likely that all men will experience 
varying degrees of  privilege and powerlessness whilst all men gain from patriarchy 
(Kaufman, 1994). While the principle axis of  power revolves around the relationship 
between men and women Connell (1995) also theorises relations of  dominance and 
subordination between groups of  men.  
Subordinated masculinities 
For Connell, the use of  the term hegemony relates to the subordination of  all of  society 
to the currently dominant cultural group. Multiple masculinities means that there is a 
structure of  subordination and domination amongst different groups of  men. One of  
the most important relationships of  domination and subordination between groups of  
men is that of  the subordination of  gay men to heterosexual men (Connell, 1995; 
Donaldson, 1993; Herek, 1987; Kimmel, 1994; Plummer, 1999; Stoltenberg, 1992). 
Connell makes the point that homosexual masculinities are positioned at the bottom of  
the gender hierarchy among men, stating that gayness, in patriarchal ideology, is the 
repository of  whatever is symbolically expelled from hegemonic masculinity (1995, p. 
78). From the viewpoint of  hegemonic masculinity, gayness becomes associated with 
femininity and threatens the current order.  
The power relationship involved in subordination is brought into stark relief  by 
researchers such as Town (1998, 1999) and Plummer (1999) whose studies explicitly 
describe participant accounts of  physical assault and terror as defining aspects of  
growing into adulthood as gay. Suicide becomes a real consideration in order to escape 
the psychological pain (Town, 1998, 1999). In these studies, relations of  cathexis and 
power are explicit organising structures of  the gender order amongst schoolboys. On 
the basis that gayness is associated with femininity, persecution of  boys exhibiting 
feminine characteristics or behaviour (or not engaging in masculine activity such as 
rugby) is a strategy that confirms masculinity as not-femininity. Additionally, these 
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studies show the power of  a discourse of  silence in which sexuality (especially 
homosexuality) is rarely discussed in the school curriculum; heterosexuality is just a 
basic rule that you learn, youre brought up with, you dont even consciously think about 
it (A participant quoted in Town, 1999, p. 144); that is, (hetero)sexuality is learnt in the 
silence of  a taken-for-granted. 
Complicit masculinities 
Connells concept of  complicit masculinities is that masculinities are constructed in such 
a way that men support the hegemonic project without necessarily meeting the 
hegemonic ideal themselves, or even having to take conscious steps to promote 
patriarchy. For instance, a man does not need to be an All Black,16 he can support the 
dominance of  rugby masculinities by participating as a spectator. Complicity however, 
can also mean doing nothing. By not taking steps to change the status quo, silence and 
inaction become supportive of  hegemony. In this way men who do not meet the 
masculine ideal participate in its maintenance and obtain the patriarchal dividend that 
accrues to all men.  
Marginalized masculinities 
Marginalized masculinities are formed through the interplay of  gender relations with 
other social structures such as race and class. Race and class interact with gender 
relations to limit access to the hegemonic ideal for many groups of  men. For instance, 
Messners (1991) study of  athletic careers shows that Black men were acutely aware of  
their oppression. While in their struggle to construct a masculine identity in such a 
context they were able to establish respect through physical presence, personal style 
and expressiveness (1991, p. 70), this did not bring about any change in social equity at 
large. Marginalization is relative to what Connell (1995) calls the authorisation of  the 
dominant group. 
Connells concept of  hegemonic masculinity and its relationship to subordinated, 
complicit and marginalized masculinities is not a deterministic one, nor are these names 
for fixed character types, but what he calls configurations of  practice. Rather than 
viewing subordinated, complicit and marginalized masculinities as types of  masculinity 
that, but for a certain number of  character traits would achieve hegemonic status, these 
                                                 
16 The All Blacks are the New Zealand national rugby union team, known as such by their black uniform. 
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have a role to play in the maintenance of  the hegemonic ideal. In this sense masculinities, 
as configurations of  practice, are always in dynamic relationship within other social 
structures of  inequality.  
While Connell has a substantial focus on social structures, at the personal level he also 
theorises masculinity as a lifelong gender project that is both an individual and collective 
endeavour.  That is, through body-reflexive practices, more than individual lives are 
formed: a social world is formed (Connell, 1996, p. 159). That is, men do masculinity, 
and this doing is always socially situated (West & Zimmerman, 1991). While 
acknowledging individual agency this suggests that the potential for free will is 
constrained within already existing social and cultural traditions and institutions. As a 
hierarchy, the masculine gender order makes it clear that it is men who oppress other 
men and hence, limit individual agency. Body-reflexive practices respond to situations in 
which certain ways of  being and doing, and not others, are legitimated (Connell, 1995). 
Likewise, body-reflexive practices are not purposeless. Something is being achieved in 
the doing. Through this process a situation that previously existed is changed into 
another. In this sense, the interaction of  body, the social and configurations of  practice 
create a world (or ontology) that not only refers to the body but also has effect on the 
body (Connell, 1995). It is through body-reflexive practice that health effects can be 
considered as gendered. 
Sports masculinities 
Sport is a powerful institution through which male hegemony is constructed and 
reconstructed (Bryson, 1987, p. 349). Sport is a key issue for this study because of  its 
health consequences for participants. Similarly, the importance of  sport to the 
construction of  masculinities is demonstrated in the adverse consequences for those 
boys who do not conform (Grieve, cited in Fitzclarence & Hickey, 2001, p. 121). By 
examining sport through a gender lens, particularly organised sport, one important 
instance of  the impact of  masculinity upon health becomes visible.  
Sport has a particular potency for the construction of  gender because of  the pervasive 
media depiction of  sports imagery to which almost all of  society is exposed. Some 
organised sport, more than others, has assumed national importance. Fougere (1987) 
argues that for New Zealand, the sport of  rugby in part facilitated, the emergence of  
the New Zealand nation itself  (p. 113). As symbolism of  a nation, rugby presented 
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particular images of  New Zealand men that, although the imagery has shifted with 
social change, symbolically linked men with nationhood (Phillips, 1996). In contrast to 
mens participation in organised sport, womens participation in sport is often trivialised, 
ignored, and frequently controlled by men (Bryson, 1987). Fougere (1987) states that 
while rugby has always been a game for men and boys, womens rugby teams remain 
a sports-page joke (p. 113). 
In contrast to essentialist and determinist notions of  masculinity the considerable time, 
effort and energy devoted to teaching boys to become men through sport, and the 
struggle that boys encounter in finding success at sport, belies any notion of  
masculine biological destiny (Whitson, 1990). Mens sport constructs relationships to 
other men in ways that are deemed manly. While sport makes boys into men, it does 
so by providing an organised potent (and public) experience for the construction of  a 
particular relationship between mens (and boys) bodies and bodily experience. Sport 
teaches an intentional use of  mens bodies in which violence, pain and injury are 
valorised in this process.  
Crossett (1990) sees modern sport arising out of  a backlash to 19th gains by women. As 
a social institution, modern sport reaffirmed the naturalisation of  mens privileged 
position over women through inherent connections between sport, morality, and 
manliness (p. 45). Through sport, mens relationship to their bodies is constructed in 
such a way that the ideological notion of  superiority over women through strength, skill 
and assertion of  force is supported. Moreover, as the sporting arena is a public domain, 
these attributes are on display for men, women and children to participate. Participation 
involves more than those playing on the field, rugby may involve spectatorship, but 
more importantly, it demands participation (Fougere, 1987, p. 113). Bryson (1987) 
demonstrates the potency of  sport as a spectacle using a vivid media portrayal of  the 
father-son relationship from an advertising campaign run during the 1983 Sydney rugby 
season. The cameras focus was upon an excited (i.e. emotional) father in close contact 
with his young son in the middle of  the crowd. The music consisted of  stirring (strong) 
lyrics (sung by Tina Turner) accompanied by an orchestra, choir, with imagery that cut 
back and forth from roughhouse football to the father and son: 
Feel  the roar of  the crowd, 
This is  men against  men, doing i t  proud, 
Show him the courage, show him the sk i l l ,  
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What i t  means to be part  of  a team, someday he wi l l ,  
 
(Ci ted in ,  Bryson,  1987,  p. 358) 
Sport has been increasingly seen as an essential aspect of  a male childs development of  
manly attributes such as courage, nerve, pluck, and endurance (Adelman cited in 
Crosset, 1990, p. 52). In contrast, without sport, intellectual boys have been thought of  
as weak, not having their passions under control, having perverse sexual thoughts, and 
were believed to masturbate (considered in this context to be negative) (Beynon, 2001; 
Crosset, 1990): 
Without sport ,  then,  boys became womanl ike,  del icate,  and 
degenerate. Without spor t ,  men could lose control  over  their  
own sexual  des ires,  become suscept ib le to sexual excesses, 
and eventual ly  suffer  f rom sexual exhaust ion. (Crosset,  1990, 
p.  53) 
The cure for these deficits was physical exercise, or trips to the country to experience 
a more hardy life. The notion that a boys mind could be kept pure and free from 
temptation through the pursuit of  manly pastimes such as sport (Town, 1999, p. 139) 
remains prevalent.  
Violence and injury serve to construct masculinity, affirming conceptions of  sports 
masculinities (White et al., 1995). Schacht (1996) has argued that rugby situates men in a 
hierarchy of  athleticism, strength, tolerance of  pain, and distance from femininity. 
Similarly, Phoenix and Frosh (2001) have found that boys claims to the hegemonic or 
masculine ideal was frequently through sporting prowess. Even where competitive sport 
is unavailable boys formulate other strategies that embody athleticism and physicality 
through ritualised verbal abuse known as cussing (Swain, 2002). In their study of  
Australian Rules football, Fitzclarence and Hicky (2001) draw a link between masculinity 
and violence within mass media depicting the hardness of  the game and valorisation 
of  damage, abuse, and intimidation (p. 129).  
Such an investment in claims to a hegemonic masculine identity through sport means 
that being removed from sport through injury leaves little room to reclaim a masculine 
sense of  self  and construct different relationship to their body that is seen as masculine 
(Sparkes & Smith, 2002). Sport provides an arena in which emotion and competitiveness 
are linked to violence and masculinity. Hutchins & Mikosza describe rugby league as a 
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cultural exemplar of  hegemonic masculinity (1998, p. 250) for this very reason. Their 
study of  rugby commentary in Australian sports magazine shows the active involvement 
of  the media in this process citing headlines such as: Rugby League: 80 Minute Hate, 
Jump On His Head, Big Jimmy, Kill! Kill! Kill!, Slaughter! and King hit! (Cited in 
Hutchins & Mikosza, 1998, p. 252).  
Phillips (1996) also notes the culture of  violence linked to rugby masculinities in New 
Zealand: 
The v iolent  insens it iv i ty  to pain and injury , the incredib le 
crudeness of  language, the misogyny,  the drunken 
boor ishness. (p.  271) 
While the headlines cited by Hutchins & Mikosza depict a perpetration of  explicit 
violence, not only is the ability to hand it out (it being an objectification of  physical 
assault) as a required aspect of  the male athlete, but also the ability to take it (like a 
man). The question of  how to take it is about the manner of  accepting injury and 
pain as a man. It is to do with violence, and like the perpetration of  violence, it is 
similarly full of  manly meaning. Through organised sport the concern with force and 
skill becomes a statement embedded in the body (Connell, 1987, p. 85). Acknowledging 
pain is indicative of  being something that one is supposed to always guard against  
being vulnerable, potentially weak, and feminine (Schacht, 1996, p. 560). If  David and 
Brannons (1976) description of  the male role of  no sissy stuff , success, strength, and 
aggression is a guide to the desired form of  masculinity, then disabling injury can be 
experienced as emasculating. 
In their study of  Canadian athletes, White et al. (1995) have shown that pain was 
normalised, hidden, disrespected, concealed, and depersonalised. Showing pain or injury, 
in so far that it compromises physical power, also compromises the masculine 
conception of  self. Disabling injury compromises the public ability to display power and 
control. The athletes interviewed in the study associated incapacitation with weakness, 
passivity, incompetence, impotence, and vulnerability. By becoming incapacitated 
through injury or pain, the athlete is marked as deviant, unable to take it like a man. 
Incapacity becomes associated to femininity through vulnerability and weakness. In this 
respect, injury is gendered. Crosset links the gendered nature of  injury to longer term 
health issues, arguing that: 
  69
Such pressures are power fu l ly  ins id ious however , because the 
fear of hav ing one s mascul in i ty  quest ioned [by other men] can 
threaten the long- term heal th of  an ath lete who might  stop 
l is tening to pain s ignals from his body and return to the team. 
(1990,  p. 177) 
Just as manliness is enhanced by (violently) defeating the opponent, little is diminished 
in losing if  it is assumed all competitors are manly men (Crosset, 1990). The battlefield 
metaphor, so often used to describe combative sport, historically links male violence to 
the restoration of  honour through the duel (Spierenburg, 1998) and echoes Easleas 
(1987) comments on militarised science. Sport is a highly ritualised means of  learning 
courage, heroism, and violent combat that could be stopped at the blow of  a whistle 
(Phillips, 1980, p. 231). In this regard, the exclusion of  women as credible athletes is 
critical to the masculinist project of  rugby and other combative sports (e.g. boxing). 
That is, to defeat women at rugby would undermine the construction of  masculinity as 
not-feminine through sport. 
Attempts by women to enter the arena of  combative sport have provoked severe public 
backlash to protect male exclusivity as proper. A recent example has been efforts by 
women to enter as boxers in Oceania boxing championships. Australian boxing 
administrator Arthur Tunstall opposed the idea on the grounds that a woman is a 
petite person, not to be knocked around (McMorran, 1998, p. 45). In a more 
sophisticated assertion of  mens exclusive claim to combative and violent sport, 
journalist Bob South (1996) constructed a parody of  the woman boxer:  
[Fathers ] can buy those wee box ing g loves for  their  l i t t le 
dar l ings,  then get  down on their  knees and trade b lows in the 
fa int  hope that  their  sweet ie might grow up to be some rough, 
tough pugi l is t  named Terminator  T ina, Sugar Rose, or  Hi t  
Woman Harr ie t .  Maybe Pumpkins wi l l  even become the 
Baddest   Woman on the Planet .  Wow. (p. 9)  
That a combative team sports such as rugby league is a masculine exemplar shows 
that public demonstration of  physical strength and skill, such as that required for ballet, 
is not sufficient to affirm masculinity. It is the male exclusivity, utilisation of  violence, 
and men in competition with men, that is exalted above all else; or as James and Saville-
Smith have put it, it is the group dependency, the risk, the violence, and the virility 
(1994, p. 52).   
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Rugby holds its high status in countries such as Australia and New Zealand as the 
epitome of  hegemonic masculinity because it captures the disparate elements of  
hegemonic masculinity in a highly public way. Success on the sports field is echoed in 
other arenas of  male dominance, such as the company boardroom: 
Toughness in  mak ing d if f icu lt  dec is ions replaced phys ical  
toughness;  a ruth less wi l l  to win around the board table 
replaced mateship;  power  and money replaced good 
b lokemanship as  the key at tr ibutes  of the go-gett ing cel lphone 
man. (Phi l l ips,  1996,  p. 276) 
Sport, as well as other social sites (e.g. pubs, clubs, military, etc), are an arena where men 
learn to relate to men and also exclude, objectify, and demean women (Whitson, 1990). 
Through sport, male superiority is naturalised and connected to the physiology of  the 
male body so that taken-for-granted assumptions of  men as bigger, stronger, faster, 
become part of  the public structure of  womens oppression by men. Our focus is rarely 
drawn to the many women who are stronger, bigger, and faster than many men; or that 
few other men could measure up to most professional sportsmen. Echoing Freuds 
theory of  psychosexual development, to do so may deeply disturb the foundation of  the 
male psyche grounded in mens separation from women (Kidd, 1987, p. 257).  
As sport is a crucial site (in all likelihood because it is one of  the few sites men can be 
overtly emotional without provoking homophobia) for linking masculinity with 
particular positively sanctioned skills, behaviour and ways of  being men, sport becomes a 
potent location for naturalising the male assertion of  violence, aggression, force, 
competitiveness, and the passivity of  women (Bryson, 1987); and as a powerful symbolic 
form propagated by mass media, this connection extends well beyond the action on the 
field. By virtue of  its extensions into wider public life through the mass media, courts, 
pubs and club life, it is also a potent force in the naturalisation of  what it is that is 
bounded by the term masculine. The sports field puts on public display a potent 
image of  masculinity to which other men, women and children engage with as 
spectators (Connell, 1990; Drummond, 2002; Messner, 1991). Importantly, it is also a 
social site where violence is controlled (and sanctioned) through sophisticated 
mechanisms (referee, media, courts, spectator approval, etc.), so as not to be a threat to 
the established social order. 
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At first, organised (combative) sport appears to contradict the general assertion of  
Seidler (1989, 1997) that masculinity rejects emotion and dependency or any appearance 
of  emotion and dependency. The team however, is an acceptable experience of  
dependency on each other and there are strict rituals around such behaviour. It is a site 
where young men are initiated into a sharing, or solidarity, of  manliness, where 
particular behaviours and the language of  manliness are absorbed within an emotionally 
charged setting that is publicly exalted. High levels of  emotion and dependency are not 
usually permitted for the hegemonic masculine character, yet these can be experienced 
and expressed within this particular and tightly constrained domain of  male 
homosociality.  
Toward understanding men and suicidal experience 
Freud describes masculinity as a conflict-ridden process in which a boys father is 
depicted as somewhat terrifying and dominating figure. As other men enter and 
continue to feature in mens lives, violence becomes ever-present and immanent in its 
various symbolic or physical forms. Violence then becomes a defining feature of  
masculinity. The critical theorising of  Connell, Seidler and others, depicts masculinity as 
the physical embodiment of  the rational mind controlling the body to forcefully occupy 
social space. In doing so, the Enlightenment project of  rationality and mind-body split 
is brought into the present with consequences for mens health and well-being. This 
suggests that the material effects of  masculinity must also be mental ones in which 
violence also features; both real and symbolic.  
Social relationships for men, and even relationships to self, are constructed around a 
hierarchy of  domination through patriarchy and relationships between different groups 
of  men. The internal structure of  masculinities has material effects at the level of  the 
individual man. Mens individual experience of  this is a fractured and conflicted one; on 
one hand obtaining the patriarchal dividend, and on the other, an experience of  
subordination. Boys and men thrown into this pre-existing gender structure and Freuds 
work suggests that from their earliest moments they are always doing and working at a 
personal project of  masculinity, in both their relationship to their body and in 
relationship to others. Hence, if  men are always engaged in the doing and working out 
of  gender, including in health and ill-health, then the way in which men are socially 
engaged in the doing and working out as men is central to a complete understanding of  
mens suicidal experience.   
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C h a p t e r  5  
METHODOLOGY 
The research approach proposed in this study is one that has a focus on understanding 
an other; where that other may be a person or a text. Understanding others is of  central 
concern to the practice of  mental health nursing. The term understanding can have 
several meanings. Understanding another persons distress might mean to define and 
label the issue as an objective fact irrespective of  that persons experience of  it. 
However, in this sense of  the term understanding, we would not be understanding the 
person as a person but as an object. The power to define the meaning of  the experience 
is located with the expert rather than the person experiencing the distress. In contrast, 
the position taken in this study on mental health nursing has been that mental health 
nursing is about a human encounter with the person. From this position, understanding 
is about grasping the meaning of  the experience for the other person. Wilkin (2003) 
states this as primarily being and becoming with people who are suffering (either 
directly or indirectly as carers) the effects of  mental dis-ease or distress (p. 26). As he 
goes on to elaborate, Wilkin argues that this involves the mental health nurse taking up 
the position of  learner, and being taught by the other person. This requires an active 
participation rather than distant uninvolved observation. It is a process, a conscious and 
deliberate activity, rather than passive receipt of  data.  
The issue of  understanding is of  central concern to the work of  Hans Georg Gadamer 
in his major work Truth and Method. He does not set out to elaborate a system of  rules 
by which correct understanding is established, but rather, to investigate what happens 
to us over and above our wanting and doing instead of  what we do or ought to do 
(Gadamer, 1965/1975, p. xvi). Grondin (2002) suggests that for Gadamer, 
understanding has three connotations: 1) understanding as an intellectual grasp, 2) 
understanding as practical knowledge, and 3) understanding as agreement. As an 
intellectual grasp Gadamer is following on from Wilhelm Dilthey in that understanding 
is a comprehension or insight; that is, to make something intelligible. As practical know-
how rather than a possession of  facts or knowledge in which activity is a calculation, a 
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person is able to exercise a practical skill; for example, as a musician in knowing how 
to play music. Practical knowledge is more about know-how rather than theory and 
hence, involves some degree of  self-understanding. To understand is also to agree or to 
concur. Such a meaning therefore involves partnership around the subject-matter. For 
Gadamer, agreement is dialogical and occurs through the medium of  language. This 
does not mean that all dialogue reaches understanding. As Grondin points out, of  
course, understanding often fails (2002, p. 42). The notion of  agreement is not 
intended as a perfect consensus, but instead is meant to emphasise that each participant 
be taken seriously in what is said. 
Gadamers rejects the conception of  knowing as an act of  merely sensory perception 
and cognitive knowledge as cognition. Instead, he meticulously argues for an historical 
and dialectical concept of  experience, where knowing is not simply a stream of  
perceptions but a happening, an event, an encounter (Palmer, 1969, p. 194-195).  An 
experience of  understanding is an awareness of  not-knowing; that is, experience is first 
of  all experience of  not-ness  something is not as we had assumed (Palmer, 1969, p. 
195. Original emphasis). Basic hermeneutic experience is that our anticipations of  
understanding have been shattered (Grondin, 2002). Hence, experience has a negative 
character. We learn by what it is not. From this we learn to leave things open. On this 
basis it can be said that the accumulation of  experience leads to a capacity for better 
understanding. As an apprehension of  expectations being confronted, experience is also 
an experience of  ones finite-ness or limitations.  
The hermeneutic circle 
Historically, hermeneutics was developed for the purpose of  correctly interpreting 
biblical texts. The nineteenth century saw hermeneutics drawn into the philosophical 
debates of  the human sciences. With Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Maurice Merleau 
Ponty (1908-1961) and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), hermeneutics took a 
phenomenological, ontological and existential turn. More recently with Hans-Georg 
Gadamer (1900-2002), history and language has taken central place in philosophical 
hermeneutics. 
Drawing on the work of  Heidegger, Gadamer asserts that the hermeneutic circle is not 
a formal geometric or logical circle as such, nor a method, but rather is the ontological 
structure of  understanding itself. The notion of  circularity is used here to emphasise 
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coherence rather than geometry (Grondin, 2002). The circle describes the form in 
which the interpretation which produces understanding is accomplished (Gadamer, 
1959/1988, p. 71). The structure of  hermeneutical understanding is the circular 
relation between the whole and its parts: the anticipated meaning of  a whole is 
understood through the parts, but it is in light of  a whole that the parts take on their 
illuminating function (Gadamer, 1963/1987, p. 126). The constant shifting between the 
parts and whole is how an experience is understood. For instance, to reach an 
understanding of  a sentence each part is made sense against the whole sentence. The 
whole sentence makes sense only when each part is in harmony within the whole. Both 
the understandings of  the parts and the whole are adjusted in a to-ing and fro-ing 
against each other until there is a harmony between the parts and the whole. It is in the 
harmony of  all the parts and whole that lies the criterion of  correct understanding 
(Gadamer, 1965/1975, p. 259). 
The circularity of  hermeneutics means it is not possible to be outside of  the circle. That 
is, we are always already within the hermeneutic circle of  understanding. There is not a 
beginning or an end. Heidegger uses the term thrown to express the historical 
situatedness of  our existence that both constrains and makes possible our 
understandings. We are thrown into a world where language and culture already exists.  
Understanding a sentence then, to use my earlier example, is an act of  projecting ahead 
to an anticipated whole. From the first moment of  reading a sentence it is anticipated 
that it will be meaningful. The anticipation of  meaning that governs our understanding 
proceeds from our historical situatedness. Understanding a text begins with fore-
concepts that are replaced by more suitable concepts: exactly this constant re-designing 
constitutive of  the back and forth of  meaning in understanding and interpreting, is the 
process which Heidegger describes (Gadamer, 1959/1988, p. 72). In this, the task then 
is the working out of  the correct fore-concepts and replacing or amending these with 
more suitable ones. Gadamer goes on to say that methodologically conscious 
understanding will be concerned not merely to form anticipatory ideas, but to make 
them conscious, so as to check them and thus acquire right understanding from the 
things themselves (1965/1975, p. 239).  
New understanding is always a dynamic project of  anticipating, modifying or replacing 
already existing concepts: 
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every  rev is ion of  the fore -pro ject is  capable of  pro ject ing 
before i tse lf  a  new pro ject  of meaning, that r iva l pro jec ts can 
emerge s ide by s ide unt i l  i t  becomes c learer  what the unity  of  
meaning is ,  that interpretat ion begins with fore-concept ions 
that  are replaced by more sui table ones. This constant  
process of new pro ject ion is  the movement  of  unders tanding 
and interpretat ion.  (Gadamer,  1965/1975, p.  236) 
Tradition and prejudice 
Gadamer disagrees with the Enlightenment positioning of  reason in opposition to 
prejudice, asserting that reason cannot operate outside of  tradition. For Gadamer, the 
very possibility to understand is formed on the basis of  prejudice. Prejudices, or pre-
judgements, are our initial standpoint or expectations and assumptions on something. 
This initial position is relative to a tradition of  language, culture and history. The 
knowledge that an individual or community has of  a particular object domain is not 
that individuals or communitys product alone but that of  history (Warnke, 1987, p. 
79). Wachterhauser puts it similarly, stating that tradition sets the normative context of  
inquiry for a community of  learners (2002, p. 58. Original emphasis). Wachterhauser 
further explains that as a normative tradition it sets the boundaries, at least initially, for 
what is acceptable in terms of, for example, research questions that can be asked and 
even the acceptability of  answers. Traditions of  inquiry also have their own conceptual 
language that is itself  historically constituted:  
We are a lways a lready b iased in our  th ink ing and our  
knowledge of  the wor ld.  To grow into th is l inguis t ic  
interpretat ion means to grow up in the wor ld. To this  extent,  
language is the real  mark of  our  f in i tude. I t  is  a lways beyond 
us.  (Gadamer, 1976, p. 64) 
While prejudice enables the possibility of  understanding, all that we bring with us to the 
task is not conscious or fully knowable. Hence, prejudice cannot be fully articulated and 
therefore we are not free to separate productive prejudices from hindering prejudices in 
advance. Gadamer states instead, that this separation must take place in the process of  
understanding itself. It is the task of  hermeneutics to ask how this happens. In doing 
this, critical reasoning cannot be set aside; that is, not any understanding will do. 
Gadamer argues that the task of  hermeneutics is not to simply passively accept 
prejudice in the process of  understanding, nor to develop a procedure of  
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understanding, but to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place 
(Gadamer, 1965/1975, p. 263).  
Effective-history 
In Gadamers view we belong to history. By effective-history Gadamer is referring to a 
history of  influence (1959/1988, p. 78) Gadamer sees all understanding as 
determined by the past and that all understanding takes place in tradition. Effective-
history is present in all understanding whether we are aware of  it or not. Understanding 
is therefore an historical experience in the sense that the past determines the future. 
Gadamer takes the position that we do not rationally calculate the world but rather, that 
we experience our being-in-the-world, and that this experience is historical. For science, 
facts stand outside of  time and place whereas for Gadamer all knowledge proceeds 
from what is historically pre-given as essentially, an effective-historical relation 
(Gadamer, 1965/1975, p. 267). In any process of  understanding, we are unable to 
achieve some objective point outside of  history so as to look down upon it, because we 
are already in it the moment we try to grasp at comprehending something.  
Understanding and meaning is therefore not fixed, but bound to history through 
prejudice and tradition. Understanding is an historical experience in which history has a 
productive effect. The power of  effective-history does not depend on it being 
recognised. It is rather, an element in the act of  understanding already at work, for 
instance, in the anticipated understandings brought to bear on something to be 
comprehended. The effects of  effective-history also mean that it is determined in 
advance both what seems to us worth enquiring about and what will appear as an object 
of  investigation (Gadamer, 1965/1985, p. 268). Gadamer calls attention to the fact that 
in all understanding there is this historical element and that we will miss the whole 
truth of  the phenomenon when we take its immediate appearance as the whole truth 
(Gadamer, 1965/1985, p. 268). The task of  hermeneutics must therefore be conscious 
of  the effectivity of  history in understanding. 
However, because we are already in an historical situation and unable to look from the 
outside, effective-historical reflection cannot be completely achieved (Gadamer, 
1965/1975). This is not due to a lack of  reflection, but is the nature of  historical being. 
That is, being historical, we can never completely know ourselves. Since we cannot fully 
know all of  history, our agency is limited by what we can make explicit and therefore 
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subject to critical reason. We are therefore autonomous within historical tradition even 
when we do not know where it has come from or what its ultimate goal is 
(Wachterhauser, 2002, p. 62-64). Gadamer uses the term finitude to describe this 
experience of  our dependency of  knowledge on conditions the human knower can 
never fully know (Wachterhauser, 2002, p. 56). That is, historical experience is the 
experience of  our limits or finite-ness to our knowledge. 
While inappropriate or hindering prejudices come to nothing in the to and fro process 
of  understanding, the full potentiality of  that understanding is reached when their use 
are not arbitrary. This is not to imply that prejudices are freely chosen, but a call to 
consciously examine the legitimacy, or origin and validity, of  these initial understandings 
(Gadamer, 1965/1975, p. 237). While understanding is an everyday event, what 
Gadamer proposes here is a radicalisation of  the everyday. That is to say, while 
hermeneutic understanding occurs as an everyday automatic and unexamined event, for 
hermeneutic enquiry, a consciousness of  meanings and history is needed. Rather than 
adopting some attitude of  neutralness, Gadamer calls for the conscious assimilation 
of  ones own fore-meanings and prejudices and to be aware of  ones own bias, so that 
the text may present itself  in all its newness and thus be able to assert its own truth 
against ones own fore-meanings (Gadamer, 1965/1975, p. 237). This presumes a 
preparedness to be open to modify, reject, or maintain the initial standpoint in a 
conscious way. To do this involves the development of  an awareness of  the newness 
or otherness of  the thing. For instance, a person trying to understand a text is 
prepared for it to tell him [sic] something. That is why a hermeneutically trained mind 
must be, from the start, sensitive to the texts quality of  newness (Gadamer, 
1965/1975, p. 238). This happens through consciously standing in ones own (historical) 
tradition, rather than attempting to stand outside of  it or bracketing it aside. To do 
either would be a denial of  historical reality. Gadamer (1963/1987) cautions that 
prejudices can dominate us and impair true recognition of  the historical past, however, 
without prejudice and a readiness for self-criticism, historical understanding would not 
be possible nor meaningful.  
Fusion of horizons 
For Gadamer, horizons are a metaphor for the range of  meaning that has come out of  
ones own history, language and culture. An horizon is the range of  view that 
encompasses all within it from a particular vantage point. From an horizon, the relative 
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significance of  everything in view is established. Hence, to acquire an horizon also 
means looking beyond what is close in order to see in better proportion what is close at 
hand (Gadamer, 1965/1985). By way of  contrast, if  a person does not have an horizon 
then that which is nearest tends to be overvalued. Hekman (1986) notes that as horizons 
are particular points of  view, and encompass a range of  meanings, they are therefore 
also finite. Nevertheless, an horizon can also be expanded through what Gadamer terms 
a fusion of  horizons. Gadamer construes understanding as a dialogical event in which 
ones own horizon is expanded through a conscious assimilation of  an others horizon 
(Gadamer, 1965/1975). This is a continual process that is always happening and always 
relative to what is historically pregiven through prejudice and tradition. 
However, by fusion, Gadamer does not mean simply understanding the others historical 
horizon in terms of  knowing the standpoint of  the other, nor is it merely stepping into 
the situation of  the other as if  to see through their eyes. In doing either of  these, 
there is no seeking of  an agreement in which our own standpoint is consciously brought 
into question. To understand the other as a fusion of  horizons then, does not mean 
leaving our own horizon, nor making the horizon of  the other into an object. The 
notion of  fusion means to let into our ontology something alien, unfamiliar, or 
something that is other. In the interplay, or to-ing and fro-ing, between the two horizons 
of  unfamiliar (i.e. otherness) and familiarity, the claim to the truth of  the other emerges.  
Taylor (2002) states that to be challenged by others means that we also see our own 
peculiarity for the first time, rather than simply remaining taken-for-granted and 
invisible. In being challenged we will also see a corresponding aspect of  the other as 
undistorted. It is to hear the other undistorted that Gadamer means by truth; the 
truth of  the other. Nonetheless, these new understandings will not be perfect; they 
remain open to refinement.  
For Gadamer, the prerequisite for understanding is to therefore have our own horizon 
rather than abandoning it for the other. The hermeneutical task is to make the fusion a 
conscious act. In Gadamerian terms, the meaning of  placing ourselves in the situation 
of  the other in order to understand, is to become aware of  the otherness, the 
indissoluble individuality of  the other person (Gadamer, 1965/1975, p. 272). This 
requires a commitment to openness: 
In  human re lat ions,  the impor tant th ing is ,  as we have seen,  to 
exper ience the Thou ,  t ru ly as a Thou ,  i .e .  not to over look 
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his [s ic ]  c la im and l is ten to what he [s ic]  has to say to us.  To 
th is  end openness is  necessary . (Gadamer,  1965/1975, 
p.  324) 
An important concept within interplay of  understanding then is the putting of  our 
prejudices at risk in the fusion of  horizons; as prejudice is only properly in play when 
put at risk of  being rejected or amended. Again, this is not to say that we give up our 
own prejudices, but rather, to be consciously situated in relation to the horizon of  the 
other (Gadamer, 1963/1987). The requirement here is for an effective-historical 
consciousness. The experience of  understanding is to have insight into the limitations 
within which the future is still open to expectation. Thus, true experience is that of  
ones own historicality (Bleicher, 1980, p. 113). While a range of  understandings are 
therefore possible, understanding can legitimately only occur within the limits dictated 
by the fusion of  horizons. Openness and awareness of  the newness, otherness, or 
unfamiliar in the text, as well as a readiness to put our own prejudices at risk in a 
question and answer dialogue with the text, permits an effective-historical 
consciousness.  
The process of question and answer 
Bleicher (1980) describes Gadamers explication of  understanding as hermeneutic and 
dialogical. This is because Gadamer explains understanding using the model of  
conversation whether the experience of  a fusion of  horizons is with a text or a person. 
The development of  understanding is analogous to the dialogue of  question and 
answer. That is, there can be no understanding without questions. Once questions cease, 
so does learning (i.e. understanding). In particular, Gadamer is arguing that the 
question-answer dialogue has as its foremost task to find the question to which the text 
(or person) presents an answer. Putting this another way, if  something is not as first 
expected then there is an implicit question about the object. In this sense, the text (or 
other) poses questions from its own horizon. However, hermeneutically, to answer the 
text we must ask questions.  
The process of  question and answer however, is not proposed as a method as there is 
no such thing as a method to learning questions or of  learning to see what needs to 
be questioned (Gadamer, 1965/1975, p. 329). It is more that the text evokes the 
question in the experience of  understanding. The other, be it a text or person, demands 
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to be recognised and listened to and agreed with in the process of  understanding, and in 
this way both are tied together; fused. The logic of  question and answer means that the 
very meaning of  a sentence is relative to the question to which it answers; and therefore 
the comprehension of  the sentence is as open or as limited by the horizon of  meaning 
of  the question. There is a demand then for a form of  partnership and openness in the 
process of  dialogue. The openness of  what is questioned is in the fact that the answer is 
not settled; the to-ing and fro-ing continues. Once settled (including to agree to 
disagree) it may be said that the object in question is understood; hence, learning ceases 
once questions cease. The question to which the text (or person) has an answer 
however, is derived from an horizon and is therefore as open or limited as its horizon 
dictates. Hence, a question can be right or wrong. A question can also be false when it 
fails to achieve a state of  openness, or may be distorted when there can be no real 
answer. From Gadamers perspective, the question must bring the object into a state of  
indeterminacy if  it is to be a true question. The purpose of  questioning is to make a 
thing indeterminate.  
Linguisticality of understanding 
The dialogical process of  question and answer becomes possible only through the 
medium of  language. Gadamer asserts that it is language that mediates any access to the 
world. Hekman (1986) argues that it is the linguisticality of  understanding that is the 
most important aspect of  Truth and Method. It is in the medium of  language that the 
mediation of  past and present occurs in the fusion of  horizons (Bleicher, 1980). For 
instance, the language I use to understand things is mine and belongs to the present 
context even if  it is some ancient text before me and comes out of  a past context. The 
experience of  understanding, as linguistic, is an experience of  our limitations. All 
contexts are at least partially constituted by language; we therefore understand ourselves 
in the world through language (Wachterhauser, 2002). That is, we grow up within the 
world. As our language is particular to our place in history our grasp of  the world will be 
limited. However, Wachterhauser notes that the fact that we cannot attain certainty, it 
does not follow that we cannot attain knowledge (2002, p. 70). Gadamer has termed 
this human finitude. This does not mean that with language everything is 
understandable and can be expressed in words; but rather, that words are sought for 
everything that is to be understood (Grondin, 2003).  
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That we start with anticipated meanings and our own language in the hermeneutic of  
understanding, means we are at risk of  using words that we see are proximate to the 
other and erroneously carry through all that the word means without opening the 
meanings of  words up to question. This can be difficult because of  our investment in 
our current understanding of  self  and consequently an investment in the distorted 
image of  the other. To understand the other would require a changed understanding of  
self  (Wachterhauser, 2002). What is critical then is the nature of  participation in the 
event of  conversation where words are searched out to convey meanings and then put 
to the test in dialogue.  
For Gadamer, language is the mediation of  past and present and all understanding 
without being in a fixed position: language is the fundamental mode of  operation of  
our being-in-the-world and the all-embracing form of  the constitution of  the world 
(Gadamer, 1966/1980, p. 147). While we understand the world in an automatic way, 
Gadamer asserts that we understand it through our own language and not an others 
language. Language is not fixed, it develops and changes over time. Our language is 
different to an others language because of  the particular challenges and hurdles taken to 
achieve understanding within each tradition. Within language is therefore history; and 
so, language gives effect to history.  
Contrary to our Enlightenment inheritance, particularly through positivist science, it is 
clear that Gadamer does not see language used as a tool, such as a system of  signs that 
represent the world, or through which we are able to somehow manipulate our world. 
There can be no point of  view outside the world of  language so that the world can 
become an object of language. Gadamer sees a relationship between words and the 
world, for Gadamer, words make the world more intelligible and accessible than it 
would be without words (Wachterhauser, 2002, p. 67), so that words do more than 
mirror the world as a representation. The world is interpreted as if  the word and the 
world are in dialogue due to some degree of  common intelligible meaning. The world, 
and objects in the world, are unintelligible without words. At the same time, 
Wachterhauser argues that Gadamer asserts a compatibility between the word and the 
world where experience acts as a corrective for getting it right: 
Judgements  of  correspondence between word and wor ld are 
poss ib le because we don t  need to s tand outs ide of language 
to  make them. Ins tead our exper ience can mediate between 
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language and the wor ld because a l l  three are in pr incip le 
 inte l l ig ible.   I f  th is is  so,  we can speak again about  gett ing i t  
r ight   even though gett ing i t  r ight   is  re lat ive to in terpretat ion.  
(p.  77) 
Clearly then, Gadamer argues that a text cannot be viewed with regard to the authors 
intentions, but for what the text addresses to us at an historical distance; that is, the 
subject matter within the text. Gadamer argues that the interpreter understands in a 
different way to the author and, if  understanding has occurred at all, understands 
differently. In this sense, the meaning of  a text goes beyond its author (Gadamer, 
1965/1975, p. 264). Through the activity of  the interpreter, the text has meanings the 
author may not have been aware. Through interpretation the text is reconstructed, not 
as a repetition or replication, but emerges as something different. Interpretation is not a 
duplication, but a creation in the present. The past then is forever being re-interpreted, 
that is to say, understood differently. In this way the text is not so much an expression 
of  life, but is taken seriously in its claim to truth. Bleicher (1980) summarises the 
process as follows: 
The interpreter is ,  therefore,  f i rs t  aware of  a d istance between 
the text and h is [s ic ]  own hor izon which leads, in the process 
of  unders tanding, to  a new, comprehens ive hor izon 
transcending the ini t ia l  quest ion and prejudices.  The 
exper ience he [s ic]  makes in the course that leads to a new 
understanding is  a hermeneut ic one and essent ia l ly  d i f ferent 
from the exper ience that  under l ies the formulat ion of  sc ient i f ic  
methods.  (p.  112-113)  
Gadamer (1984/1989) asserts that what makes understanding possible is the 
forgetfulness of  language, a forgetting of  the formal elements in which the discourse or 
text is encased (p. 32). Gadamer is arguing that we do not calculate the words to 
understand an other but understand through language in an automatic kind of  way. 
Hence, for understanding to be possible at all speech must be intelligible and a text be 
readable. Where this is not the case, interpretation is necessary, arising as a mediating 
process between the text (or other) and the reader when the text is in some way 
unintelligible or in dispute. The requirement is for the interpreter to be inserted in 
between the text and the reader in order to convey not what the speaker or writer 
originally said, but rather what he [sic] would have wanted me to say (Gadamer, 
1984/1989, p. 35. My emphasis). In arguing this, Gadamer regards the text as a phase in 
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the process of  communication that the interpreter facilitates, and does so by referring 
back to the original communicative event; the interpreter serves the text. In 
overcoming the difficulty in the readability of  the text too, is a hermeneutic fusion of  
horizons as the interpreter is involved in mediating understanding.   
Methodological process 
As the discussion above shows, Gadamers work is a philosophical investigation rather 
than an exposition of  method for the human sciences. Accepting Gadamers position on 
understanding then requires a different approach to that of  the natural sciences and, 
according to Hekman, calls into question the very notion of  method (1986, p. 95). 
The kind of  understanding that Gadamer asserts is one that is always historically and 
linguistically positioned and includes both parties (e.g. the text and the reader, 
interpreter and interpreted, etc). This position then is one that seeks to comprehend, 
have insight into, and make intelligible, the human world. 
Conversation and text 
Although Gadamer argues very strongly against a methodical approach to truth, this 
does not mean the study of  human sciences is not possible, nor does it mean that 
hermeneutics is not relevant to the methodology of  human sciences (Hekman, 1986). 
Gadamers ideas have been usefully explored by, for example, Ricoeur (1971), and more 
latterly by Hekman (1984) as a methodology for the exploration of  social action. 
However, in this study I am not seeking to explain or understand social action as such 
but rather, to comprehend or understand the experience and meaningfulness of  suicidality 
through dialogue with others (i.e. men).  
Gadamerian hermeneutical understanding, understanding a text or spoken event, 
involves speech-partners in dialogue out of  which communal life is created:  
The abi l i ty  to  unders tand is a fundamental endowment of man 
[s ic ] ,  one that susta ins h is  [s ic]  communal l i fe  wi th others  and,  
above a l l ,  one that  takes p lace by way of language and the 
par tnership of  conversat ion. (Gadamer, 1984/1989, p.  21) 
Understanding then is not something that we plan and control but is participated in with 
others. We experience understanding in dialogue when it runs counter to what we think; 
bringing us up short, forcing us to think, at the same time bringing something into a 
state of  indeterminacy.  For Gadamer, the extension of  the concept of  text to include 
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oral discourse is hermeneutically well grounded (1984/1989, p. 33). The term 
conversation signals a verbal to-and-fro process that is more organic than in say, a 
rule-based (therefore structured) face-to-face interview designed to eliminate variation 
between interviews.  
A text is not simply intelligible letters on a page, it is a phase in the execution of  the 
communicative event (1984/1989, p. 35). In the hermeneutical process of  
understanding then, a text is not the beginning and ending of  understanding, but a part 
of  the whole. Texts become a central point for Gadamer through the relationship to 
interpretation and language: 
The point  that  must be f irmly adhered to is  that  only on the 
bas is  of the concept of interpretat ion does the concept  of the 
tex t come to const i tu te a centra l concept in the s tructure of  
l inguist ical i ty ;  indeed, what  character ized the concept of  tex t 
is  that i t  presents  i tse l f  only  in  connect ion wi th in terpretat ion 
and from the point of  v iew of interpretat ion, as the authent ic  
g iven that is  to be understood. (1984/1989, p. 30) 
In the task of  interpretation, Gadamer cautions that something understood should lead 
back to the original communicative situation. With spoken conversation, intonation and 
gesture are part of  the check and balance between participants used to assist 
understanding that are not fully communicated with spoken conversation fixed as text; 
say, as a transcript. Insofar as the checks and balances are part of  the dialogue, such 
conversations are not writings to be later read as text; so that writing is more than a 
repetition in print of  something spoken (Gadamer, 1984/1989, p. 34). Hermeneutical 
understanding occurs at the time of  the communicative event as a text. The openness 
and indeterminacy in hermeneutical understanding are not fully revealed in transcripts 
of  conversations. This is because in writing that is intended to be read, the author is 
already aware of  the reader and conscious of  the need to communicate in such a way 
that the work can stand on its own. While understanding of  a text must involve 
referring back, it must equally look forward; for all that is said is always already directed 
toward understanding and includes the other in itself  (Gadamer, 1984/1989, p. 34). In 
reading a text, which is, of  course, separated from its author, the reader engages in a 
dialogue with the text in itself. In a sense, the text talks to the reader evoking questions. 
However, texts can be regarded in this way. Conversation transcripts do not possess the 
additional non-verbal interaction that made the original speech intelligible. Nonetheless, 
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transcripts (e.g. of  researcher-participant conversations) might be regarded as an 
historical record of  the conversations that have taken place though requiring 
interpretation. As historical records conversation transcripts cannot be regarded as 
equivalent to the original communicative event. Clearly there are two historical events: 
firstly, the original communicative event of  the conversations, and secondly, a reading or 
dialogue with the transcripts; that is, an interpretation.  
A double-hermeneutic approach 
Although as researcher I would be present in both the original communicative event and 
the later interpretation, my horizon of  understanding progressively widens as I am 
transformed (i.e. a fusion of  horizons) by ongoing understanding. However, the horizon 
of  the other person also changes in a critical way. In the first instance, the horizon of  
meaning is that of  the participants which they bring to the conversations, while in the 
second instance, the horizon of  meaning is that of  the transcripts as an historical 
record. To understand transcripts of  these conversations, because they are unable to 
stand on their own as writings, there is a necessity for interpretation. Correct 
interpretation must consider the historical horizon of  the text (and researcher) and 
cannot merely consider the literal meaning of  the words. It is worth noting that in any 
case it is usual for transcripts of  spoken conversation to require cleaning in order to 
be intelligible, and have therefore already undergone a preliminary form interpretation. 
To make transcripts then understandable Gadamer calls for this to be done in a 
conscious hermeneutical way. 
Hermeneutically, it does not make sense to speak of  a beginning to understanding so 
even as I refer here to an original communicative event (being that of  the research 
conversations), these are not an actual beginning to an understanding, entry into 
research conversations is intentional, with a view to their future significance and hence 
sit within history. Research interviews such as took place for this current study, were 
preliminary conversations by telephone; even preliminary warming up talk prior to 
settling down to a recorded conversation. To say that the recorded face-to-face 
conversations are the original communicative events then is merely an historical 
reference point.  
As the conversations for this study are recorded and then fixed through transcription, 
the transcripts provide a further opportunity to consider these conversations differently. 
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Considered as historical (textual) records, there are two phases of  hermeneutical 
understanding which need to be made conscious: firstly, an understanding of  the 
participant conversations, and secondly, an interpretation of  the transcripts. In the 
process of  understanding, my horizon as researcher will already be widened prior to 
interpretation of  the transcripts. 
My horizon as researcher 
The motivating force throughout understanding is derived from the researchers horizon 
of  meaning because the hermeneutical situation is determined by the prejudices that 
we bring with us (Gadamer, 1965/1975, p. 272). Such prejudices constitute the horizon 
of  a particular present. Accordingly, if  the horizon of  the enquirer shifts, then questions 
evoked by the encounter with tradition will also shift. There is therefore, more than one 
right horizon and more than one right interpretation. An horizon is not something 
that we can freely choose, nor something we can be outside of  and completely see. An 
horizon is not fixed; as history doesnt stop, our horizon moves with us as our situation 
changes. Horizons then are in motion: 
through the test ing of  our  pre judices in  the encounter with the 
past and the at tempt to understand par ts of our  t radit ion. An 
hor izon is  therefore not something there to be d iscovered,  but  
instead, is  a lways happening. I t  is  therefore inadequate to 
conceive of  an iso lated hor izon of the present  s ince i t  has 
a lready been formed through contact  with the past .  (Bleicher,  
1980,  p. 112)  
Or, as Gadamer phrases it: the horizon is, rather, something into which we move and 
that moves with us (1965/1975, p. 271). An horizon then is ones historical 
situatedness; the situation from which one meets the other. The task in conversation or 
in reading is to experience the tension or temporal distance between the text and the 
present. That is, we must recognise the text in its otherness and therefore having its own 
horizon. In the process of  dialogue, a fusion of  the two horizon produces a widening 
of  my own horizon as interpreter/researcher. That is, a new understanding is formed. 
Gadamers position reverses the methodical process of  the natural sciences in that the 
prejudices upon which an experience of  understanding takes place are only known 
historically and cannot be set beforehand; as an historical experience, we stand in the 
midst of  an event without knowing what is happening to us before we grasp what has 
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happened in looking backwards (Gadamer, 1984/1989, p. 24). Although it cannot be 
fully known what constitutes the horizon of  meaning beforehand, methodological 
conscious understanding will be concerned not merely to form anticipatory ideas, but to 
make them conscious (Gadamer, 1965/1990, p. 239). This is accomplished in the  
interpretive process in which explicit reflection is required on the conditions that 
enable the text to have one or another meaning (Gadamer, 1963/1987, p. 90). The 
formation of  new understandings can reveal something of  the old through the 
challenge or confrontation of  prejudices in the working out of  a new understanding. 
The experience of  understanding something entails a confronting and questioning, 
suggesting that new understanding would not be new unless it was asserted against 
something that had been expected. It is in this being brought up short that what had 
been anticipated is revealed; at least as a shadow of  the new understanding.  
The task then is to hold open to challenge as much as possible on what is to be 
understood through dialogue. In this regard, Gadamer suggests that there must be 
good will on behalf  of  both speech-partners to be open to hearing the truth of  the 
other. In contrast, understanding does not occur when seeking to have ones own 
opinions upheld by stridently overwhelming the others words. Although different in 
each hermeneutic phase, the task in this study is to approach participants suicidal 
experience as unfamiliar or foreign; to ask questions that cast my own opinions 
with doubt, requiring understanding to be considerate of  the horizon of  meaning of  the 
other, be it the participants or the transcripts. As understanding a thing is a process of  
modifying anticipatory ideas, preliminary ideas form the foundations of  the situatedness 
of  interpretation. The discussion above clearly shows that such pre-conceptions need to 
be put at risk to be modified, rejected, or elaborated upon. In this way, seeking to get 
behind the everyday taken-for-grantedness of  these anticipatory understandings.  
Hermeneutically, this study has no clearly defined beginning. The process of  
understanding is already happening without knowing the process of  it, and its 
anticipatory ideas have historical origins from many directions and cannot be fully 
known beforehand. Which of  these are hindering or facilitating prejudices is worked out 
through the hermeneutical to-ing and fro-ing of  understanding.  
My personal life history, and the culture and language into which I have been thrown 
is likely to be important as anticipatory understandings that I bring into this study. The 
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specifiers to my own historical, linguistic and cultural background can be endless. To 
attempt an autobiography, as a means of  describing my history and culture would only 
ever present only a partial picture. From an hermeneutic viewpoint, there is no means to 
step outside of  this history in order to look down upon it in its entirety, so my 
beginning awareness is itself  derived from within the history I am would be attempting 
to explicate. It is also important to recognise that my historical background extends 
beyond my lifetime in the culture and linguistic tradition I have grown up in. For 
instance, to say that I am a white, university-educated, adult male calls upon a particular 
history. I have benefited in manifold ways from this history that has privileged white, 
educated, heterosexual, adult males.  
As a study that seeks to inform mental health nursing, a strong body of  anticipatory 
understandings are likely to derive from being personally embedded within a tradition 
of  mental health nursing. A strong motivation for this study is that the experience being 
explored is important to this profession. Mental health nursing has its own history and 
worldview, that is in turn, influenced from many other traditions, for example, medicine 
and psychology.  
Not only is the interpretive horizon of  meanings constituted by my own personal and 
professional history and the traditions in which these sit, but also the horizon formed by 
the theoretical conceptualisation of  the study itself. In opposition to the deterministic 
view of  masculinity I have taken the view that masculinity is a social construction in 
which men are active (and also constrained) agents. Problematising masculinity is 
political in the sense that mainstream health research does not usually view masculinity 
of  itself as an issue, instead it is usual to view adverse health outcomes as a problem 
associated with being a male (e.g. by statistical association to sex categories).  
Being a man attempting to trouble the notion of  masculinity is fraught with political 
difficulty. There is a political and personal struggle that needs to be acknowledged here. 
This revolves around an uneasy tension between my conscious focus on mens 
experience and the effort to uncover the taken-for-granted within suicidal experience. 
Feminist writers have clearly shown the taken-for-grantedness of  mens centrality in 
such diverse aspects of  social life as: scientific endeavour, marriage, religion, language, 
the courts, employment, and psychiatry. Indeed, it has been proposed that one cause of  
men killing themselves is marital breakdown (Durkheim, 1897/1952), and to support 
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this assertion, writers such as Durkheim have turned to the so-called breakdown of  
taken-for-granted social structures such as marriage. Difficulty too is encountered, in the 
use of  language to argue out the thesis. Spender (1980) has for instance, highlighted the 
gendered nature of  language, asserting the male-centricity of  language. However, such 
male-centricity poses challenges when talking about men as men. By this I refer to the 
hermeneutic position that I can never be outside the circle; I cannot use any other 
language (and subsequently, a particular linguistic and cultural history) than that into 
which I am thrown. As man-made language (to draw on the title of  Spenders book), in 
which men are the normative reference, there is no other language available to step 
outside and look upon men.  
Towards a fusing of horizons 
The methodological concern here, drawing on Gadamers philosophical investigation of  
understanding, has been to develop an overarching approach from which to explore 
experiences of  suicidality. In doing this, and at the same time remaining centrally 
concerned with a position on mental health nursing in which understanding is about 
engaging with the other person meaningfully, the way in which understanding happens is 
the focus of  concern. As researcher and as a mental health nurse, I am part of  the 
process of  understanding; in Gadamerian terms, I bring my horizon to the encounter 
and a preparedness to put my prejudices at risk. Gadamers draws attention to the 
hermeneutical task rather than a particular method. For me as researcher, the 
requirement is to make the conditions in which understanding takes place as explicit as I 
am able.  
Insofar as method is applicable, the requirement from a Gadamerian perspective is for a 
dialogical partnership in which speech or text presents the horizon of  the other. In the 
case of  this study, a double hermeneutic approach is proposed in which both forms of  
dialogue occur. The following chapter  details the way that dialogue occurred in this 
study in which I set out to understand four mens experience of  their past suicidality. 
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C h a p t e r  6  
METHOD AND ANALYTICAL PROCESS 
Drawing on the methodological position outlined in the preceding chapter, this chapter 
describes how a methodology informed by Gadamers philosophical hermeneutics was 
enacted for this current study. In doing this, the discussion will cover ethical issues, the 
method adopted for the conduct of  the research, and the process of  interpretive 
analysis. In practice, there is only a notional separation between methodology, ethics, 
method and interpretive process. Each is informed by the other and there is no clear 
dividing line. 
Ethical issues 
To achieve the aims of  this study, a proposal was put to the Human Ethics Committee 
of  Victoria University of  Wellington to recruit a small number of  men who had past 
experience of  suicidality to participate in in-depth interviews about their experiences.  
The proposal for this study was approved by the Human Ethics Committee of  Victoria 
University of  Wellington (Appendix A) on 22nd March 2002. This approval was later 
extended to 31 December 2004 (Dr. A. Kirkman, personal communication, March 17, 
2004). As a Registered Nurse, the ethical application also encompassed the Code of  
Conduct for Nurses and Midwives (Nursing Council of  New Zealand, 1998) and the 
Standards of  Practice for Mental Health Nurses in New Zealand  (Australian and New 
Zealand College of  Mental Health Nurses, 1995). 
In the light of  ethical principles and the professional standards of  conduct, this study 
raised several particular ethical issues of  note: a) the potential vulnerability of  
participants, b) the particular consent, privacy, and confidentiality issues for this group 
of  people, and c) the moral standpoint and ethical requirements to conduct the study in 
a respectful and transparent manner. These are discussed in more detail below. This is 
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not to say that these were the only ethical issues, but were particular to the nature of  the 
issues involved in the conduct of  this study. 
Vulnerability and self-determination 
The earlier review of  suicidality and mens mental health shows that the nature of  this 
study required exploration of  an issue that is currently viewed within a medical model to 
be the result of  a mental illness or as equivalent to mental illness. Consequently, suicidal 
men are seen as a vulnerable group requiring special precaution around their mental 
health status. From this perspective it is thought that discussion of  past suicidal 
experience might exacerbate risk, and hence, require special precautions. The design of  
the study sought to ameliorate such possible risk by firstly, seeking participants from the 
general public rather than clients of  mental health services who were already assumed to 
be at a higher level of  risk due to diagnosed mental illnesses and secondly, excluded men 
who felt they had been suicidal in the last three months, irrespective of  intervention or 
not.  
Men who had recently experienced major depression or a psychotic illness were also 
excluded for methodological reasons; that is, the recency of  such a profound experience 
would potentially overwhelm reflections on the focus of  this study. The meaningfulness 
of  understandings would be expected to be markedly influenced by the power and 
recency of  psychotic events; their horizon of  meanings would, in all likelihood, be 
dominated by the experience of  psychosis.  
As well as these exclusions written into the Information Sheet (Appendix B), they were 
also specifically discussed within the information and consent process. Additionally, I 
discussed the necessity to  monitor risk of  serious harm to self  or others. At the same 
time, discussing resources the resources available for participants to obtain counselling 
for any distress arising out of  our conversations. I offered an initial counselling session 
at no cost to participants. Although the research conversations could be ceased at any 
time by participants, the availability of  some level of  support in the event of  later 
distress was also considered. To this end, our preliminary discussion also explored the 
social networks immediately available to participants (including telephone counselling 
services). Ultimately each of  the four men who participated in this study requested these 
services. Additionally, in my follow-up with these men, they each expressed some initial 
concern that they may experience serious distress, but that this had not occurred. 
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A further mechanism to assure the well-being of  participants was the engagement of  a 
clinical supervisor experienced in the mental health field for the duration of  the 
fieldwork phase of  this study. The primary purpose of  supervision was to reflect on the 
interactions with each of  the participants in order to review issues that may need further 
attention. Supervision also served the additional purpose of  providing self-care for me 
in the event that the exploration with participants provoked unresolved issues for me. 
While the purpose of  the initial meeting with participants was for me to assure the 
safety and well-being of  participants and ascertain if  both the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria were met, it was also a point in time where the potential participant also sought 
to assure his own safety and trust in me. Participants therefore had their own questions 
and ways of  evaluating my trustworthiness. The issue of  trust became a major theme 
within the study itself.  
The initial meeting with participants was also an important point to set up the openness 
and dialogical character of  our interactions which the successful conduct of  a 
Gadamerian approach required. Additionally, without openness and a willingness to 
facilitate understanding, genuine choice to participate or not, cannot occur. The 
explanations and discussion of  the Information Sheet and Consent Form (Appendix C) 
were important features of  this process, setting up a basis for creating dialogue and 
openness. Given the likelihood of  contact with mental health services and the possibility 
of  past experience with compulsory treatment, transparency of  processes around 
confidentiality, voluntariness, and how suicidal risk would be approached, were 
considered essential features and explicitly discussed. I discuss these issues further, 
below. 
Privacy, and confidentiality 
To assure privacy and confidentiality, the presumption put to participants was that 
pseudonyms would be used in the thesis and within any further publication, and that 
this name could be of  their own choosing if  they wished, or I could choose a name. 
Ethical approval was granted on this basis. However, this presumption of  protecting 
identity and the means to address it raised a particular issue for one of  the participants. 
One participant preferred his real name to be used rather than a pseudonym. The 
assumption of  protecting identity is argued to be particularly important for marginalized 
and stigmatised groups (Kirkman, 2001; Peterson, 1998). He wanted to use his real 
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name on the basis that a major factor in the history and perpetuation of  his abuse was 
the secrecy and silencing around it. This posed a dilemma, as disclosure of  his identity 
would in turn identify others involved in this history without their consent. Given the 
relatively small size of  the population of  New Zealand and the depth of  detail in the 
interviews, care was particularly needed around contextual detail to not only protect 
participants, but also to maintain the privacy of  others (Tolich, 2001); in this case, 
people who were abusive to him. Alternatively, excluding him from the study on this 
basis would again be an experience of  being silenced. As well as discussing the issues 
extensively beforehand, this subject also arose during the recorded conversations as part 
of  the focus on suicidal experience. 
Given that the methodology used in this study is personally situated and there is a depth 
detail to potential quotes, identifiability through the context of  the conversations is a 
potential risk. In addition to the use of  pseudonyms, both the identity of  locations and 
circumstances have therefore been either modified or deleted from the quotes used in 
this study. These changes were also made in the transcripts that participants received for 
review. In conversations with clinical and academic supervisors, only pseudonyms were 
used; and as far as possible, no identifying events or contexts are mentioned. 
Nonetheless, even with these precautions there is a small possibility of  identifiability and 
the Information Sheet acknowledges that the use of  quotations in the study does carry 
with it some level of  risk to the maintenance of  confidentiality. 
Respectfulness and transparency 
The underlying philosophical tenets of  understanding as dialogical, emphasise the 
need for respect and transparency. Gadamers philosophical hermeneutics have an 
inherent ethical sense in that the truth of  what the other has to say cannot occur if  the 
other is kept at a distance and ones own prejudice or presuppositions are not put at risk; 
both partners must have the goodwill to try and understand one another (Gadamer, 
1984/1989, p. 33). There is a necessity to acknowledge one stands within tradition in 
order to extend it through dialogue. Equally, this demand to put preunderstandings at 
risk does not exclude the possibility of  agreeing to disagree.   
For instance, my history as mental health nurse was a significant aspect of  my horizon 
as of  understanding suicidality; while at the same time, mental health professionals have 
significant power with respect to people with a mental illness. One aspect of  respect and 
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transparency therefore needed to include how I, as a mental health nurse and researcher, 
would impact on the dialogical relationship. Questions arise as to how what is said and 
not said, will be interpreted during our contact, both clinically and analytically. What is 
the nature of  my connection to mental health services? Ethically and methodologically, 
respect and transparency necessitated explicit discussion of  these issues from the 
moment of  first contact with potential participants, including through the Information 
Sheet and Consent Forms. Thus, both forms included disclosure of  my profession and 
how my perception of  clinical risk would be managed. 
In this study, it is methodologically explicit that my personal biography influences the 
research design, process, and content. However, as the earlier discussion of  
methodology also shows, this cannot be fully known. Whilst good ethical conduct 
necessitates a careful and self-conscious identification of  this influence, a Gadamerian 
perspective suggests that this task cannot be fully achieved. Nonetheless, the 
hermeneutic (and ethical task) is to continue to make explicit those presuppositions 
upon which my understandings are constructed as explicit as is possible.  
A Gadamerian hermeneutic approach demands putting pre-understandings at risk; to 
open these up for question wherever possible. As an ethical practice, openness as well as 
historical consciousness cannot be restricted to specific tasks of  the research conduct 
(e.g. Information and Consent Forms, recruitment, data collection, etc.), but must 
inform the total process of  the research endeavour. At the same time respect and 
transparency are methodological issues, they are also ethical issues. This means that 
issues of  method are also issues of  the application of  ethics. 
Method 
Gadamer critiques methodical prescription as the pathway to truth and does not 
prescribe a method or process to understanding and instead, argues that hermeneutics 
transcends method. Rather than a focus on method, Gadamer calls attention to the 
conditions of  understanding. Insofar as the notion of  method may be applied to this 
study then dialogue, how it occurs and is then recorded, become the methodical issues. 
As may be seen in the summary of  the method set out in Table 4 (p. 25), the second 
column describing how Gadamerian hermeneutics is translated into the conduct of  this 
study, is centrally concerned with dialogue.  
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Recruitment of participants 
A small number of  men were sought for in-depth, focussed dialogue on their past 
experiences of  suicidality. A follow-up interview was planned; firstly, to offer 
participants the opportunity for reflection and contribute further if  they wished, and 
secondly, to provide an opportunity to clarify issues arising from consideration of  the 
earlier interview. Two interviews also permitted the process to be broken up into smaller 
lengths in what was potentially an emotionally draining exercise for both the participants 
and myself  as interviewer. These interviews were recorded and transcribed. In addition, 
I made supplemental notes following each interview recording my impressions of  
physical context, my personal response, and of  any notable events that occurred. 
As the issue of  concern for both myself  and the participants was experiences of  
suicidality, and not characteristics of  the men themselves as such, the aim of  recruiting 
participants was to seek men who could inform me of  their suicidal experiences. That is, 
it was not different men that were required for the study but rather, men who have had 
different pertinent experiences. However, the problem was to recruit such men without 
predetermining what constituted suicidal experience. For example, I did not want to 
assume that being suicidal was fully defined by behaviour labelled suicide attempt. In 
recruitment I was therefore careful to give permission for participants to define for 
themselves what constituted being suicidal.  
Recruitment was reliant on personal networks rather than any particular sampling 
framework based on the methods of  positivist science. This approach is sometimes 
termed an incidental or opportunistic approach to recruitment (Minichiello, Aroni, 
Table 4. Summary of method 
Research dimension Gadamerian approach used in this study 
  
Participants Men who have an understanding of self as having been 
suicidal. 
Researcher Explicitly engaged within a process of understanding others. 
Sensitivity to the otherness of suicidal experience. 
Mode of data collection Spoken dialogue, conversational, question and answer style. 
Researcher and participants are focussed on understanding 
suicidality. 
Data for analysis i) spoken conversation, ii) researcher memos, iii) 
conversation transcripts. 
Mode of interpretation Double hermeneutic. 
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Timewell, & Alexander, 1990). The study was not advertised; although some third 
parties did put up notes about the study in public locations. Potential participants, or 
some other trusted person on their behalf, was asked to contact me in order for me to 
then contact the potential participant. In some instances a request for further 
information about the research was needed before this contact was made. I had no 
means of  knowing if  the person contacting me was a potential participant or third party 
unless they chose to tell me. These approaches therefore involved much discussion in 
which the Information Sheet was frequently used as a reference document to read later.  
The participants 
As this study draws upon a Gadamerian approach, interpretation rests upon a fusion of  
horizons between the participants and myself. Central to Gadamers concept of  horizon 
is that it is an historical, cultural, and linguistic vantage point. This fusion of  the 
horizons is enabled (and constrained) by what is common to us both. Both myself  and 
the four participants in this study were men of  European descent between the ages of  
30 and 60 years. English was the first language for each of  us. In common with these 
men, albeit as a mental health nurse, I was familiar with the culture and language of  
mental health. This degree of  commonality provided a useful common horizon of  
meaning from which to enter into dialogue. 
Meeting the part i c ipants  
Contact was initially by telephone or, in one instance, by email. Invariably, more details 
about myself  and the study were requested. In all but one instance, arrangements were 
then made to meet in order to go through the Information Sheet and Consent Form. As 
one participant lived at a considerable distance, much of  the initial discussion took place 
by email.  
A number of  options for meeting the participants was considered. As an aspect of  
feeling safe, the location for the interviews was a negotiated process. For instance, quiet 
cafés and rooms at the University were initially considered and offered to participants as 
possibilities. Eventually, participants homes and workplace offices were the locations 
mutually decided.  
A detailed explanation of  the study was provided at the first meeting. This included 
explanations about the Information Sheet and Consent Form, as well as a rationale for 
each aspect of  the interview process. This included discussing the following: 
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 A brief introduction to who I was; 
 How and for what reason the interview was to be taped and transcribed, 
including who had access to the tapes and transcriptions; 
 Other details that I would be noting during and outside of the interviews; 
 The reasons for the follow-up interview; 
 The reasons for my clinical supervision; 
 How I would assess risk during our contact and what process I would use in 
this event; 
 Exclusion criteria; 
 The full transcript would be provided to participants with the option of 
adding further information in the follow-up conversation and sections could 
be marked with a request for these not be quoted; and 
 An opportunity to ask questions of me. 
 
Although I did not provide participants with the Interview Guide (Appendix D), the 
process and focus areas of  the guide were made explicit and briefly discussed. In the 
initial meeting, it was inevitable that such discussions with participants approached the 
proposed content of  the interviews. This was difficult to restrain for myself  and 
participants, and was then revisited at the earliest opportunity within the recorded 
dialogue.  
Positioning the researcher 
As researcher, achieving understanding required active participation without privileging 
my presuppositions. Rather than seeking a narrative or chronological story, the approach 
taken here was to engage in an interaction characterised by an active to-ing and fro-ing, 
and a back and forth, around topics that emerged as meaningful within the exploration 
of  suicidal experience. The Interview Guide was utilised to maintain a focus on the 
topics of  interest in order to facilitate increasingly greater detail and clarity about the 
focus topic, check understandings, and elicit greater contextual data. Instead of  the 
focus being upon a list of  questions asked in an uninvolved way, the dialogical process 
becomes a priority. As the researcher, I am therefore not positioned as disengaged and 
somehow unbiased but instead, actively engaged as a dialogical partner asking question, 
listening to responses, and offering my own understandings for checking. Through this 
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active participation and contribution, my own horizon of  meanings is overtly brought 
into play.  
It is therefore more accurate to use the term conversations to describe the dialogue 
rather than interviews. Geanellos (1999, p. 40) uses the term participative 
conversation to describe the character of  interviewing guided by Gadamerian 
hermeneutic research. At the same time, it was a conversation guided by the agreed 
purpose; accordingly, dialogue was continually directed back to illuminate suicidality 
from a multitude of  angles. This process enabled increasing detail about suicidal 
experience to be brought into question for me as researcher to learn more and hence 
understand better.  
Entry into the conversations began with an introduction that recapitulated the purpose 
of  the interviews and that it would be audiotaped. In addition, a reminder was provided 
that emotional supports, both formal and informal, need to be considered. This 
included an offer of  a debriefing session with a psychotherapist,17 if  it was needed for 
any distress or discomfort. Consistent with the overall research approach this 
introduction was conducted in a conversational style. That is, from the moment of  
introduction onward the interaction was recursive and open-ended, although guided by 
the explicit focus of  the research. 
Given the emotional energy of  such an active engagement on a topic area that was 
important to the participants, closure was an important process. Closure included a 
conscious slowing down of  the process, turning off  the tape recorder, followed by an 
opportunity to reflect on the experience of  the discussion. This reflection was also an 
opportunity to check on the well-being of  participants. Again, this purpose and the 
requirements for this process were made explicit. Closure included making 
arrangements for a debriefing or counselling session if  required and a reminder of  the 
supports that were available. Additionally, arrangements for the follow-up meeting were 
discussed, and checked that participants remained agreeable. Sometimes, further 
information arose during closure. Permission to note this was obtained. 
                                                 
17 The availability of a group of psychotherapists who were prepared to be available at short notice and also had 
extensive experience of psychiatric and mental health issues was organised prior to the fieldwork (I would pay the 
initial session fee). Ultimately, this arrangement was not called upon. 
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The data 
The data for this study was in various forms and is shaped by the dialogical 
hermeneutic character of  the study. These are listed as follows: 
 Audiotaped recordings of each conversation; 
 Transcripts of the conversations;  
 Memos on the conversations; and 
 My own experience of the conversations. 
These different forms combine to create a relatively comprehensive historical record of  
what was used to inform an exploration of  these mens suicidal experiences. 
The text for this study was obtained from the transcription of  the audiotaped 
conversations with the four participants. While it was originally intended to have all 
initial conversations completed before entering the follow-up conversations, this did not 
occur. Conversations occurred on the basis of  the timing of  recruitment and seeking to 
intrude as little as possible on the participants lifestyle and work commitments. Insofar 
as the purpose of  dialogue was to expand my horizon, the sequence of  conversations 
was methodologically unimportant.  
Transcriptions included notation of  prolonged pauses and unintelligible sections. The 
recordings of  these conversations were made using a professional quality tape recorder 
from which the majority of  the conversations were later transcribed by a secretarial 
service; excepting the first conversation which was transcribed by myself. As far as 
possible all identifying information was then removed from the transcripts before 
returning these to the participants for review. At this point participants also had the 
option of  requesting that parts be never quoted. This option was taken up by one 
participant. Additionally, place names and some characteristics of  events were modified. 
A check with participants for identifiability resulted in only one further change to one 
of  the transcripts.  
Another form of  text drawn upon to support the analysis were notes that I made 
throughout the fieldwork aspect of  the study, and following the suggestion outlined by 
Minichiello et al. (1990), consisted of  a form of  personal log. These notes included 
observations about the context, my own personal responses to the conversations, and 
my general perceptions of  the nonverbal responses of  participants (for example, 
expressiveness or lack of  expressiveness where it might have been expected). In part, 
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this was facilitated by reflections during clinical supervision sessions. This memoing 
also included reflection on the research process itself  (for example, engagement and 
closure).  
From the two conversations with four men, more than 10 hours of  audiotape were 
produced. Following transcription and checking, the text was then imported into N6 
(Qualitative Solutions & Research, 2000). N6 is a qualitative software programme 
designed to hold text data and provides a number of  tools to aid in qualitative analysis. 
N6 enabled convenient storage and a systematic means of  retrieving particular text in 
the process of  analysis. Unlike say, utilisation for a grounded theory methodology 
(Amankwaa, 2000; Plass & Schetsche, 2000), coding was used within N6 simply as an 
aid to text search and retrieval rather than to facilitate the development of  themes or 
build theory (see St. John & Johnson, 2000 for further discussion of  issues). Only the 
intelligible spoken words were put down in transcription text. A basic level of  tonal 
variation, silence, overtalking, and so forth was also noted.  
Transcripts are substantial documents and awkward to read because of  the spoken 
nature of  the text. They are not writings intended to stand on their own to be read. It 
is therefore not an insignificant task to be asked to read them. This was offered to 
participants as an option, depending on their interest. Nonetheless, every participant did 
indeed read them. Entry into the follow-up conversations started from a response to 
reading the transcripts (e.g. what did you think about the transcript?).  
Interpreting the conversations 
In Truth and Method Gadamer (1965/1975) has argued that insofar as people 
communicate with one another and exist in communities, then understanding occurs. 
While understanding is therefore an everyday thing, he argues that the task of  human 
sciences becomes to understand with greater deliberateness and consciousness of  the 
hermeneutic nature of  understanding and the conditions under which understanding 
takes place (p. 263). This is a radicalisation of  an everyday event; and in the case of  
mental health nursing, a radicalisation of  an integral aspect of  practice  communicating 
with and understanding mental health nursing clients.  
Two hermeneutic processes are undertaken in the interpretation of  the conversations 
with participants. Understanding firstly occurs within the conversations with 
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participants. Understanding is then further developed through an interpretive analysis of  
the transcripts. I have termed this approach a double hermeneutic. 
Understanding the conversations 
Before the conversations with the four men in this study were fixed as transcripts, 
understandings were formed in conversational dialogue. That is, although the transcripts 
are a form of  historical record, understanding was first created within the living dialogue 
of  the conversations. The purpose of  examining the conversations themselves, is to 
elaborate what it was that was conversationally understood. To put this another way, 
through the conversational partners being held by the focus of  conversation  that is, 
the suicidal experiences of  each of  the men  the task is to describe what was 
illuminated in the dialogue as I understood it to be. I emphasise here that I have my own 
understanding. Each of  the men would have somewhat different, albeit significantly 
related, understandings of  the same conversation. 
Hermeneutically, insofar as understanding has occurred, presuppositions have required 
modifying, accepting, or rejecting in the to-ing and fro-ing of  the dialogue. Such 
conversation are a temporal living thing, always situated and always moving. Analysis of  
conversations then is always too late, as understanding has already occurred and moved 
on (Gadamer, 1984/1989). Hence, to examine the conversations for the conditions in 
which new understanding has emerged cannot occur as part of  the conversation itself  
(as it would then become the conversation). However, this is made possible in dialogue 
with transcripts. Transcripts offer the advantage over the conversations in that they are 
fixed. An interrogation of  the transcripts however, is to engage in a different dialogue to 
that which has already occurred in conversation. In that they refer back to the original 
conversations, a different understanding of  the conversations occurs. 
Conversation 
Conversation may seem to be something to be taken-for-granted as it is so much of  
daily social life. In Gadamers work, conversation is the key to understanding, and the 
key to understanding further about something. In this study, conversation begins the 
process of  exploring four mens experiences of  suicidality. 
While Gadamer doesnt specify how to dialogue he makes frequent reference to 
conversation as a model for understanding a text. To the degree that conversation 
results in understanding, means that one has learned something. However, not all 
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conversation leads to understanding. An interaction in which the purpose is to succeed 
in getting ones opinion accepted by another is not a conversation in this sense intended 
here. In successful conversation both partners in dialogue put their preunderstandings 
at risk to truly hear the other person. Such a conversation then is dependent on holding 
the object of  conversation open to question. That is, there is something not expected 
about the object thus provoking dialogue. Proper questions result in bringing the object 
into a state of  indeterminance. These questions cannot be known beforehand as it is not 
known what will emerge to hold open to question. 
Drawing on a Gadamerian methodology means that as researcher I am positioned as 
learning through recursive dialogue, rather than as an uninvolved knowing expert. If  I 
am to understand I must be fully engaged in the conversational process; consequently, if  
understanding has occurred, I am transformed as a result. The nature of  the research 
interview then will be characterised by an attitude of  good will to understand the 
other and to ask and be asked questions and offer my own understandings for 
questioning. As researcher, understanding will depend on reciprocal participation (but 
also, not taking over), rather than sinking into the background of  the dialogue. Equally, 
this does not mean a pretence of  not knowing, as understanding requires putting 
preunderstandings properly into play. 
Hence, effective conversation depends on the balance reached in order to consciously put 
prejudice properly into play. The intention here therefore, is not to obtain his 
understanding  in which my understandings are made inaccessible  but to truly 
understand through putting my preunderstandings at risk. In her application of  
Gadamer to interviewing, Geanellos (1999) describes the hallmark of  this sort of  
dialogue as a speculative, undogmatic openness and a willingness to be instructed to 
another point of  view; to another horizon (p. 41). As an active participant in this 
dialogical process I will influence the other as he will influence me. The issue is not to 
eliminate the process of  influencing, but to make it a conscious process and address it 
as such.  
Any analysis that seeks to make explicit the conditions of  understanding must 
account for understanding having already occurred within the conversations that 
produced the transcript data. The process I have undertaken here is to write out a form 
of  autobiographical  story of  each conversation that tells the reader of  my 
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understanding of  suicidality arising from the conversation. This story writes out the 
understandings I have reached within the conversations in a narrative form as if  to an 
imagined audience (e.g. as in writing a letter). In addition, as far as possible preserving 
contextual understanding including what I took to be the pivotal meanings and events 
important to the construction of  my understanding. Hence, this writing is not simply a 
definitional statement nor a chronological narrative; as an historical record of  the 
conversations, they do not attempt to capture chronology as if  a detached observer, but 
instead, are written as a participant in the creation of  that history. That is, in a literal 
sense it is my point of  view. Equally, the intent here was not to abstract the essential 
social phenomenon, nor to explain what gave rise to this understanding, but to 
summarise the conversation in such a way as to faithfully capture in writing the way in 
which I understood each of  the conversations on suicidality. While this writing cannot 
capture everything, it begins a process of  interpretation by fixing in writing something 
of  the current state of  my understanding.  
These stories therefore convey my understanding rather than his. A different story 
would be written by each of  the research participants. Although the expectation would 
be that there would be a substantial commonality in each of  the stories, reflecting the 
fact that the conversations were co-created, the stories would nevertheless be different 
as they are different authors.  
In an effort to stay close to the original event and the language of  each conversation, 
the story of  each conversation was constructed using substantial quotes from the 
transcripts. However, these were pieced together within a narrative in order to convey 
the context of  my understanding. As the experience of  the conversation also contributes 
to understanding (i.e. it is not a social act independent of  my presence), the narrative 
portrayal was facilitated by memos and reflection.  
As well as a story for each conversation, the production of  these gave rise to a meta-
story consisting of  the collection of  stories. Reflecting across all conversations, a 
summary was written that attempted to tell what I understood to have been my 
understanding of  suicidality as a result of  these many hours of  conversation and story 
writing. A thematic summary of  this meta-story is set out and discussed in the following 
chapter. 
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(Re)interpretation through the transcripts 
The purpose of  an interpretation of  the transcripts differs to that of  the conversations. 
Having the transcripts available as an historical record of  the original conversations 
offers the possibility of  a different understanding to emerge from dialogue with the text. 
Understanding no longer develops in dialogue with another person, but instead, in 
dialogue with a fixed text. This is not simply a different interpretation of  the 
conversations, as the transcripts are an historical record and are not the conversations 
themselves which, of  course, occurred in the past and therefore no longer exists. Yet, 
the significance of  analysing the transcripts lies in the fact is that an interpretive analysis 
of  the transcripts relates back to the conversations and therefore has the possibility of  
saying something about the original event. To put this another way that is closer to 
Gadamers words, the conversations were the historical influence from which the 
transcripts were produced (i.e. effective-history). 
The interpretation of  the transcripts is therefore a kind of  interrogation from a specific 
horizon of  meaning. This horizon of  meaning is consciously informed by the earlier 
review of  masculinity, mental health, and suicidality, as well as historically effected from 
understanding developed from the earlier conversations. The transcripts are therefore 
examined in order to provide a different interpretation about the conversations in which 
an understanding of  suicidal experience as men was reached. 
This theoretical horizon was one in which the everyday taken-for-granted meanings are 
seen as imbued with gendered meaning in which power operates in certain ways. Such a 
positioning is therefore one in which the taken-for-granted and natural are regarded 
with attitude of  suspicion; for example, suspicion is directed toward those aspects of  
the text that depict social contexts and outcomes as natural. This position could not 
be put into play through conversation in which understandings are constructed on the 
basis of  their everydayness. Gadamer (1984/1989) has argued that the invisibility of  
language enables the very possibility of  communication, so that it is only when the 
process of  understanding is disrupted that questions are asked about meaning. 
However, the written text can be interrogated in such a way as to bring meanings once 
again into a state of  indeterminacy by asking questions from a particular theoretical 
horizon. In this way meanings beyond the taken-for-granted are illuminated in these 
texts. Through an explicit, and therefore conscious, attitude of  suspicion then, the text 
is made distant, other, and somewhat unfamiliar. Questions were put to the text such as: 
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Why this meaning? Why say it this way? Why this meaning now? Where did this meaning 
come from? What other meaning could there have been? 
The first step in the analytical process is to conversationally understand the past suicidal 
experiences of  the four men in this study. The following chapter provides a discussion 
of  my understandings as a result of  the dialogue produced through the processes 
outlined above. 
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C h a p t e r  7  
CONVERSATIONS WITH FOUR MEN 
Four men participated in initial, and follow-up conversations on their past experiences 
of  suicidality in accord with the process set out earlier resulting in eight transcripts. 
Transcribed conversations do not necessarily proceed in grammatically correct prose, 
but are frequently overlapping, hesitant or rushed, change topic in mid-sentence, and are 
supplemented by the use of  ums, ahs, and silences. In natural conversation non-verbal 
behaviour is frequently used to facilitate communication. Additionally, the 
environmental context may influence the interaction, such as the pet cat coming over 
for a pat. Memoing was therefore also utilised to facilitate later interpretation. 
The quotes used in the following analysis use commas and periods to approximate 
hesitations in the flow and three periods () to indicate silence or unfinished sentences. 
The mathematical less than (<) and greater than (>) brackets are used to insert such 
events as laughter or crying, or to show where identifying people or places have been 
removed to prevent identification. The source of  the quote is identified by a notation of  
name and paragraph number. This notation takes the form of  (Namen, ¶n). The number 
n following the name indicates if  the transcript is from the first or second conversation 
with person. For example, the notation of  (William2, ¶50) would therefore mean the 
quote is from paragraph 50 from the follow-up conversation with William. 
This chapter sets out an overview of  these conversations. It describes my understanding 
of  what was told to me at the conversational level; that is, it sets out my understanding 
of  what was conveyed to me by all four participants. This chapter is therefore a thematic 
retelling of  the story as faithfully as is possible, but in a summary form. I do not do this 
from an uninformed or neutral position, but rather, do so from standing within the 
tradition of  my profession as a mental health nurse.  
The retelling of  an other persons story of  their troubles is a common occurrence in 
mental health settings between clinicians and across teams. For instance, a clinical 
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parallel can be found in the retelling (or documenting) of  an assessment interview. The 
original interview is told in as raw a form as it is possible to remember in an attempt to 
convey the clients understanding of  their troubles. However, such a retelling of  an 
interview is not the end of  the process of  understanding the clients issues. The retold 
story would then be reflected upon by the team and an understanding (clinical analysis 
or hypothesis) is then developed and written up. A different understanding of  the 
clients story is developed, but related to the original interview. In all likelihood this 
understanding is regarded as provisional and investigated further.  
Having transcribed the recordings of  two conversations with each of  the four men in 
this study and then written summaries of  each, common issues and pivotal events stand 
out. This chapter describes these key themes or issues that, out of  all the other possible 
life events to be recollected, appear to have been emphasised. This is not a retelling of  a 
story in the sense of  a chronology instead, it is told according to a set of  themes. In this 
regard, what it is that constitutes the theme guides the description.  
The chapter commences with a short outline introducing the four men. This description 
is necessarily brief  in order to reduce the risk of  identifiability. The following chapters 
revisit these key issues, building further on this initial point of  understanding. 
Four men 
All four men were European, spoke English as their first language, and were aged 
between 30 and 60 years old. They each had an option to choose a pseudonym or leave 
this for me to choose for use in this study. Although they each identify New Zealand as 
home, they were not all born in New Zealand and in our conversations they related 
experiences from other countries as well as that encountered in New Zealand. Some 
details have been changed to further protect identity in the biographies set out below. 
Peter 
Peter was the first of  the four men whom I met to talk about suicidal experiences. On 
first meeting Peter, he was welcoming, appeared pleased to meet me, and very 
comfortable talking about people, living and life in general. Peter had been hesitant 
upon hearing of  my study topic as he did not think he met the criteria for previously 
being suicidal stating that he had never tried to kill himself. However, it became clear 
very early in our preliminary discussion that indeed he had been suicidal across a 
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number of  years; for instance, at one point, planning how his death might be brought 
about. Once into the process of  our conversation, retelling his experiences alternately 
brought enthusiasm, passion, and tearfulness. Many cups of  hot tea were consumed 
keeping the winter cold out of  his sitting room and time seemed to rapidly evaporate.  
Andrew 
Andrew was the youngest of  the four men. He was currently undertaking further 
tertiary study. He had previously run a successful business. We met at his home, which 
was light and airy with wonderful scenic views from the lounge room where we sat each 
time. He was passionate about telling his experiences, though much of  it was difficult 
for him to tell. There was an obvious  determination at times to confront the telling of  
the story. He later told me it was a conscious effort to be honest with himself. At the 
same time, like the other three men, Andrew was also warmly welcoming and eloquent 
in what he wanted to put to me. 
Podraig 
Podraig was the oldest of  the four men. Like Andrew, Podraig had also successfully run 
a business and then gone on to university, studying as a mature-age student. In this he 
was also successful. Unlike the other three men, I first met Podraig by email and then by 
telephone, before eventually meeting at his home. It was a warm and friendly home in a 
quiet and peaceful setting that matched his expressed desire to keep stress to a 
minimum. It was a great setting in which to engage in unhurried conversation without 
intrusion. As with the other men, conversation brought out passion and tearfulness as 
well as a strong desire to tell it as it is in all its rawness. I felt that it was important to 
him for me to understand where he came from. Some of  what we talked about was full 
of  recollected pain that continues to have the power to provoke real anger many 
decades later. 
William 
William was of  a similar age to Podraig and the last of  the four men I met up with. We 
met in an office at his workplace. I didnt at first notice he limped until later when it 
became a central aspect of  what he had to tell me. William too, had been successful in 
middle management and like Peter, his children and partner (and previous partner) 
became a central part of  his story. Although I was late to our first meeting, William was 
nevertheless generous in the use of  his time and willing to permit the conversation to 
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explore some very difficult areas of  his personal history. While some of  what he told 
had been told many times during hospital admissions and seemed to be familiar territory 
to tell a psychiatric/mental health nurse, there remained certain aspects that were clearly 
painful to tell; and perhaps less often told. Like Podraig, it was important for William to 
impart the wisdom of  painful experience to me for others to learn. 
Family violence and abuse 
Each of  the four men had strong recollections of  experiencing traumatic experiences in 
their childhood homes. This trauma was ongoing and extended into their school years.  
While Andrew and Podraig spoke of  their own physical abuse as children, our 
conversations show that they were acutely aware of  the violence directed toward their 
mothers and siblings. It was also apparent that the violence that pervaded the home was 
experienced as ongoing until well into their school years. Podraig is clear about the 
violence in his childhood home, saying:  
My father  was, an alcohol ic ,  and he was pret ty v iolent  wi th 
a lcohol .  I  l ived in  a very n ice p lace unt i l  I  was four  <sarcast ic  
tone>.  From when I  was s ix  months o ld,  s imply because he 
used to p ick me up by the head and throw me against  the wal l .  
(Podraig1, ¶3)   
Andrew also comments that:  
There was a lo t  of  v io lence in the fami ly as wel l  and I  know 
that  there is  a lot  of  other  people worse of f  than I  had i t ,  but  
the thing is  the damage.  (Andrew, ¶13)  
The damage Andrew speaks of  is evident in Podraigs later remarks the bind he found 
himself  in with the relationship to his father as a child:  
I  was fr ightened of  him.  Fr ightfu l.  I t 's  real ly  confus ing when 
you're a l i t t le  boy and you jus t real ly  love your father  and 
you're scared of h im as well .  You love and hate h im al l  at  the 
same t ime. And I ,  the th ing you' re desperate for  is  for  h im is 
to show af fec t ion but  he doesn' t .  Then the l i t t le g l impses of  i t  
when he's in a good mood come occasional ly  in  the evening, 
but they can d isappear in  a f lash. Keep going back and try  to 
grasp onto that l i t t le b it .  (Podraig1,  ¶50)   
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The fear and terror expressed by Podraig also meant learning at a young age to manage 
behaviour in such a way as to avoid provoking the violence. At other times, it could 
mean taking on adult roles. For Andrew, this included becoming the man about the 
house as a 10 year old child: 
I  have to go back to my ear ly chi ldhood, and I  had a toolbox, 
and I  d id a l l  the home maintenance for  mum you know. I  had a 
toolbox at the age of  ten. Dad I  don' t  th ink had two 
screwdr ivers.  (Andrew1,  ¶75)  
Peters story seems at first to be different initially suggesting an absence of  childhood 
trauma or victimisation. Perhaps because, unlike Podraig or Andrew, his story does not 
reveal physical abuse. However, Peter gradually reveals the emotional impact of  the 
volatile nature of  his parents marital breakdown:  
So I fe l t  l ike okay th ings had happened in the past  which were 
about  these stresses and th ings and I  would just  become a 
help less chi ld bas ical ly  in  the face of  that ,  because I  was, a 
b ig par t  of  me was a pained,  you know, d istressed chi ld from 
some of the fundamental  gr ief  and pain of my chi ldhood which 
was around my fami ly  the very  d is tressed nature of my 
fami ly.  (Peter1, ¶101)  
The depth and extent of  the distress for Peter comes through in statements like the 
following that show the long-lasting impact of  the disintegration of  his harmonious 
nurturing home: 
I  th ink basical ly  a l l  of  the gr ief  the gr ief  was the gr ief  and loss 
of  fami ly  real ly ,  because the fami ly  b lew apart  and the 
depress ion and the anger  have ar isen out of ,  yeah,  a very  
smal l  person you know, and beginning in  l i fe ,  and a l l  the 
undercurrents of  d is tress and fear and anguish and torment  
that  were around in my emot ional k ind of  home. And that was, 
c lear ly  I  couldn' t  deal  wi th i t  and d idn ' t  deal  wi th i t .  You know 
it 's  haunted me real ly .  (Peter2, ¶84)  
While Peter was not physically assaulted. His description shows that he experienced the 
effects of  exposure to family violence as a young boy as emotional abuse, rather than 
physical abuse. The trauma is real in his descriptions of  his parents marital breakdown 
when he remarks that it was:  
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real ly  scary  and awful and hyster ica l.  You know, i t  was 
horr ib le real ly .  (Peter2, ¶38)  
He contrasts this experience to earlier experiences of  his family as being warm, fun, 
and lots of  nurturing. He makes a special point about the loss of  connection and 
relationship with his father, and the silencing from his mother. 
Williams childhood trauma came from multiple sources. William suffered from an 
injury to his leg at age 1½ years that resulted in multiple hospitalisations for painful 
reconstructive surgery to his foot and ankle over many years. It is unclear how the injury 
originally occurred. In addition to repeated traumatic hospital experiences, his father 
died when he was 2½ years of  age. Seen as being too young to understand or cope, 
William did not attend the funeral. He doesnt recollect his fathers death ever being 
discussed. He feels that at the age he felt that his father had simply vanished. The death 
of  his father also resulted in other changes to his home life. William describes moving 
around a lot, school absenteeism, and a remoteness to his mother, stepfather, and 
siblings. His story portrays a sense of  emotional disconnection and neglect for William 
during these years. He seems to confirm this later in a discussion about trust:  
I  guess I  wanted to be nurtured.  I  wanted to make up for  the 
fac t that  you know, mum wasn t  there.  (Wil l iam2, ¶62)  
At age eleven, William tried to kill himself  with his mothers sleeping tablets. Discovered 
by his stepfather and mother, he was made to vomit. This incident was never discussed 
within the home, nor does he recall ever being taken to a doctor as a result. 
Fathers and other men 
Fathers and stepfathers appear in these conversations as significant figures to the 
traumatic events of  their childhood years. In contrast, they feature minimally in the 
adult years; if  they feature at all.  
Andrew describes a childhood with a violent alcoholic father and similarly Podraig 
describes his experience of  childhood as a tense and terrifying relationship with his 
abusive father:  
So I d idn' t  have much idea of or  much value of  se l f  f rom a 
pretty  ear ly  age.  I  was a quite iso lated lonely k ind of  l i t t le  boy.  
Spent  al l  my t ime in my home wi th pretend fr iends for  a long 
t ime.  He was actual ly  sexual ly  abus ing my two e ldest  s is ters 
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at  the t ime.  But I  d idn' t  come to f ind that out  unt i l  many years 
later .  And I  k ind of  found i f  I  d id funct ion with other guys,  
other human beings i f  you l ike, they were general ly  people 
who just  you know, gave me heaps of af fec t ion and I  d idn ' t  
have any idea of whether  that  affec t ion had,  you know, what 
k ind of mot ives might have been behind the af fec t ion. I  d idn' t  
real ly  care. Just  any k ind of affect ion i f  you l ike.  So I  found 
mysel f  in the s i tuat ion <garbled>,  where I  was abused by 
somebody outs ide the fami ly.  (Podraig1,  ¶3)  
Podraig and Andrew both describe their childhood as isolated. Podraig spent much of  
his time playing with pretend friends, while Andrew became mums little helper at 
age 10 with his own toolbox doing the house repairs.  
Fathers have also appeared to significantly influence the quality of  relationships with 
their mothers: 
My re lat ionship wi th my mother is  very  st rong.  But I  th ink I  
had held some resentment at  her  when the fami ly  was very  
dysfunct ional that she d idn' t  take us out as chi ldren. She 
d idn' t  take us out of  that  env ironment.  So I  had to deal  wi th 
that  la ter  on. But that  d idn' t  come about unt i l  jus t recent ly .  
(Andrew1, ¶19)  
While there was an awareness of  the ongoing exposure to violence and threat to their 
siblings and mothers from fathers or stepfathers, mothers were nevertheless blamed for 
not removing them from their childhood fear and terror, or were instead blamed for the 
disintegration of  the family. This impact is long-lasting. While Andrew speaks of  
resolving this with his mother, this did not happen for the other men. 
Peter and William had different experiences. They did not experience the violence and 
fear that beset Andrew and Podraig. The earliest childhood years appeared to be idyllic 
for Peter. He describes a happy, loving, hippy lifestyle. However, by the time he was 
into his early teenage years his parents relationship was disintegrating in a frightful way. 
This had a lifelong traumatic impact on Peter. 
In contrast to the others, William experienced great loss associated with significant 
change in the home. Other than mentioning his stepfather to make him throw up the 
Mogadon overdose at age eleven, William is silent about his stepfather. Silence was a 
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feature of  the trauma these men experienced as children. William experienced silence 
from his mother in the context of  his fathers death, and then, again, from his mother 
and stepfather after overdosing on his mothers Mogadon. Peter experienced silence 
from his mother after his father left home, refusing to speak to him about it. Andrew 
talked about the silencing of  his sexual assault, and stated that as a Catholic family, 
sexual abuse was never spoken about. Equally, violence in the family was never spoken 
about because of  the fear of  more violence. Similarly, Podraig described his fathers (and 
later, his stepfathers) sexual abuse of  his sisters as the family secret (Podraig1, ¶20). 
In this context then, silence and silencing was used as a means to control and victimise. 
In their early adult years, these experiences of  their fathers and step-fathers left them 
wondering what they would themselves be like as fathers and partners. Andrew 
expresses this doubt when he states:  
I 'm th ir ty-seven,  I 'm st i l l  not marr ied <laughs> and no 
chi ldren.  And that 's  a consc ious dec is ion because I  wonder 
what  sort  of  I 'm sure I 'd make a good father,  but  
(Andrew1, ¶41)  
He continues, clearly worried about sexual abuse, saying: 
Am I going to be able to trust  mysel f  in ra is ing chi ldren the 
way they should be ra ised? You know, are they going to be 
safe? Am I going to be safe? (Andrew1,  ¶114)  
Sexual assault 
While Andrew and Podraig experienced physical abuse as children, they were also made 
victims of  sexual assault. Andrew talks about the impact of  being sexually assaulted at 
age 10 by his older brother that took some years to understand and connect to his 
emotional distress and relationship issues. His familys strong Roman Catholic beliefs 
seemed to further complicate the impact of  this trauma: 
Well  there was one part icu lar  inc ident  I  th ink  k ind of  took up 
the um, to the suic idal  th ink ing and that was at  the age of ten 
then um sexual ly  abused by a fami ly member  and of  course 
coming from a Cathol ic  fami ly  that was,  ah,  put the cat among 
the p igeons,  and i t  was a lso the case the family  they never ,  
never  spoke about  th ings anyway. (Andrew1, ¶3)  
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He eventually connected this event to a recurring nightmare. The intensity of  the 
trauma and its current effect on him is still recollected, decades later: 
After that inc ident at the age of ten I  had th is recurr ing dream 
of  um, i f  you could envisage l ike just  a white l ight with a b lack 
surround,  and you can' t  see anything of the b lackness and 
that  there was th is l ike a leather bal l  ro l l ing down tak ing up 
more of the l ight .  And i t 's  gett ing c loser  and c loser  to you to 
the point of  suf focat ing you.  And I  eventual ly  equated to that 
as being grabbed f rom behind with a hand held over  my mouth 
and being to ld to shut  up and don' t  scream. And because of 
that  the feel ing that was associated with that dream is  coming 
to me dur ing the day, I  could be walk ing down the street and 
then a l l  of  a sudden I  just  get th is  overwhelming sensat ion of  
that  of the feel ing,  of that dream. And ah, you know, I  knew I 
was not in a good s tate.  And I  had  Had panic at tacks at  
dif ferent  stages out in publ ic ,  and my temperature,  b lood 
pressure,  would skyrocket ,  and be complete ly red in the face 
and sweat ing and I d have to get  away,  get home. (Andrew1, 
¶87)  
Podraig attributed his sexual assault as an 11 year old child to what he believed to be his 
need for affection, linking this to the lack of  affection he experienced at home:  
I  was rather  confused at  the t ime I  th ink.  Because I  mean, the 
d if f icu lty  was hav ing no ideas, boundar ies or  moral va lue or  
you know, jus t f rom my upbr inging, just  hav ing v io lence 
around me and that sort  of  th ing. You know, the confus ion was 
probably  more over you know, was i t  such a bad exper ience? 
Was i t  even p leasurable,  to some degree? You know, I  had no 
d ist inct ion in  my mind of  what  was p leasurable and what 
wasn t .  But  I  iso lated even more.  (Podraig1,  ¶5)  
Although at first he states that the experience was confusing rather than frightening, 
because it didnt hurt, he didnt do anything nasty to me (Podraig1, ¶48), he later goes 
on to say that as a result he further isolated himself. He also bitterly reflects that from 
this experience he learnt that sex and love arent freely given and that it became quite 
a pattern for life (Podraig1, ¶5).  
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Unsafe schools 
While home life was a location in which, as children, these men were victims of  
traumatic experiences, school was also an unsafe place. Their school experience became 
an extension of  their victimisation. School was another social setting in which they 
encountered this experience. Moreover, their recollections show that there was an 
absence of  people or places mentioned as safe and secure. School continued to provide 
experiences of  victimisation until they left. All four men left school as soon as they were 
able. This is not to say there were elements or times at school that were indeed safe, but 
that the overall experience was of  a lack of  safety and security.  
Peter described his early high school as a torment. Andrew found he was wary of  
other boys in the change rooms and of  the priests. William described being persistently 
teased about his different walk and later, his weight. Podraig described his response to 
peers at school as an awareness of  vulnerability and threat: 
I  would at tach myself  to a teacher.  [Br ian: To a teacher?]  
Yeah.  [Br ian:  Rather than.. . ]  because I 'd feel protected.  The 
g ir ls  seemed threatening, and in fac t the guys seem 
threatening too. To me you know, they seemed to have a 
secret about manhood that I  d idn' t  know about ,  or  something 
that  they had that  I  d idn ' t .  They seemed to l ike,  they were real 
men. I  d idn' t  l ike that  you know. (Podraig1, ¶8-10) 
While teachers were sometimes seen as offering temporary safety, and indeed Podraig 
and Peter sought out the presence of  teachers for protection, this did not stop the 
victimisation. The company of  teachers did not stop the nastiness, jibing, and feelings 
of  inadequacy. In combination with feeling small and less physically developed than his 
age-peers in early high school Podraig found himself  bullied. The bullying was nasty and 
sexual, with taunts about incest. It was an experience that eventually led to a prolonged 
emotional collapse: 
But that 's  not,  not  much fun when you go through school  and 
you re feel ing real ly  d i f ferent anyway,  and I  was a very t iny  
boy, and I  fe l t  v ic t imised a lot ,  and the k ind of  taunts that 
were,  the k ind of  v ict imisat ion was,  you know, your o ld man 
fucks your  s is ters.  And i ts  not fun stuf f .  You know, maybe 
you re jus t one of your  s is ters  sons! (Podraig1, ¶20)  
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At thirteen years old and almost catatonic at home, and being cared for by his mother, 
Podraigs sisters also verbally abused him. He recalls them yelling at him day after day: 
 jus t  l ike your  fuck in   o ld man, lay down and have l i fe done 
for  you. (Podraig1, ¶38)  
Although this was yet another experience of  victimisation for Podraig, it is also clear 
that his sisters felt they were also being re-victimised by the care and attention that he 
was receiving from his mother, while unbeknown to Podraig, they were continuing to be 
raped by their father. 
Peter was bullied because he also was seen as different to the other boys. Peter recalls 
that throughout the third and fourth form he was:  
real ly  knocked around every  luncht ime and p lay t ime [and]  
I  mean i t  was, sor t  of  l ives in my memory. I t  was torment you 
know. (Peter2, ¶6)   
He attributes this to his appearance; although he also feels that not playing rugby was a 
significant and compounding factor. While he says he had a lot of  adult support from 
teachers and family, it is also clear that this support did not stop the bullying or the 
trauma of  the experience.  
For Andrew, teachers were never seen as possible supports; in particular, he was 
suspicious of  the motivations of  the male teachers. Andrew felt that as a result of  his 
sexual assault he became suspicious of  the motivations of  all males. And elsewhere in 
his life, particularly at school Andrew was watchful of  the sexual motivation from the 
males around him: 
Basical ly  I  was a lways very  wary  of males. And I  wouldn' t  go 
in the scouts  because of  being worr ied about  the Scoutmaster .  
I  was worr ied about pr iests .  (Andrew1, ¶15)  
He also remembers being acutely aware of  the other boys in the sports dressing room 
before and after playing soccer: 
Well  I  played soccer  for  most  of those years , and was a lways 
worr ied about ,  I  don' t  know whether  i t 's  was just  a normal  
th ing to be worr ied about,  in  that  being scared of  being in  the 
changing rooms,  and you know, keeping your ,  don' t  want to 
expose yoursel f  to  anybody, and you know, i t s I  suppose 
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that 's  a natural  th ing, but i t  was jus t a case of ,  so aware of i t  
that  i t  was uncomfor table. (Andrew1,  ¶21)  
In some instances, teachers were the source of  their victimisation. For Podraig, there 
was a connection between victimisation from the school and the bullying in the 
playground.  
And twice a year  in  those days at Sunday Mass the pr iest  
would read out  the names of  everybody in the par ish and how 
much they 'd pledged and i f  you came from a poor  Ir ish fami ly 
l ike I  did, that  would be read out.  That would be read out that 
they got  noth ing. So with in that  smal l  school  env ironment  that  
I  was in  I 'd  hear the taunts about that  too.  (Podraig1, ¶32)  
The failure of  his family to pledge any money became a potent source of  shame and 
became yet another means to taunt him. This continued on into his later school years. 
And everybody would know that you had to apply ,  that you had 
to apply for  a k ind of spec ia l d ispensat ion from the church to 
get funding i f  you hadn' t  been able to provide the k ind of  
money that was required for  tu i t ion. Now you were expected to 
go in to th is  school  but  you were c lassed even by the other  
students as k ind of  l ike the char i ty  case of the school.  So the 
stuff  jus t cont inued.  (Podraig1, ¶32)  
William provides a different example of  the impact of  victimisation within the school. 
William clearly recollects giving up on school at a very young age knowing he would 
never be able to write like the other children because of  his left-handedness. This was a 
point of  difference in the classroom from a very early age. 
I  remember  very c lear ly as  a f ive-year-o ld s i t t ing in the 
c lassroom look ing at  our wr i t ing lessons.  And at  the end of the 
lesson we held our wr i t ing up and the teacher would have a 
look. Whoever  had the neatest  wr i t ing got  a je l ly  baby.  Of 
course I  was busy try ing to learn to wr i te  wi th my oppos ite 
hand.  I  never got  a je l ly  baby.  I  gave up. I  thought  what 's  the 
point  of  t ry ing? (Wil l iam1, ¶38)  
In the playground, William too was subject to bullying, first for the limp produced by 
the surgery, then later for his weight. This evaluation of  himself  as being unable to fit in 
(and hence, unable to succeed) seemed confirmed for him when later on at school 
teachers labelled him as a troublemaker and ringleader; yet William saw himself  as a 
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loner, picked on by his peers. He was eventually dismissed from school for punching the 
Deputy Principal after feeling that he had been shoved in the back during the school 
assembly. As he saw it, he made an unconscious, albeit violent response, to a physical 
taunt.  
Each of  these men regarded themselves as unsuccessful at school. Any success that they 
had (for instance, Williams horse riding, Andrews athletics, etc.) was quickly discounted 
against the overall negative school experience. Academic failure became yet another 
experience of  an ongoing experience of  victimisation. 
Becoming different at school 
These conversations show that their realisation of  difference from their peers did not 
occur until they were at school. Until school, their home experience constituted 
normality. At school, difference meant deficiency and vulnerability. Difference became 
feared because it was the target of  victimisation. Victimisation was both constitutive of, 
and constituted by, difference. That is, they learnt what it was that was different from 
what it was that they were victimised about. Difference was always related to the body. 
Difference was a pervasive aspect of  their consciousness of  everyday life at school.  
I  would be aware of  i t  24 hours a day. Was d if ferent .  Their  
vo ices were deeper,  I  d idn' t  have as big a chest ,  I  wasn' t  as 
muscular.  I  d idn' t  have that musc le jus t above my knee that  
the other boys seemed to have or ,  I  fel t  these th ings!  I  
somehow hadn' t  developed proper ly sexual ly  or  in  a phys ical 
sense. (Podraig1, ¶18)  
Unlike the other three men, Andrew didnt describe being bullied or isolated from his 
peers and instead, describes being very much involved with his peer group through his 
sporting activities. However, he also becomes profoundly aware of  being different in 
other ways:  
But with regards to having th is feel ing of being di f ferent.  
When I  was growing up I  knew cer ta in th ings had happened 
and the th ing was I  ac tual ly  wanted to be the same as 
everyone e lse. And I  th ink  even to th is day I  s truggle with the 
fac t that  I  didn' t  p lay  rugby. You know th is  whole k iwi th ing 
about  you know, b lokey, and you know I  p layed soccer  and 
ended up. I t  was meant to be the more gent ler  of  the sports  
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and ended up hav ing a horrendous ank le through i t  w ith the 
inser t ion of screws and whatnot ,  which I  s t i l l  carry .  But  I  was 
never  b ig enough to p lay rugby because I  was only a smal l  
fe l low then and l ight weight  and I  used to get  absolute ly  
pummel led you know. Some of the Polynes ian boys l ined me 
up and that was i t .  (Andrew2,  ¶11)  
While Andrew bases his feelings of  difference relative to his physical form, he also 
describes historical experience as a mark of  difference. He was conscious that his 
experience of  rape somehow meant that he could not be like other boys. This 
experience separated him from the other boys in a profound way and physical difference 
added to his feelings of  difference. Like the body, he was helpless to change or undo 
this experiential marker of  difference. 
Each of  the men describe their experiences of  bullying as a consequence of  being 
somehow different. Difference was to be vulnerable and unsafe.  
I  got teased a lot  as  a chi ld  because of my foot ,  which made 
me feel l ike an outs ider.  We came to New Zealand when I  was 
ten.  And then I  was teased not  only  about my l imping,  but 
being <fore ign> and fe lt  even more an outs ider.  And e leven, 
had my f irs t  su ic ide at tempt .  I  took a whole bott le of mum's  
Mogadon s leeping pi l ls .  (Wi l l iam1,  ¶11-13) 
Each of  the men attributed their leaving school to the belief  that things would be better 
outside of  school.  
Mistrust and sexuality 
As these men entered their later teenage and early adult years various experiences were 
encountered of  feeling unsafe, vulnerable, and mistrustful. A particular aspect of  this 
experience was related to sexuality and intimacy.  
Exploring intimacy and attempting to engage in meaningful relationships was fraught 
with difficulty. There was a fear of  intimacy and a complete lack of  any experience that 
approximated what was needed in order to form intimate emotional and physical 
relationships. Intimate relationships were then a source of  tremendous angst. 
Podraig stated his situation in his mid-teens bluntly and painfully:  
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I  never  have re lat ionships . < laughs> I  never  had par tners . I  
only  had pr isoners  and hostages. (Podraig1,  ¶68)  
Despite the level of  control that his previous statement might portray, he goes on to 
add: 
I  just d idn ' t  fee l  that  th ing that I  knew was,  yeah, I 'd  be 
exc ited about  seeing women, then when I  was with them. I t  
was l ike I  was desperate for  something,  and then, I  was 
desperate for  some kind of  a feel ing and I  expected them to 
be able to prov ide i t ,  and they,  I  had no idea that  i t  was.  What 
I  d id know was that  i t  was me that was not real ly  funct ional on 
an emot ional  level.  But I  did what  I  could do to avoid tak ing 
that  respons ib i l i ty .  (Podraig1,  ¶68)  
Each of  these men talked about heterosexual relationships as the expected norm. There 
was no doubting the heteronormative standard. In addition, there was an unquestioning 
acceptance of  homophobia. In various ways they each expressed their unacceptability 
of  homosexuality in their teenage years. It is clear in their recollections that 
homosexuality was viewed as a defect (and therefore, different) and as a consequence, 
the vulnerability that being associated with homosexuality brought was to be greatly 
feared. Nevertheless, each of  the men described a period of  time where they were very 
aware, and very worried, about attributes or behaviours of  themselves they saw might 
be construed as evidence they were homosexual. For instance, the choice of  different 
dress style and expression of  creativity (Peter), the experience of  male sexual assault 
(Andrew, Podraig), or disinterest in rugby (all), they each considered this to be evidence 
that they may be homosexual.  
The fear of  homosexuality in these conversations is also linked to religious and moral 
beliefs, as well as feelings of  guilt and shame:  
Well  there was, because I  thought,  because of  what  had 
happened at  an ear l ier  age that  you know, in  my ear ly  
th ink ing,  I  thought ,  god maybe I 'm gonna become a 
homosexual you know there,  and of  course some of the 
int imacy which goes on with a normal  heterosexual 
re lat ionship I  fe l t  t remendous gui l t  over  certa in th ings when I  
shouldn ' t .  And I  th ink  i t 's  that fac t of ,  s truggl ing wi th your  own 
ah, bel ie f  sys tem and what 's  r ight and what 's  wrong. 
(Andrew1, ¶104)  
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Nevertheless, although expressing some ambivalence about the degree of  his awareness 
of  exploration of  sexuality at the time, Peter remembers actively pursuing a more 
feminine presentation of  himself, that on reflection, he now sees as an exploration of  
an alternative sexuality to a macho masculinity: 
But i t  is  in terest ing that  I  was explor ing gender . I  was 
certa in ly  phys ical ly  mani fes t ing, i f  you l ike, my feminine 
nature in  my late adolescence ear ly twent ies by , you know, 
wear ing a lo t  of  the k ind of  accoutrements  of feminin ity  i f  you 
l ike, earr ings, neck laces,  and very long hair .  And wear ing 
c lothes that  were express ive of softer ,  you know, jus t not  
over t ly  male c lobber  <laughing> by any means,  you know. And 
yeah, and actual ly ,  because I 'd a lways fe lt  more comfor table 
wi th female company than I  had wi th male company,  you 
know, I 'd  a lways found that.  So there's something there. I t  
was, I  th ink I  fel t  less under threat .  Yeah, that 's  what  i t  was.  I  
fe l t  less threatened by women than I  d id by men. (Peter2,  ¶14)  
Even in this part of  the conversation with Peter, his concluding point about threat from 
men indicates the ever-present awareness of  risk in connection with a different 
expression of  maleness to what was expected by other males.  
Mistrust and fear had a serious impact on the development of  intimate peer 
relationships. All four men experienced difficult relationships with women causing great 
emotional pain for all involved. None of  the men spoke about intimate or sexual 
relationships with men.  
Andrew states that as a teenager he was totally dysfunctional, and directly attributed 
this to the experience of  being sexually assaulted by his brother: 
I  th ink um, try ing to be a teenager  at the best of  t imes is hard 
enough. But  l ike, I  was complete ly  scared of  get t ing in to any 
sort  of  re lat ionship wi th a female. And,  ah. And I  jus t had 
these feel ings that I  just wasn' t  good enough. And ah, yeah, I  
d idn' t  real ise how normal  incest  is  you know. (Andrew1, ¶7)  
Andrew goes on to state that his fears were particularly around physical intimacy 
because of  the shame of  feeling unclean.  
Similarly, Podraig attributes relationship difficulties to being sexually assaulted as a child: 
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So, the real  problems came along and d if f icu lt ies with young 
women. I  s tar ted feel ing my oats as  i t  were,  and had 
d if f icu lt ies re lat ing because I  real ly  wanted the af fec t ion but ,  I  
s tar ted to quest ion you know, i f  I  touched on any sexual thing,  
that  there is ,  that  there must  be a pr ice to i t .  And from my f irs t  
sexual exper ience, I  th ink  that 's  what  I  g leaned you know, that 
there's something inst inct ive.  That i t s not,  sex and love aren' t  
f reely g iven. I t  became qui te a pat tern for  l i fe.  (Podraig1, ¶7)  
For Podraig then this experience taught him that sexual intimacy didnt occur in a 
reciprocal partnership. Instead, he goes on to express a sense of  desperateness or 
neediness within himself  that couldnt be met within sexual relationships that he 
manages: 
I t  was l ike I  was desperate for  something and then,  I  was 
desperate for  some kind of  a feel ing and I  expected them to 
be able to prov ide i t ,  and they.  I  had no idea that  i t  was.  What 
I  d id know was that  i t  was me that was not real ly  funct ional on 
an emot ional  level.  But I  did what  I  could do to avoid tak ing 
that  respons ib i l i ty .  I  d idn ' t  want that admiss ion to myself .  I  
d idn' t  want  to be conf i rming the k ind of th ings that I 'd had 
conf irmed to me by a l l  the guys as I  went  through secondary 
school and pr imary  school and stuff  l ike that .  I  didn' t  need to 
be doing that  to me too.  Because when I  f ina l ly  star ted doing 
that ,  and did f ina l ly  s tar t  doing i t ,  then a l l  I  wanted to do was 
d ie. Because then I  was a tota l fa i lure to me as wel l .  
(Podraig1,¶68)  
William found he was unable to seek out intimate relationships in the same manner as 
his male peers. He found that he was unable to: 
sort  of  go out  and chase women the way the res t of  the boys 
could.  To chase gir ls .  So even though I 've had a number of  
re lat ionships , I  guess I  missed a lo t  of  oppor tunit ies.  
(Wil l iam1,  ¶205)  
As with the other three men, William also was unable to trust male peers or adult men. 
William connects this to what he sees as the emotional absence of  his mother as well as 
a lack of  shared interests in things that are particular to men: 
I  guess i t  was a total  lack of  t rus t of  men and boys in 
par t icu lar  in  my past.  The fac t that I  wanted that ,  I  don' t  know, 
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I  guess I  wanted to be nurtured.  I  wanted to make up for  the 
fac t that ,  you know, mum wasn' t  there.  You know, I 've a lways 
fe l t  c loser  to women than what I  have to men espec ia l ly  when 
i t  comes to rugby, rac ing and beer,  none of which I  have a 
pass ion for .  (Wi l l iam2,  ¶62)  
William eventually marries, twice. However, reflecting back on these relationships he 
feels that these choices were influenced by a belief  he was an unlovable person saying: 
I guess because I felt I didnt deserve to be loved I chose somebody who wouldnt love 
me (William1, ¶76). His first marriage produced a child and when he and his partner 
separated the description of  his time as a single parent is regarded as the happiest time 
of  his life. Unfortunately, this ended in a bitter custody battle in which he lost. This 
traumatic time resulted in several attempts to take his own life and subsequent 
psychiatric admissions. 
It is very clear to Peter that his failings around relationships are due to his early 
traumatic experiences of  victimisation, particularly the trauma of  the dissolution of  his 
childhood family home: 
Well  I  mean,  you know, I  know that I  have in past re lat ionships 
l ived out  a lot  of  the muck,  that  was emot ional muck that  was 
in my fami ly in terms of the re lat ionships and the behaviours.  
And I  certa in ly  made a dec is ion to change that .  I t s been 
bloody hard. But  I 've never  yeah,  I 've always fe lt  yeah,  I 've 
fe l t  afra id of  anger ,  of  other people 's anger at me and my own 
anger you know, and through down the years . So I 've k ind of 
wanted to be in  a wor ld that 's  gent le and lov ing and nurtur ing 
<laughing>.  I 've had to acknowledge my own anger and 
actual ly  do some express ing of i t  too.  And I 've had to a lso 
accept that  the wor ld isn' t  always going to be that way. But  I  
certa in ly  seek out and you know, want to be in more 
env ironments  that  are about ,  you know, about warmth and 
loving and goodness between people than people feel ing at 
odds with each other.  (Peter2,  ¶36)  
In these remarks, Peter is particularly concerned about his anger. It is not an image of  
himself  that he wants to be associated with. Like Peter, anger (even rage) was also a 
feature of  events related by Andrew, and although Podraig did not discuss perpetrating 
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violence directly, he describes taking his rage out against the world for a couple of  
years (Podraig1, ¶73) through serious criminal behaviour.  
Sport 
While various strategies were used to deal with increasing distress, including avoidance 
(e.g. absenteeism, truanting, etc.), sport featured prominently as a strategy for alleviating 
ongoing distress in their teenage years. However, non-participation in sport was also 
significant. Each of  the men mention that not playing rugby was seen as important to 
them being targeted as being-different. Rugby exerts a strong life-long influence that, 
even now, continues to position them as being different. As Andrew puts it: 
I  th ink even to this  day I  s truggle wi th the fact that  I  d idn' t  
p lay  rugby.  You know th is  whole Kiwi th ing about,  you know, 
[being] b lokey.  (Andrew2, ¶11)  
Nonetheless, while not playing rugby, each of  the men seemed to make some attempt to 
claim inclusion through involvement in sport as teenagers  that is, except Peter who 
instead, took up using cannabis. For instance, Andrew chose to compete in triathlons 
and play soccer. To some degree, playing soccer meant that he was involved in a team 
and was therefore included in a peer network. Although Andrew might be marginalized 
elsewhere, his inclusion in a male team sport ameliorated against his isolation. Like 
Andrew, Podraig sought refuge in the solitude and confrontation of  marathon 
running.  
The running was real ly  the th ing that  was my drug at  that  t ime. 
I t  got  the adrenal ine that got  th ings moving.  I t  was a k ind of 
f ight  agains t the wor ld when I  was out  there and i t  would get ,  
i t  was sor t  l ike of  when the adrenal ine comes up and you 
e ither  f lee or you confront.  The running was my confrontat ion 
to i t  and the adrenal ine would pump. And before I  real ly  
star ted dr ink ing at about  18 or  19 and I  found that there was a 
quicker way to i t ,  that  was my answer.  (Podraig1,  ¶26)  
Running seemed to be an important test for Podraig, affirming something about his 
existence. At the same time the solitude offered by long-distance running avoided the 
psychological pain that otherwise seemed ever-present. 
Williams strategy was to be independent of  his peers, like Podraig, generally choosing 
individual pursuits. Although his isolation was somewhat tempered by his horse riding, 
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for which he prided his skill at dressage. An additional, and important strategy for 
William, was to simply absent himself  from school. While William chose to name his 
separateness as independence and aloofness, his school experience was clearly one 
of  being excluded even though he chose to claim responsibility for this as his choice. 
While William continued his love of  horse riding after leaving school, he became 
strongly involved in a biker group. Although at first glance this appears unusually 
sociable for William, the rules of  bikers emphasise the separateness, independence, 
and emotional isolation with which he was already familiar. However, his lack of  trust 
was reflected in the code of  the gang, or way of  life, that excludes intimacy: 
I  mean,  I  suppose one of the th ings too, one of the reasons 
why I  fe l t  safe when I  was wi th that  b ike crowd was bas ical ly  
we were a l l  people looking for  so lace wi thout  quest ions being 
asked. (Wi l l iam1,  ¶248)  
Similarly, Andrew continued to be involved in individual sports following school 
through fishing, hunting, driving, triathlons, and tramping; all of  which were individual 
pursuits, but with a social element. Podraig did not speak about any involvement in 
sport after leaving school. Peter did not seek out any sporting activity, stating that he has 
never been comfortable with competition. Instead, Peter immersed himself  in artistically 
expressive outlets. 
Drugs and alcohol 
Drugs (mostly cannabis) and alcohol were important features of  these mens lives from 
their early teenage years. While alcohol and drug abuse variously complicated these 
mens lives as teenagers and young adults, they see a link between their entry into heavy 
drug and alcohol use and the level of  distress and anxiety present in their everyday lives. 
They do not portray their drug and alcohol use as some sort of  youthful or 
developmental risk-taking experience. Additionally, their remarks point to a kind of  
relationship with sport, in that sport appears to be an alternative form of  relief  or 
escape from distress; albeit inferior in terms of  speed and efficacy. In this sense, alcohol 
and drug abuse are constructed here as a form of  self-medication using substances that 
were accessible to them at the time. 
Unlike the other three men, Andrew did not abuse alcohol or drugs in his youth. 
Nonetheless, it remains significant to his story that he explicitly considered his position 
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on alcohol abuse, making a conscious decision to be abstinent. In this sense, alcohol was 
a significant presence in his teenage years with which he struggled. This becomes clearer 
in his rationale. The choice of  abstinence was due to the highly adverse impact of  his 
fathers alcoholism on his family and childhood home. Instead, Andrew states that threw 
himself  into sport, eventually extending his athletics into such arduous events as the 
triathlon.  
The significance of  alcohol for Andrew is also shown later in his early adult years when 
he began to drink alcohol as part of  a relationship. In his remarks about his initial 
experience of  drinking, he found alcohol to be:  
a godsend, [prov id ing]  a p lace I  could go to. Under the 
inf luence of  a lcohol  was just  b l iss . (Andrew1,  ¶41)  
So, rather than drugs and alcohol having not had an impact on Andrew until his early 
adult years, it had already been a long-standing issue for him through the conscious 
consideration of  abstinence. It is the very fact of  this awareness, and what he chooses 
to do with it (i.e. abstinence) that has already made alcohol an issue for him. 
For the other three men, abuse of  drugs and alcohol appears to have occurred as soon 
as they were old enough for it to come within reach of  their social context. Except for 
Andrew, these men were bingeing and using drugs from their earliest high school years. 
While alcohol was the substance of  choice for William and Podraig, for Peter, it was 
drugs; predominantly cannabis. However, like William and Podraig, abuse escalated 
throughout his teenage years.  
There were some t imes in my late adolescence I  would put i t  
down to where I  exper ienced what is  fai r ly  common I think , 
which is  some self-destruc t ive tendenc ies , which is  around 
wipe-out with a lcohol.  Sometimes with other drugs. Mari juana 
and yeah,  most ly  mar i juana which I  used to use to an extreme 
degree where I  would be unable to k ind of  I  would be in  a 
pretty  ragged state at t imes.  And I  of ten wondered why d id I  
need to go that  far  because i t  ac tual ly  got past  being p leasant  
you know. I t s just  sor t  o f ,  fee l ing b loody awful real ly .  (Peter1,  
¶12)  
When Peter reflects back on this period he expresses puzzlement at the extremes he 
now sees that were involved, labelling it self-destructive, and wondering what it was that 
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drove him. However, while he names this behaviour as self-destructive, Peter states that 
it was not specifically suicidal: 
But that to me that  wasn' t  about  spec if ica l ly  su ic idal but i t  was 
i t  was, you know, I  th ink that 's  a fai r ly  common exper ience of 
people to have some of those t imes where we they we just  
want  to sel f-destruc t.  A n ihi l is t ic  k ind of thing real ly .  (Peter1,  
¶12)   
While Podraigs alcohol abuse was heavy in his late teenage years, the death of  his first 
partner resulted in an extraordinary level of  cannabis use and very little else, including 
food and water. Unlike Peter however, Podraig did end this period by an explicit act to 
end his life. He was discovered hanging and admitted into the local general hospital for 
medical and psychiatric care.  
While William relates some use of  cannabis, his concerns focus almost exclusively on 
his experience of  drinking heavily from age 13 to try: 
drowning i t  [ fee l ings] out,  or  t ry ing to drown i t  out.  
(Wil l iam1,  ¶285)  
He left school the next year, and at age 16 had his first psychiatric admission following 
an attempt to shoot himself. His first experience with psychiatry was horrendous. His 
drinking escalated, and he recollects that he often mixed alcohol with his prescribed 
medication.  
Although substance abuse appears to have been initially used as a means to relieve the 
anxiety of  day-to-day life, it eventually added another layer of  difficulty to already 
complex issues for these men. For Andrew and Podraig, substance abuse (including 
alcohol) led to violence and crime. Andrew relates violent rage associated with his binge 
drinking. He also attributes drinking to the ending of  his first relationship and loss of  
work. Similarly, Podraig entered a career of  crime and started abusing hard drugs. 
Normalness 
A common thread for each of  these conversations was that throughout their childhood 
and school years these men recollected understanding their emotional state to be 
normal. While they understood themselves to be different, there is a complete 
absence of  recollection of  understanding themselves to be anything other than normal. 
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This stands in stark contrast to their detailed descriptions of  distress and the growing 
awareness of  being different. While an awareness of  being different to their school-age 
peers grew, these men were silent on being other than normal. As William says,  
I  knew no other way,  that s just  the way I  fe l t .  (Wil l iam1, ¶11)  
Each of  the men seemed to draw complex, and apparently contradictory distinctions 
between normal and different. For instance, the following part of  the conversation with 
Andrew shows one view of  difference and normality.  
Andrew: I  would a lways start  the year of f  in a h igher s tream of 
c lass but then a lways end up down in C or  D and i t  
just  k ind of  ind icated to me that  I  wasn' t  as inte l l igent 
as some of the people thought I  was,  you know, that 
thought  I  was in te l l igent .  
Br ian: So you saw it  that  way rather  than  
Andrew: Oh, i t  was re inforc ing the whole t ime,  and i t  was 
knowing that the school cert i f icate, that a certa in 
percentage had to fa i l .   
Br ian: So in that sense you wouldn' t  have seen yourself  
d i f ferent  to the other  k ids,  jus t not as  in te l l igent? 
Andrew: Yeah.  Yeah.  
Br ian: So no idea you were depressed e ither  probably? 
Andrew: No.  Just l iv ing i t .  
Br ian: That  was normal i ty  for  you.  There was not  something 
par t icu lar ly  a problem here, so no reason to even ask 
for  help? 
Andrew: No. 
(Andrew2, ¶37-44) 
In this excerpt of  my conversation with Andrew about his deteriorating academic 
performance, he puts forward a view in which he positions his poor intelligence as 
something separate or distant. He does not see himself  as fundamentally different from 
the norm of  his peers. There was simply no prompt or motivation to seeking help. His 
experience of  the world had led him to understand that others simply got their 
assessment of  his intelligence wrong. While Andrew describes his emotional experience 
as just lived, in a taken-for-granted way. Until others, or other circumstances named 
them as abnormal, the need for help was not prompted for their increasingly distressed 
psychological state. The adults around them in their childhood years also did not see 
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cause to intervene; at least until a crisis point was reached (e.g. Podraigs emotional 
collapse).  
While help for emotional needs remained unrecognised at school, the help of  teachers 
was sought out for physical threat (i.e. bullying). However, in other circumstances adults 
were also the source of  their distress; for instance, Podraigs humiliation at school 
assembly for his familys poverty and his description of  his search for affection as 
causing him to be vulnerable to further victimisation through sexual assault.  
Peter provided a somewhat different example about help. At school, Peter described his 
teachers and other adults as supportive of  his Bohemian difference and desire for 
creative expression.  
I  had hair  down to my bum <both laughing> which I  had very 
t id i ly  t ied back from the front.  You wouldn ' t  have known, but  I  
had th is long pony ta i l  and,  you know, I  had the longest  hair  of  
any man that I 've ever  seen real ly ,  and um I  was wear ing ear 
r ings and I  was wear ing necklaces you know, now, um, and 
people loved that .  I  was a Bohemian you know  (Peter1,  
¶106)  
In particular, his school principal stood out for modifying requirements of  the 
curriculum to suit Peter. However, reflecting back on this showed that this help made 
him even more different to his peers through the special arrangements. As a result, Peter 
became increasingly aware that he was inadequate, unable to cope with the hard 
subjects of  maths and science, and not up to playing sport. The help seemed to 
emphasise the problem rather than stopping it or making the problem go away for him. 
Similarly, Podraig appreciated the attention and care his mother paid to him, but his 
problems too, appeared to get emphasised through the vociferous accusatory responses 
from his sisters. 
Finding effective help 
Looking back on their school years, what was purported as help then was variously 
ineffective at resolving the issues that it was sought out to deal with and appeared to 
exacerbate the underlying issues or even result in a further a further breech of  trust. 
While peers were frequently the source of  psychological pain, the company of  girls was 
somewhat preferred to that of  boys. By the time these men left school there appeared to 
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be little experience of  effective help and support for their distress. Where resources 
were discovered that ameliorated their distress (e.g. truanting, sport, drugs, etc.), it was 
as a result of  their own efforts.  
In their later teenage and early adult years two different paths were taken in which these 
men encountered the help of  health professionals. Prompted by crises, Andrew and 
Peter sought out professional help from their general practitioner (GP). Many years 
of  repeated crises of  emotional distress. For instance, Andrew described a cyclical spiral 
downward of  binge drinking, involving deterioration at work and loss of  relationships. 
For some time he had also endured increasing panic attacks. He eventually moved back 
to his parents home. While this was a refuge for him, it was also a place of  bad 
memories.  
I t  was hel l  to l ive with them and I  would jus t stay  in  my room, 
and I  remember some days for  quite long, you know, months, 
consecut ive months,  sometimes not  even going outs ide the 
house.  (Andrew2, ¶25)  
At this stage, Andrew felt that a crisis point had been reached, feeling that he was in a 
much more dangerous place than he had previously coped with, visualising himself  
deliberately driving into a specific bridge. A recognition that he was stepping over his 
line in the sand beyond which he did not have self-control forced him to seek help 
from his GP. 
While for a time in his early adult years Peter had been mostly enjoying life using 
cannabis and partying. However, he increasingly began to experience debilitating panic 
attacks that left him overwhelmed, scared, unable to move, and wishing he wasnt there. 
These were associated with day-to-day stress (e.g. raising a child) that, while difficult, he 
saw other people managing. However, stressful circumstances could leave Peter sobbing, 
cold, terrified, and unable to remain on his own. Peter sought support from friends and 
family (not his birth family). He recollects that thoughts of  killing himself  seemed too 
horrific to inflict on everyone; he did not want to do violence to those people 
(Peter1, ¶79). Nevertheless, he found himself  planning how to bring about his own 
death in such a way that those around him would consider it an accident. This thinking 
prompted Peter to seek professional help from his GP. 
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Andrew and Peter were both prescribed medication from their GP. They were also 
referred to various forms of  counselling and psychotherapy. For both of  them, 
medication was viewed as a means to enable them to work on their problems rather 
than as a cure. However, both Andrew and Peter also experienced counselling that was 
both, effective and not effective for them. This included different therapeutic 
approaches from both health service professionals as well as others (e.g. counsellors, 
psychologists). Looking back, Andrew regards that the most effective help and support 
has come from Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). Another effective strategy for him was to 
confront his brother about sexually assaulting him as a child. While he expected a denial, 
and this is what happened, he came away feeling sufficient closure was achieved in order 
to move on. 
The notion of  what has been effective help is unclear. Peter seems to come close to 
defining the difference in the following remarks: 
Well  ah, the psychotherapeut ic work has, you know, through 
art icu lat ing a k ind of unders tanding the h is tory, my h istory  and 
my exper ience. I 've,  actual ly  there's a whole lo t  of  th ings 
about  my re lat ionships  <> there 's been a lot  of  heal ing 
through that.  I t  hasn' t  required me to storm and rave and,  you 
know, and gesta lt  and you know, cathar t  < laughs>. And I 've 
been real ly  surpr ised at  that cause you know I  ta lk a lo t  and 
I 'm qui te an expert  ta lker <laughter>. And I  a lways fe l t  I  was 
an expert  in what  was wrong with me i f  you l ike,  but actual ly  
the talk ing of  the psychotherapy has been very very  ef fec t ive 
in chipping away at  some of  that s tuf f .  And actual ly  you know, 
the way i t  was descr ibed to me when I  asked what the process 
was, cause I  got impat ient with i t  < laughs>,  the way I  th ink  
anyone does you know, was very  much about  that th ing of  
br inging in to consc ious unders tanding the real guts of the 
story  bas ical ly ,  I  mean to have some power over i t  in my l i fe  
instead of being at  i ts  mercy.  (Peter1, ¶100)  
From this description, ef fective therapeutic work involves an historical exploration of  
the trajectory to suicidality in a way that in turn, leads to a shift in understanding. The 
result of  effective help then appears to have been a way of  thinking historically and 
critically in order to develop a different construction (i.e. the real guts) of  himself  
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from these events. In changing his view of  himself  in his past, Peter has found that he 
changed his present circumstances. 
Finding help was however, a very different story for William and Podraig. In response to 
attempts to take their own life they were compulsorily admitted for psychiatric care; 
William was admitted into an institutional setting in his mid-teens, and Podraig into a 
medical unit of  a general hospital in his early adult years. This help was experienced as 
traumatic, leaving them both to conclude they would have nothing to do with 
psychiatric services ever again. Decades later, the anger at the earlier experience is still 
very apparent in the conversation I had with William: 
At s ixteen I  t r ied to b low my head apar t  with a r i f le.  That t ime 
I  was put into <inst i tu t ion> I  hated i t .  I  was drugged to the 
eyebal ls .  I  real ly  don' t  remember that much about  i t  but  what  I  
do remember  yeah,  I  swore I 'd never have anyth ing to do wi th 
mental  health serv ices again. I  mean nobody to ld me what was 
wrong with me,  luck i ly ,  because apparent ly  I  was label led 
schizophrenic.  But then back then everybody was 
schizophrenic.  (Wi l l iam1, ¶50)  
Nonetheless, William has had ongoing experiences with mental health services since 
that early admission. He has experienced various medications as well as electro 
convulsive therapy (ECT). He has had various diagnostic labels attributed to his 
repeated hospital admissions. In contrast to his first psychiatric admission, his regard for 
mental health services has become much more positive. William attributes this change to 
good relationships with his psychiatrist and GP. Furthermore, he now has access to 
much longer consultations and good follow-up after discharge from hospital. He 
contrasts this to previous times when he has felt abandoned in times of  crisis, when he 
could only get the answer phone at mental health crisis services. 
Unlike William, due to serious medical complications, Podraig was treated in a medical 
unit. He recollects feeling treated differently. The nursing staff  communicated to him 
that his problems were simply an issue of  mind over matter (Podraig2, ¶39). He says 
he was not helped, but instead, stigmatised and neglected. He left the hospital after 
recovering feeling an intense anger at the world that decades later remains present in 
our conversation:  
Br ian: Did that  anger  s tar t  whi le you were in  the ward? 
Podraig:  Yeah. 
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Br ian: Just  le f t  to  th ink?  
Podraig:  Yeah,  because I  thought you know what  was the 
point  of  haul ing me down from the road? Why not  jus t 
leave me? I  mean what have they done? Where 's the 
intervent ion? What 's  happened? Noth ing's changed.  
Br ian: What  d id they do?  
Podraig:  Noth ing.  
Br ian: Not even ant i  depressants?  
Podraig:  Noth ing. 
Br ian: No?  
Podraig:  They ended up g iv ing me an ant i  depressant  after  I  
lef t .  
Br ian: Oh, okay. I  was going to ask because   
Podraig:  Which was absolute ly useless. I t  was one of these 
th ings where you had to take about twelve a day and 
then i t  gradual ly  goes up to about 24.  And i t  d id 
nothing.  I  had i t  for  weeks and weeks and weeks and i t  
changed noth ing. Al l  I  got was angr ier .  Nobody was 
deal ing with the issue.  With me. Al l  they were doing 
was try ing to <?get> me out of  the <?way> So my 
anger just  increased t i l l  I  threw the whole b loody lo t  
away.  (Podraig2, ¶55-67) 
 
While Podraig feels certain that the deep anger kept him from killing himself, it was also 
an impetus for entering a long period of  serious crime which, in turn, produced further 
experiences of  violence and victimisation as well as drug abuse. This in turn, led to 
further attempts to take his own life, sometimes with the antidepressants that he had 
been prescribed. Again, attempts to take his own life led to other hospital admissions 
during which, like William, he acquired different diagnostic labels. The multiple 
experiences with psychiatry over these years have continued to leave him feeling 
unhelped, invalidated, frustrated, and angry. 
Podraig has also explored alternatives to psychiatry; in this he has traversed the range 
from meditation gurus to self-help literature. He recollects that in some ways there 
seemed to be something in each experience that was helpful. At the suggestion of  his 
partner at the time who expressed her confidence in his abilities, Podraig has since 
successfully undertaken a degree programme. He was surprised to find not only was he 
successful, but that the subject area deeply interested him.  
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Nonetheless, during his time at university he experienced a number of  crises in 
connection with his relationship, as well as discovering he had a chronic physical illness. 
These events eventually led to him being drawn once again into a period of  heavy drug 
use. However, unlike earlier times, he sought out a clinic for drug and alcohol abuse and 
was admitted for a prolonged period of  rehabilitation. Here, he underwent a very 
different process to his experiences of  psychiatry. He describes what happened as 
having the layers of  his identity stripped back: 
I  got an assessment  done at A and E18 a t  <hospita l>.  And I  
went  in  there on the <exact date>.  For the f i rs t  two years I  
couldn' t  real ly  < inaudib le>. The onion had been str ipped.  The 
trouble wi th onions is  that  their  sk ins are r ight  to the centre 
and i f  you peel  back the sk ins  you end up with noth ing there. 
That 's  what  I  fe l t .  And I  d idn' t  know who I  was or  what  my 
ident i ty  was. I t  was real ly  qui te a lonely t ime. I t  was a real ly  
lonely t ime. I  got depressed quite a b i t  and I  f i l led i t  up by 
hav ing my phone number  avai lable as  a contact for  anybody 
who was hav ing a lcohol or  drug problems and wanted to r ing 
AA.  (Podraig1, ¶105)  
He regards this admission as a turning point in his life, setting him on a path of  ongoing 
recovery. 
Ongoing recovery 
At the time these conversations took place, each of  these men had found strategies to 
relieve their psychological distress that they believe are working. At the same time, this 
positive self-evaluation is tempered by a realisation that each of  them has previously felt 
that they were on top of  their issues, and yet experienced further psychological crises. 
To get to this point in their history, many different approaches to help have been tried 
and experienced throughout the intervening years. In their reflections on this history 
there appears to be no single outstanding point at which recovery commenced, although 
a number of  key events are identified as influencing the path they have taken.  
All four men have very clearly stated that, although not wishing their experiences on 
others, the path they were set upon has meant that I [have] learnt a lot about myself  
(William1, ¶196). Podraigs remarks about stripping away the onion layers of  his sense 
                                                 
18 Accident and Emergency unit of the public hospital. Elsewhere called an Emergency or Casualty department. 
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of  self  describe the profound levels of  experience to which this comment refers. They 
each also point to the importance of  being resourceful by learning as much as possible 
about what was happening. In this regard, these men do not point to one reliable source, 
but rather point to multiple sources of  information and to different people and 
different services. The range of  resources includes health professionals, self-help 
resources (e.g. books) and groups (e.g. AA), as well as people within their day-to-day 
relationships. William in particular, argues the importance of  seeking to be informed. 
Podraig highlights that it is not known what will become useful until later, and only 
upon reflection that it can be seen what has contributed positively and what didnt, so he 
suggests to be broad in selecting resources. 
Developing positive relationships with people was highlighted as a key issue. This took 
different forms. For William, Andrew and Peter, their partners (and their children) 
provided a means to continue living in times of  great psychological pain. Peter describes 
this connection quite powerfully to me a number of  times; for instance: 
The reason I  wouldn ' t  do i t  was because the loving of  my 
par tner  and her fami ly .  My very,  very,  in t imate fr iends who 
were around me.  (Peter1,  ¶88)  
Other relationships were also important. William regarded a relationship with his 
psychiatrist and GP, as a key reason for accessing mental health services. Andrew and 
Podraig also found that involvement in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) was a critical part 
of  their ongoing strategy. It was through AA, that they discovered other people needed 
them on the other end of  the telephone, and that their knowledge and experience was 
valued. This is reciprocated, for they both rely on their AA connections to guide and 
maintain their recovery process.  
They each emphasise the necessity to work on their problems. While Andrew and 
William frame their problems, in part, as a biological (i.e. as genetic and organic changes 
to the brain) problem, they both strongly assert that:  
I m sorry ,  but  I  th ink  counsel l ing is  real ly  impor tant.  I  mean 
handing out  p i l ls  is  not enough. (Wi l l iam1,  ¶272)   
Work then, meant revisiting the history and developing a different understanding of  
the real guts of  the story (Peter1, ¶100). Medication on the other hand was valued as a 
means to enable the work to happen. 
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C h a p t e r  8  
A (RE)INTERPRETATION OF FOUR 
CONVERSATIONS 
Having previously set out the key points of  my understanding of  my conversations with 
the four men in this study, this understanding is revisited at a deeper level in this 
chapter. Through an interpretive analysis of  transcripts (supported by memos), this 
chapter undertakes a further (and different) understanding of  the conversations. 
Transcripts are a link back to the original conversational events in a similar way that 
medical records serve to connect a clinical analysis to the original interview with a client. 
Transcripts are an aide memoir and audit trail. As a fixed historical record, they are made 
available to many more people than were present at the original event. While separate 
from the original event to which they refer, these texts serve to enable a deeper 
understanding to be developed through further interpretation. In this way, the horizon 
of  the clinical lens is imposed upon the clients story and consequently becomes the 
clinicians interpretation. Similarly, while referring to the original conversation, the 
interpretation in this chapter is not the same as that from the conversations themselves, 
yet provides further information about the original conversation through the 
opportunity provided by the transcripts. In the process of  (re)interpretation19 a different 
horizon of  meaning is imposed on the text, consequently a different story is told, and a 
different set of  issues is revealed as significant.   
Home and school are shown to be key social contexts for the construction of  
understandings that become significant for these men. As children and young people, 
they understand their victimisation as normal until, in the social context of  school, 
they are increasingly excluded on the basis of  difference. In this chapter, this process, 
and the trajectory leading from this process to suicidality, is shown to be a gendered 
one. In revisiting these conversations, bringing the taken-for-granteds into view, this 
                                                 
19 I use the parentheses in (re)interpretation to indicate that while it is a new interpretation, it is another interpretation 
of the original to which it refers back to. That is, it is both an interpretation and reinterpretation at the same time. 
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chapter will focus on the way in which masculinity influences the meaning-making 
processes in the pathway that these men have taken in their experiences of  suicidality. 
Historicity and victimisation 
The social fact of  what actually happened in these mens lives as a discoverable truth 
is not at issue here but rather, the way in which their history was experienced and then 
reinterpreted in an ongoing attempt to better understand  themselves and their world. 
Specific events in their lives stand out as significant, even life-changing, according to this 
meaning-making process. Historically, certain events are viewed as having been 
influential while others are barely noticeable.   
Heidegger (1962) has said that the world is already replete with ready-to-hand meanings 
through our cultural and linguistic heritage, and that we are thrown into this world. 
These already existing meanings remain tacit and unexamined insofar as assumptions are 
not interrupted in some way that requires our conscious attention (Martin & 
Thompson, 2003). Seidler (1989, 1994, 1997) has for instance, argued that our present 
understanding of  masculinity is historically linked to our Enlightenment heritage. While 
these already existing meanings make it possible for the world to be intelligible, it 
correspondingly constrains the range of  possible meanings (Gadamer, 1965/1975). In 
this regard, the body is already endowed with taken-for-granted gendered meanings. 
Within the hermeneutic perspective, to understand suicidality then is to understand it as 
a deeply historical and embodied endeavour, inextricably tied to the social context 
through language and culture. Through temporal distance, some events will stand out 
for these men as having been influential; this of  course, is from the vantage point of  the 
present and as such is a viewpoint that is culturally and linguistically situated in the 
present. 
To relate their understandings, these men commence their sense-making story from 
their childhood, describing what they now comprehend as traumatic events. This 
understanding is from the vantage point of  their present horizon of  meaning. The 
experience of  victimisation in the home as children was understood in the past context 
as normal; and as such, was invisible and unquestioned. Construed as normal, there 
was no impetus to question the taken-for-grantedness of  their experiences of  violence 
or neglect. Also as children, their experience was also likely to be one in which there was 
no experience of  being able to cause change. Their father, or father figure, embodied 
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power within their childhood home. As children, their experience was likely to be one 
of  powerlessness, and understood as such in a tacit unacknowledged way. For Podraig, 
this understanding of  powerlessness had been put to the test resulting in the practical 
experience of  being overpowered (i.e. violently assaulted) by his father or stepfather. 
This somatic and emotional experience of  powerlessness then, had become embodied at 
an early age and understood as normal.  
School brought experiences that challenged existing understandings. At school, they 
began to make sense of  themselves as different. However, being different, 
necessitates something against which to be different. What it was that they were 
different to did not become clear for many years.  
With respect to health, Gadamer (1996) has said that well-being, as a state of  
equilibrium, is an equilibrium within the world and not simply an absence of  
physiological dysfunction. Well-being is well-being within the world. That which is 
normal and taken-for-granted is not usually conscious to us until something is 
experienced as wrong or not as it should be, or as Gadamer has said, that something 
is lacking; he states that in its very freedom from disturbance, [well-being] almost 
completely escapes our attention (p. 73). As children, difference was experienced 
negatively in quite material ways, for instance, through the violence of  bullying and 
exclusion from peer groups. The notion of  difference makes sense only in relation to 
something else. The contrast between presence and absence, discloses that something 
was there. Through its relativity to something else that is taken-for-granted, the pain of  
being different, of  being victimised, and of  being excluded, discloses something of  
what had been taken-for-granted. In this case, through what bullying achieves, bullying 
discloses something about when bullying does not occur. 
Understanding these experiences of  difference did not occur independently of  what 
had gone before. In repeated cycles, unexpected events are cause for reflection, that in 
turn also shift and extend previous understandings. Becoming different at school then 
occurs in a dynamic between past and present, whilst also situated within institution of  
school, as well as peer relationships in the playground. The struggle to make sense of  
this experience includes the practical working out of  it in both the playground and 
classroom. In other words, not just any understanding will do. For instance, Podraigs 
consciousness of  his small stature constrained his ability to locate himself  
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socioculturally. He could not for instance, construe himself  as one of  the First XV.20 
Clearly, being different was also construed as being less-than. 
The past also both provides possibilities and constraints to understand future 
experiences. For instance, experiences of  powerlessness, violence, or neglect in the 
childhood home become ready-to-hand understandings upon which to make sense of  
later experiences at school. Against their historical background, the experience of  other 
boys targeting them is readily associated with their past experiences, and therefore 
readily interpreted in an almost taken-for-granted way. However, that their experience is 
not the same as others in the school ground is a new experience and hence, stands out 
as difference.  
Fathers are complex and contradictory figures in these mens reflections on  their 
childhood. Early  memories of  a home milieu of  happy relationships goes to crap 
in later childhood. Fathers leave and step-fathers enter their lives. Fathers who are 
drunk, violent and threatening are feared and also loved.  Their narratives show that 
their experience of  fathers and stepfathers bequeathed a tradition that remained 
something that they struggled with from a very early time in their lives. This is evident in 
their narratives of  the following years, showing that the struggle around these issues are 
the basis for later understandings of  their life experiences. In a real sense, as these men 
look back, the trauma they experienced are foundational experiences upon which later 
understandings are constructed.  
Trauma, and consequently fear and terror, may be as a result of  family violence or loss, 
but the central figure in this experience is their father or step-father. The distressing 
experiences created by their fathers occur within particular contexts of  childhood. 
However, significant to what they related that was influential to the development of  
their understandings was also what was absent; that is, what was not mentioned that I 
had expected to hear about. In these conversations, until their school years these men 
do not mention any other adults except for their mothers. This doesnt mean there was 
no other adult present in their lives, but that for some reason they are not significant to 
what these men attempt to convey to me.  
                                                 
20 The First XV is a term used to mean the first 15 members of the rugby union team. 
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In their childhood home, these men do not appear to have had access to adult help 
except for their mothers. Yet, mothers are blamed for not protecting or preventing the 
terror and fear or neglect experienced from their fathers and step-fathers. Mothers are 
variously seen as inaccessible and remote, silent, and also subjected to fear and violence. 
Podraig draws this picture vividly when saying that as a child he states:  
 [ I ]  spent  a l l  my t ime in my home with pretend fr iends for  a 
long t ime. (Podraig1, ¶3)  
A picture of  isolation and powerlessness appears from a very early age. Similarly, school 
brought further related experiences of  violence, fear, and an absence of  adult help. As 
in their home, the teachers at school did not stop the bullying. As Martin & Dawda 
(1999) have stated, experience shapes understanding, therefore understanding is also an 
embodied experience. Hence, self  understanding must be congruent with its practical 
working out. The practical day-to-day experience and understanding was that of  
victimisation. 
 Experiencing re-victimisation 
Consistent with the current literature that demonstrates the significance of  school in 
shaping the development of  young masculinities (Connell, 2000; Mac an Ghaill, 1994; 
Mills, 2001) these men relate significant events from these years in the context of  school 
rather than any other social location. The construction of  their school-boy masculinities 
involved the school as an institution, teachers, sport, curriculum, and their peers (both 
male and female). Mac an Ghaill (1994) has argued that schools are institutionally 
gendered, arguing that the authority of  the school is generally held by and serves the 
interests of  heterosexual men. Institutional expectations are therefore gendered. This 
may be seen for instance, in the gender-based expectations in sport and curriculum. 
Institutionally, there was an expectation on boys to play rugby as a sport. Other sports 
were regarded as sissy.  Similarly, in the curriculum there are hard subjects and 
soft subjects. Boys were expected to do the hard subjects. That boys sometimes 
undertake the so-called softer sports or subjects does not necessarily challenge the 
accepted norms of  masculinity. For instance, while Peter undertook the soft subjects, 
this did not serve to bring these subjects into the hegemonic masculine domain, but 
rather, Peter was excluded from legitimate masculinity leaving the hegemonic standard 
uncontested. 
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Masculinities are constructed in the playground through peer and teacher dynamics 
(Mac an Ghaill, 1994; Mac an Ghaill, 1996; Phoenix & Frosh, 2001; Swain, 2002). In 
particular, bullying had a profound impact at school upon these men. School ground 
violence was used to exclude certain attributes from school ground hegemonic 
masculinity. This included smallness of  stature, passivity, being sensitive, creativity, 
accent, and styles of  dress. A hierarchy was being enforced within the school ground 
culture based on excluding the expression of  certain emotions and emphasising physical 
control. This was congruent with school authority in setting the curriculum and the 
privileging of  certain sporting activity over other sports. As Connell (1995) has argued, 
hegemonic standards are not necessarily determined by any particular group but 
requires some degree of  correspondence between the cultural ideal, institutional power, 
and individuals. So, while there may be obvious differences between playground 
expectations of  peers and those of  teaching staff, at some point, there is also a 
convergence. While not necessitating an explicit agreement, the convergence of  interests 
is range generally acceptable to all. In this interplay between scrutiny, reward, and 
punishment, lies the power of  disciplinary processes (Foucault, 1975/1979). 
As children entering school with pre-existing understandings of  what constituted 
normal in a taken-for-granted way; that is, the presence of  violence and fear was 
unquestioned (as were their responses to this). However, what was previously their 
unexamined assumptions about their home life were constructed as different through 
the wider social interactions of  school. In particular, encountering the expanded social 
context of  school life brought an awareness of  things about their bodies and thinking 
that they began to understand as a differentness from that of  other boys in the school.  
In their stories of  their school years, it was from their male peers that they feared 
violence and exclusion. Being victimised was of  itself  a reason to be marked as 
different; normal boys were not victimised. Part of  this process of  understanding 
their differentness was an emerging awareness that, what marked them as different, were 
also associated with femininity through homophobia. That is, being victimised, not 
fighting, not playing rugby, physical deformity, being sensitive, dressing differently, doing 
art or music, associating with girls, seeking the protection of  teachers, and so forth 
became associated with femininity. Soccer was sissy (Andrew), and music rather than 
maths, was defined as taking softer subjects (Peter). Through a process of  ongoing 
victimisation their differentness became embedded in their historical background. This 
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was built on their previous understandings of  violence and bullying in relationship to 
women and men, as well as other hierarchies; such as age. There is an absence of  any 
influence from within and without the school that seemed to significantly question their 
understanding of  these experiences in any other way. 
At school, fear of  violence and the experience of  victimisation is extended into a wider 
social context. In a sense, as children, the experience of  victimisation in their lives is 
now global. The social context of  school brings further experiences of  victimisation of  
male violence, and significantly, also now connects male violence to sexuality through 
homophobia. By their later school years, the meanings of  differentness and violence are 
interpreted as an expulsion of  homosexuality. For Podraig and Andrew, male violence is 
additionally linked to sexuality through their experiences of  sexual assault.  
Struggling to fit in 
At the same time as realising themselves to be different, there was a struggle to fit in. 
There were different aspects of  themselves that these men mentioned that indicated 
what it was that made them different: appearance, dress style, grooming, behaviour, 
social skills (e.g. being quieter than other boys), sport, relationships to peers and 
teachers, and choice of  school subjects. Through their engagement with the 
sociocultural context of  the school, these boys understood themselves to be deficient 
and less-than other boys. They were aware that it was these attributes that were targeted 
in the bullying and exclusion they experienced. However, during their school years, the 
external constraints of  physical violence that targeted specific attributes or behaviours 
became internalised so that upon leaving school, these boys had internalised the 
hierarchical structure, knew their place in it, and monitored themselves for signs of  
transgression. As Foucault has argued, through the internalisation of  surveillance, they 
had been disciplined in accord with the dominant cultural view (Foucault, 1975/1979). 
Motivated by their distress, their school years were characterised as a period of  struggle. 
This was crystallised as a quest to fit in. Like Podraigs earlier portrait of  himself  as a 
little boy seeking his fathers love and at the same time terrified of  his violence, these 
boys were grappling with the challenge of  fitting in while at the same time fearful of  the 
rejection and threat of  violence from their peers. The institution of  school was not 
separated from this struggle. This struggle took place within an institutional context that 
helped shape the struggle to make sense of  difference and an inability to fit in. 
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An extensive history, and consequent understanding of  self  as a victim, existed by the 
time they grappled with issues of  sexuality and sexual intimacy in their teenage years. 
Furthermore, Podraig and Andrew had both experienced sexual assault from older 
males. They remained wary of  males around them and the potential for further sexual 
assault. This impacted widely on their relationships with male peers and adults, causing 
them to be persistently vigilant for potential sexual vulnerability. The ever-present need 
to be watchful meant that the opportunity to develop and experience trusting 
relationships was severely curtailed. In their teenage years, developing sexual intimacy 
was therefore fraught with these additional tensions.  
In the case of  these men, it is clear from these discussions that  heterosexuality was the 
dominant norm. As the dominant cultural form, heterosexuality was simply not 
questioned by these men. On the other hand they were highly aware of  what constituted 
the trigger for homophobic responses as severe negative sanctions existed to curtail 
homosexuality. Being homosexual was discussed in these conversations as something 
that was greatly feared due to the vulnerability, threat of  violence, and ostracization. As 
a result of  working through his experiences in different sociocultural contexts at home 
and at school (e.g. religious beliefs, home violence, school ground homophobia, and 
sexual assault) Andrew positioned homosexuality as some sort of  disease or personality 
defect of  the body that might occur contrary to his will: I thought god, maybe Im 
gonna become a homosexual (Andrew1, ¶108). Ashamed of  his body, and believing he 
was undeserving of  affection and care, Andrew rejected physical intimacy until his early 
adult years. By being so closely connected to the body, exploration of  sexual intimacy 
was a powerful signifier of  conformity (or not) to heterosexuality. At the same time 
intimacy was desired, it was also feared. 
Yet, conformity to the heterosexual standard through sexually intimate relationships was 
additionally complex because of  already present understandings (prejudice) about 
themselves developed from earlier experiences of  victimisation, fear, sexual assault, and 
isolation. While both Andrew and Peter worked this tension through by avoiding sex, 
Podraig took from his experience of  sexual assault the understanding that intimacy was 
a transaction; that to obtain affection, sexual intimacy had a personal cost. In his sexual 
relationships with young women he describes a distancing and control over the 
transaction by managing intimacy.  
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Sport 
As school boys, these men described being highly conscious that not playing rugby 
marked them as different in important ways that no other sport could address. 
Somehow, it marked them as less than other boys. The role of  rugby in shaping school 
boy masculinities in New Zealand (Fougere, 1987; Pringle, 2002; Rout, 1992; Town, 
1999) and elsewhere (Edley & Wetherell, 1997; French, 1999, 1996; Phoenix & Frosh, 
2001) has also been observed by others as significant. Such an emphasis on rugby is not 
isolated from the larger sociocultural context. Phillips (1996) has described rugby as 
defining the identity of  a nation. He argues that rugby brought together the muscular 
virtues of  the pioneering heritage and the need to contain that spirit within civilised 
boundaries (p. 86). Not playing rugby then, marked them as unable to meet the 
hegemonic standard, not only for the present, but is a significant constraint upon their 
view of  themselves as men into the future. Not playing and not even liking rugby were 
further markers of  their difference to which they were acutely aware.  
Nonetheless, except for Peter, these men emphasised the role of  sport in their school 
life. Of  the four men, Andrew was the only one to play a body-contact sport. In his 
discussion of  soccer he shows he is aware of  the role rugby had as a proving ground for 
a physical masculinity. While he points to the severity of  his soccer injuries as a claim to 
masculinity through taking it, he recalls that this was insufficient, as soccer was the 
game for sissies. In this, Andrew clearly connects injury and pain to the hierarchy of  
maleness. The degree of  injury was insufficient to lift Andrews claim to fit in. 
Athletics provided a different set of  tensions. Although athletics does not have the 
privileged status of  rugby, the comments from these men suggest that in doing long-
distance running, the relationship of  the mind as being in control of  the body was a 
private affirmation of  masculinity. Furthermore, the success of  Andrew and Podraig at 
athletics emphasised this meaning-making in that they related experiencing little other 
success in their school years. Podraig perhaps best captured the significance of  this 
meaningfulness in athletics when he talked about the adrenaline, and confrontation he 
experienced in long-distance running. His language well captures the dominant 
masculine ideals of  competition, rationality (of  the mind), and physical strength. 
However, unlike rugby, athletics does not privilege the controlled violence and exclusion 
of  women (Fitzclarence & Hickey, 2001; Hutchins & Mikosza, 1998; Schacht, 1996). 
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Difference and being less-than 
Consistently, these men expressed a childhood in which they said they discussed 
experiences of  not fitting in. As an experience of  something lacking or wrong, 
difference and feelings of  inadequacy point to what it is that is considered normal, as it 
is this that they differed from in a negative way. While their interactions as children (and 
later as younger teenagers) undoubtedly included a multitude of  forms of  
communication, explicit victimisation provided unmistakeable experiences through 
which they rapidly became aware of  the motivations for their exclusion. That is, they 
were aware of  what it was about them that was being targeted. The nature of  what it is 
that is different or shameful therefore begins to define the shape of  what is currently 
accepted as normal from which they are excluded. To put this another way, the range 
of  normal did not include certain attributes for which they were targeted. Victimisation 
begins to answer the implied question of  fitting in; that is, it answers the question of  
to what did they not fit in with?  
Through threat and overt violence their victimisation taught what it was about them that 
meant they were different and inadequate. The normal that these men identified from 
their childhood was that they were different from other boys. They differed from 
normal boys in a negative way. Their differences were associated in various ways that 
could be easily associated with femininity; smallness, passivity, clothes, etc. Additionally, 
at some point during their school years, being a victim itself  became a target for further 
exclusion.  
There is a distinction between victimisation and losing a fight. If  men are to be 
consistent with David and Brannons (1976) oft-quoted four themes of  the sturdy 
oak, big wheel, give em hell, and not do sissy stuff ; then men cannot also be 
victims, as it is women who must be the victims of  mens violence (Gilligan, 2004). Yet, 
both victimisation and losing a fight involve violence and men both win and lose. Of  
itself, losing is not necessarily victimisation. However, school-ground bullying is not 
doing battle nor doing sport. What it is that defines bullying is the social context, the 
spectacle (even when others are not directly present, someone getting done over 
becomes known throughout the school). Difference is both constitutive and 
constituted by the violence. Bullying is a policing of  the boundaries between different 
and not-different; and it is perpetrated by males on other males. The meaning of  
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violence in the arena of  the school-ground is to repel the feminine attributes of  males, 
and preserving the dominant masculine image.  
Notably these men did not question this status quo. Instead, they became highly adept 
themselves at a process of  self-surveillance for signs of  transgression to the hegemonic 
standard. Such self-surveillance, finding many faults in physical appearance, dress, 
behaviour, lack of  success, and social relationships, confirmed their understandings of  
difference to the other boys. Foucault describes this process as disciplinary; whereby 
discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, docile bodies (1975/1979, p. 
138). For Foucault, disciplinary power constantly surveys the body for transgression, it 
is anonymous, and at the same time everywhere. Such scrutiny brings about ever 
increasing detail to light, and in doing so, subjects bodies to increasing constraint.  
Sport was one domain in which these men worked out an identity as less than other 
males. As an explicitly competitive physical test (and spectacle), sport emphasised a 
hierarchy between winners and losers. While rugby might be regarded as entertainment, 
the importance of  rugby for constructing male identity cannot be underestimated. 
Rugby has had an historically significant place in national identity for men in New 
Zealand (Phillips, 1996). This hierarchical positioning extends beyond the teams 
involved to all men. As the First IV are at the pinnacle, all other men are measured 
against this standard. Not playing rugby at all is at the lowest point of  the hierarchy; as 
is expressing complete disinterest. The privileged position of  rugby men, means that 
playing rugby provides a potent means for a claim to masculine status. 
While significant, rugby was not the only means of  constructing male identity. The 
school curriculum was similarly hierarchical, distinguishing between those that did well 
and those that did not. Even as a very young child, William recognised this in the system 
of  rewards for handwriting. Instead of  being encouraged to do better, he understood 
that he would never be rewarded. As older children, subjects at school were also divided 
between hard and soft. Soft subjects were those with substantially feminine 
attributes. 
By the time they leave school in their mid-teens, these men had a vast history of  
victimisation upon which to resource further understandings of  new experiences of  
violence, threat and fear. Understanding these experiences differently than as 
confirmation of  inadequacy (and therefore responding differently), was not possible. 
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While providing a rich means of  possible understandings as victimised, and what this 
meant for a sense of  identity, this background did not provide for a view of  self  as 
other than victimised. They knew their place as subordinated to the other boys; they 
knew they did not fit in. By the time they left school their difference to other 
(normal) boys was known to them in great detail. They were excluded, and knew this 
to be correct. They knew they were not a proper bloke (Peter2, ¶17).  
Insidiously, exclusion and the knowledge that they were not proper blokes brought 
about a sense of  angst. There is no single event to which they are able to point as the 
beginning to this angst. Nonetheless, each of  the men look back now and see their 
distress as evidence they had been depressed as children and teenagers. Leaving school 
as early as possible was described as an effort to reduce their distress. While this 
removed them from direct day to day contact of  the proving ground of  the school yard 
it did not remove the need to deal with the issue of  fitting in; leaving school simply 
changed the social context and did not of  itself  change their sense of  self.  
Before reaching their adult years, Andrew and William both tried to shoot themselves, 
while Peter and Podraig initially turned to drugs. However, as Peter notes with the 
benefit of  hindsight: 
But I  never,  I  d idn t  deal wi th the gr ief  bas ical ly ,  and the pain, 
you know. (Peter1, ¶47)  
In their teenage and adult years, intimate relationships became an important context in 
which varying levels of  crises were precipitated. Relationships became a key focus for 
crises because of  the anxieties that arose out of  the expectations or demands that they 
experienced and were historically ill-equipped to resolve. Fused with the understandings 
of  self  that these men carried on leaving school, these new crises became understood as 
further confirmation of  their individual faultiness and not-belonging in the world. 
Within relationships (and in their choice of  partners, or of  consciously not choosing 
partners) these understandings were worked through further, ultimately confirming an 
understanding that they did not fit in. Crises were multiple and occurred at different 
times and in different social contexts in their histories, that at times were precipitants to 
suicidality. As well as the location in which these crises tended to occur, these men also 
made it clear that partners, children, families, and friends were also people that they 
highly valued during those times. So, for instance, while Peter describes raising his child 
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as stressful, pushing him beyond his capacity to cope, he also held onto the presence of  
his family as a source of  comfort from the terror and fear of  his personal abyss.  
While psychiatric services may be thought of  as a resource for psychological pain, 
Podraig and William describe a different experience. They described their experience of  
involuntary intervention by mental health services as traumatising. Their recollections 
of  compulsory treatment and perception of  interactions were understood as 
invalidating. From Podraigs perspective, there was nothing he could say that was 
accepted as valid.  
Felt  as  i f  I  d idn' t  have a voice. I  fel t  as  i f  I  could scream from 
the top of the ta l les t bui ld ing in  <c ity> and for  some reason 
nobody would hear i t .  They could hear everybody e lse's  
babble but they could not hear  me. I  wasn' t  a l lowed to be 
heard.  That 's  how I  fe l t .  I  fel t  as  i f  I  just  wasn' t  al lowed to be 
heard,  that  my voice d idn' t  mat ter  (Podraig2,  ¶152)  
Fused with the horizon from which they viewed the world, Podraig and William viewed 
involuntary treatment as the removal their last claim to fit in; the removal of  their right 
to speak with a rational voice. As Podraig put it in the quote above, he was not allowed 
to be heard. Moreover, the assumption of  the right to be heard  to participate in 
society  was no longer a given but accorded to them by the authority of  specialist 
health professionals. The experience of  loss of  control and isolation was further 
compounded in a profound way. Podraig and William were now authoritatively labelled 
as not normal. Their diagnosis was scientific proof  of  their individual faultiness and 
provided the reason for their exclusion. Whereas at school the bullies had faces and 
were known personally, and in a sense were local and personal, diagnosis on the other 
hand, is universal and unassailable. They understood themselves to be examined 
objectively using universal rules and were found to be not normal compared to universal 
norms. There was no claim to some higher authority that exceeded psychiatry. The 
universality of  diagnosis meant that rather than not fitting in to their social context, 
their exclusion took on a universal perspective. 
On their discharge, William coped by resorting to familiar means of  dealing with anxiety 
and increased his drinking.  However, Podraig did something different and instead took 
his rage out against the world (Podraig1, ¶73). In Podraigs view he was excluded from 
the world and used this as a justification to embark on a career of  serious crime, feeling 
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that the world did not care for him. In the years that followed, both men had multiple 
encounters with psychiatric services for attempts to take their own lives. 
Another mechanism of  policing the boundaries of  different and not-different was 
through labelling. While psychiatry imposes labels, an earlier label attached to these men 
at school was of  being sensitive. Being sensitive meant apprehending emotional and 
somatic experience in a way that was qualitatively different to that of  other boys and 
easily associated with femininity. There was a difference in their responses, such as being 
quiet and creative, rather than sporty, not forming friendships, and a preoccupation 
about safety (including sexual vulnerability). Sensitivity may also have been a sense of  
reflection, self  examination, and introspection. Yet, to avoid violence targeted at 
personal attributes, a certain degree of  sensitivity appeared necessary to know what it is 
that is targeted so as to avoid it. On the other hand, in that sensitivity is associated with 
femininity, it becomes a target of  the same violence. Reflection and sensitivity then, or 
knowing what it is that is targeted (i.e. knowing what is and isnt manly), is in part, also 
constitutive of  being a victim.  
The experience of  difference was not one of  an uninvolved observing mind, separate to 
the body it controls; difference was meaningful in the sense that it mattered. These men 
cared very deeply that they were cast as different. Difference was also a felt difference 
through the senses of  the body. These men experienced the pain of  violence and injury. 
They could see and feel the muscles and bones through which they were small or tall. 
They could hear their quietness of  their voice or the accent with which they spoke. 
They could feel and see their different dress style, and the way the walked or moved. 
Additionally, the anxiety and fear they spoke about, rather than in the mind are 
physical experiences able to be located somatically; for instance, as that tight knot in the 
abdomen, the horrible nausea in the stomach, or tightness of  breathing in the chest. 
Guilt and shame mark the body through the slumped posture and slowness of  
movement.21 For these men at school, these were prolonged experiences over many 
years in which difference, and being less than other men, becomes painful and 
embodied in a multitude of  ways that in turn, becomes confirmatory of  being less-than. 
That it matters is at the same time experienced through the body. The way in which 
                                                 
21 A contemporary depiction of the physical manifestation of psychological pain is the changes that the character of 
Golum undergoes in the film Lord of the Rings (Jackson, 2001).  
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difference becomes meaningful is not simply intellectual (i.e. separated from the body), 
but is worked through in an embodied and historically situated context. 
As the embodied apprehension of  difference is ongoing, so is the project of  self  
understanding. While these men identify a prolonged period of  working out the 
experience of  difference, what they desired was to fit in. Their exclusion was never 
absolute or uncontested or stable but rather, they grappled and struggled with doing 
what was necessary to fit in; or at least minimise the psychological pain. This grappling 
was always in reference to their body, and always socially situated. As such, coming to 
grips with gender.  
Fathers and heteronormativity 
Fathers (and step-fathers) are central figures in these conversations. They are depicted as 
feared, terrifying figures who perpetrate violence. They are also central figures even 
when absent. Paradoxically, fathers are feared, loved and needed all at once. Fathers and 
step-fathers are the central figure around which all other relationships in the family 
revolve. Mothers and siblings emerge only in the reflection of  fathers. This is a complex 
and conflicted picture whereby fathers are placed as a potent influence. The potency of  
fathers is through fear; both fear of  violence and fear of  absence. As children, these 
men managed their emotions and behaviour so that tension and violence (and even 
absence) were not provoked. The impact of  these experiences is enduring, and is 
depicted for instance, in the lyrics of  the rock singer Meatloaf  (Steinman, 1993): 
And though the n ightmares should be over 
Now some of the terrors are st i l l  intact 
I  l l  hear that  ugly  coarse and v io lent voice 
And then he grabs me from behind and then he drags me 
back! 
 
But  i t  was long ago and i t  was far  away 
Oh God i t  seems so very far  away  
Later, as adults their fathers return in the shape of  their fears of  perpetrating upon their 
own children the experiences that damaged them as children. Andrew worries that he 
will be unsafe with young children, unwilling to care for young children by bathing 
them. With shame, guilt, and great sadness Peter relates raging against his child in times 
of  stress, although quickly adding that he has done a lot of  work to address this. William 
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also relates that doing the family thing overwhelmed him. These tensions are worked 
through in times of  feeling suicidal in the way in which Peter and William relate taking 
great care to minimise the impact their manner of  death would have on their children. 
While this thinking helps Peter from acting on his suicidal thinking (although he had 
planned how to make his death accidental), William makes attempts to kill himself  
while his children are absent and chooses to gas himself  rather than using violent and 
bloody means. 
Understandings are also developed about their own experiences in relationship to their 
father; and as a consequence, to their mothers and siblings. These understandings were 
carried forward into their school years. Understandings about emotions, behaviour, and 
power are first understood in the context of  the childhood home.22 While they do not 
label their experience as abuse, their reflections are consistent with descriptions of  
chronic child maltreatment (Erickson, Egeland, & Pianta, 1989), children who have 
experienced the death of  someone close to them (McCloskey & Walker, 2000), and of  
the childhood experience of  parental discord (Depner, Leino, & Chun, 1992; McCloskey 
& Walker, 2000).  
At school, authority figures were easily associated with the fear of  their fathers and step-
fathers. Even after these men had left home in their teenage years, the impact of  fathers 
continued on in the authority figures of  other successful men and different authority 
figures. Adult men, in different forms, are pervasively associated with fear, 
heterosexuality, and authority. Adult men are variously feared in these conversations for 
their ability to humiliate, threaten and do violence, sexually assault, change the school 
curriculum, privilege rugby over other sport, leave home, determine employment, and 
diagnose psychopathology.  
The heterosexual norm is taken for granted and unquestioned in the content these men 
discuss. A certain patriarchal way of  relating to women and children is described in their 
reflections of  their earlier years. Andrew and Podraig particularly describe their 
childhood homes where patriarchal control was maintained through fear and violence. 
As an institution, school is a deeply gendered regime, affirming relations of  domination 
and subordination (Mac an Ghaill, 1994). School was a social location of  male privilege. 
                                                 
22 Piekarska (2000) describes four types of abuse: physical, emotional, sexual, and neglect. Of note is that while there 
was recognition of intentional physical abuse in the early 1960s, recognition of other forms of maltreatment did not 
get attention until at least a decade later. 
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While they were in a position of  greater power than the young women they chased or 
with whom they managed their relationships, they were also victims of  male power. 
To have sex with women then was primarily about proving heterosexual masculinity to 
other males. Like the rugby field, sex with women was a proving ground for masculinity. 
This was also a contradictory experience on another level. While desiring to be near 
women, there was also a fear and need for distance. Intimacy was unfamiliar and 
threatened masculine control of  emotion. While in one sense sex could be conceived of  
as the proper mechanistic functioning of  the body with the mind in control, intimacy 
was an experiential dwelling in the body and provoked feelings of  vulnerability 
threatening to overthrow heterosexual accomplishment (Allen, 2002). Podraig expresses 
this conflict, and the tremendous angst it produced, when he talked about being a great 
lover in control of  these relationships yet feeling something important to him is amiss.  
Contradictions were also experienced in relationships with other males. At the same 
time as seeking to fit in, relationships with other males were carefully scrutinised for 
homosexuality. Behaviour that could be construed as indicative of  homosexuality would 
be a target of  homophobic response from other boys. Heterosexuality was mandatory 
and unquestioned (Mac an Ghaill, 1994). So, while hugging in the context of  winning 
the match was acceptable affirming male bonding, hugging in the school ground would 
acquire homosexual meaning. These tensions between possible meanings are expressed 
by Andrew in the dressing room, watchful of  the other boys. Andrew is uncertain if  his 
vulnerability is a recollection of  his sexual assault, or some sense of  shame about his 
bodys development. 
Irrational men 
Crises that have an emotional aspect to them or are about relationships are more often 
construed to be within, or as a characteristic, of  the individual. That is, these crises are 
thought of  as internal to the individual rather than between people. A person can also be 
thought of  to be in crisis if  they relate to others in ways inconsistent with the normative 
expectations of  society (McNamee, 1992). McNamee points out that society also has to 
recognise it as a crisis to be labelled as such. This is demonstrated by the existence of  
services that are specifically designed for events regarded as crises (e.g. Mental Health 
Crisis Teams). Such services exist on the assumption that such relational crises are a 
result of  a disturbance in an individuals mental functioning. Furthermore, to the degree 
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that this view is taken-for-granted, individuals will seek out the services of  a health 
professional in the event of  a feeling in crisis. That is, the crisis is construed as 
abnormal or pathological rather than say, an issue of  personal growth and learning or 
difficult social circumstances.  
The scrutiny of  health professionals is significant.  Experiences of  crises for the four 
men were labelled as diagnoses of  personality disorder or mental illnesses23 such as 
schizophrenia, depression, manic-depressive, or addictions (e.g. alcoholism or other 
substances). Diagnosis confirmed individual faultiness or abnormality as the cause of  
the relationship crisis. As a result of  this process, these men acquired a label that 
explained all the crises and distress they had experienced extending back into their 
school years. In addition, their diagnosis prescribed their future well-being as bleak.  
As mentally disordered or ill, it was also a given that these men were irrational. Several 
consequences flowed from this equation; greatly emphasised for William and Podraig by 
their experiences of  compulsory treatment. Among these were, firstly, confidence in the 
ability to accurately interpret experiences was questioned. The historical reality of  
events was now uncertain; the correct view being determined by health professionals. 
Secondly, irrationality was further affirmation of  being not-masculine (Warren, 1983). 
Being irrational is anathema to the modern conception of  an autonomous and 
successful individual. The excessive expressed emotionality of  the crisis (except for 
anger which I return to shortly) are viewed as both out of  control, pathological, and 
unmanly. Consequently, being angry was also now seen as evidence of  irrationality. 
Likewise, being ill is to be unproductive, contrary to the expectation of  men as 
economically useful (Cushman, 1990; Cushman & Gilford, 1999). Thirdly, every 
thought, behaviour, and emotional response was now subject to the scrutiny of  
biomedicine; typically, examined against the criteria of  the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of  Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). Normality was 
subject to restoration through biochemical intervention. If  this was not forthcoming, 
the efficacy of  the biochemical treatment was questioned rather than the fact of  the 
mental illness and the associated irrationality. For instance, surviving bullying, 
sensitiveness, academic failure, and isolation at school were pathologised as early 
                                                 
23 The exemplar of the classificatory system of observed behaviours is the taxonomy of mental disorders titled the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Crowe (2000) argues that the DSM construes normality in 
relationship to productivity, unity, moderation and rationality. Such values are important to the modernist project. 
Such values are also highly regarded as defining the hegemonic ideal of masculinity 
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evidence of  current mental illness rather than understood as a struggle to understand. 
Diagnosis, like the bullies at school, blamed the victim for their victimhood and hence, 
victimised them further through the diagnosis. 
These encounters with health professionals provided a vast new language upon which to 
construct an understanding of  their experiences. Scientific words and meanings were 
provided through which to comprehend their past and present experiences of  distress. 
Problems were now construed as a result of  an  illness. Although the diagnostic labels 
changed over time,24 suicidality was generally thought to be the result of  major 
depressive illness. This was viewed as either the major disorder or secondary to another 
disorder such as alcoholism. Feeling suicidal was seen as a sign of  underlying mental 
illness and therefore not normal.  
Being diagnosed with an illness held out some hope that intervention would produce 
normality. That is, normality could be biologically achieved through the ingestion of  a 
pill or driving electrical current through the brain to restore physiology. However, the 
absence of  distress of  itself  was insufficient to enable them to fit in;  to be normal. 
That is, treatment to bring about the absence of  distress did not mean that they would 
then be normal. The meaning of  normal was much more than the absence of  distress as 
normal.  
Quelling anxiety: A matter of survival 
As the degree of  difference between self  evaluation and the hegemonic standard 
deepened, anxieties increased for these four men. In the search for the means to 
enhance a claim to masculinity, sport and substance abuse became pivotal means to 
manage anxiety. Both sport and substance use were available and accessible within the 
social context of  school. While alcohol and drug abuse were not condoned by the 
school, both were easily available.  
As the ideal masculinity, rugby also becomes one way of  policing this demarcation 
between feminine and masculine. For instance, Town (1999) describes a practice of  
deterrence and defeminisation in which violence and emotional constrain are 
characteristic features. Insofar as sport is to do with the body, the test of  mind over 
body (e.g. mastery of  pain) reaffirms hegemonic masculine values (White et al., 1995; 
                                                 
24 At the time these men were diagnosed the consensus views on both schizophrenia and personality disorder was 
that these were largely untreatable and intervention was substantially palliative. 
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Whitson, 1990). To reject rugby, is easily equated to a rejection of  dominant male values. 
This is not to say that a rejection of  rugby leaves no claim at all to masculinity. On the 
contrary, efforts were made to accomplish particular attributes of  the hegemonic 
standard. To the degree that athletics, soccer and horse riding provided a test of  physical 
force and skill, accomplishment in these sports affirmed control of  the mind over the 
body, congruent with dominant masculine ideals. In Foucauldian terms, any sport was 
an examination of  masculinity, a disciplining exercise and as such, the more combative 
the sport the greater the test of  masculinity.  
While sport was discovered as being to some degree effective at ameliorating anxiety,  
drugs and alcohol were found to be faster. There is a clear recollection that alcohol and 
drugs took away the pain. Podraig in particular described in detail the escape that 
marathon running provided. Drugs (generally cannabis) and alcohol were discovered 
very early in school life as both an available and accessible means to quell their 
increasing anxieties. Like sport, a key issue was that alcohol and drugs were also 
consistent with a number of  important hegemonic values. This is evident for instance, 
with alcohol through in the advertising of  beer linking it to highly valued aspects of  
male culture (Hill, 1999). The risk-taking, anti-authority, and mateship involved in 
alcohol and drug abuse provided a limited means to fit in. The chemical effect on their 
anxieties was startling. Peter stated this emphatically, in his comment that his excessive 
use of  cannabis was for annihilation, driven by an underlying need to stop the 
psychological pain. Peter is also clear that he did not regard this desire as a suicidal one. 
Rather than wanting to die, he wanted to get rid of  intolerable psychological pain, or 
psychache as Shneidman (1993) has labelled this experience. Abusing alcohol and 
drugs to stop the psychological pain was not an explicit and informed choice in which a 
number of  options were accessible and available. Nevertheless, they became a means to 
survive by quelling their anxieties; or at least, this was temporarily achieved. 
While chemicals may temporarily remove the memory of  victimisation, the experience 
and its effects were not erased. Furthermore, alcohol and drug abuse brought its own 
set of  adverse consequences. As well as a physiological impact, there were social 
consequences. The negative impact however, did not appear to become apparent until 
their adult years. Andrew spoke of  losing income, relationships and the anger and 
violence of  his alcoholic bingeing. Podraig spoke explicitly of  being drawn into a 
criminal world in which he spent a prolonged time in fear. He also became addicted to 
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harder drugs and made multiple suicide attempts. These experiences too, are easily 
understood yet again, as further confirmation of  hopelessness rekindling the experience 
of  not fitting in and the associated feeling of  angst. 
Participating in sport, no matter how substantial a role this might play in everyday living 
at school, did not resolve the original issues. Similarly, use of  chemicals to relieve anxiety 
did not resolve the original issues, and ultimately added further to long-standing feelings 
of  not fitting in.  
Re-constructing self as recovering 
The four men in this study tended to use the term recovering rather than recovered, 
to describe their current state. The term conveys a sense of  history in that it locates 
themselves temporally in relation to their experiences. It is also a cautious term in that 
they are uncertain about recover y. Their teenage and early adult years were not a period 
of  unremitting distress. To the contrary, the men in this study describe periods where 
they felt under control and there was an absence of  distress. Within certain contexts 
and relationships there were times when they felt they did fit in. Indeed, each of  these 
men succeeded at establishing or running some sort of  business. However, crises 
returned, reminding them that enjoying life was not deserved; that they werent 
meant to succeed or be happy. The return of  these times of  crisis was viewed as 
confirmation that it was the absence of  distress that was unusual rather than the 
presence of  distress.  
While medicine is seen as somewhat useful to alleviate symptoms (e.g. lifting mood), it 
falls short of  bringing about recovery. Within the medical model, recovery means a 
return to a disease-free state; that is, recovery is to have cured the disease. However, 
because normal is culturally defined rather than a physiological state and hence 
biologically determined, a return to the culturally expected norm is not possible on the 
basis of  medication alone. That is, medication was unable to cause them to fit in. 
Nonetheless, where medication (and ECT) was found to be beneficial was as an enabler 
for something else to happen. Medication lifted energy and mood so that work could 
be done. Unfortunately, medication was also available to enable overdosing. 
Resourcing themselves for survival and recovery was not straightforward; it was a 
process of  uncertain discovery and became known only upon reflection. Recognising 
what was useful and what was not depended upon an ability to reflect on themselves. 
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Through the sense-making of  reflection and doing, what was helpful was gradually 
sorted from what was not helpful. In this way, what worked and what didnt was entirely 
idiosyncratic. This working out of  understandings did not cease at times when they were 
suicidal. Suicidal experience was one form of  doing what they understood to be who 
they were in the world. 
Over a prolonged time their experiences with many different resources led them to 
become more discriminating on what was helpful and what help was needed. However, 
simply being exposed to many resources was insufficient. This is shown by a familiar 
pattern of  responses to crises; for example, use of  drugs or alcohol in response to 
stress. An important element to this figuring out what worked and what didnt had to 
do with the nature of  relationships with both health professionals and significant others 
close to them. The nature of  these relationships were themselves a substantially 
unfamiliar experience, and while this alone provoked anxiety and crisis, relationships 
nevertheless provided a wider horizon of  meaning from which to comprehend 
themselves and the world, and hence, try new ways of  understanding (and therefore 
new ways of  responding). 
Relationships that helped to create change included marriage, children, close friends, as 
well as health professionals. Relationships also included those charismatic people who 
stepped into their lives for brief  moments, yet had a provocative impact (e.g. Indian 
gurus, spiritual guides, etc). Change was not always positive or painless. While they 
experienced the collapse of  intimate relationships in early adulthood, they also 
experienced a very different kind of  relationship to the fear and isolation that they had 
been familiar with in their early lives, and consequently expanded their range of  
understandings. For Peter and William, children were also a part of  that changed 
experience. They experienced a love for their children and what it was to care for and be 
needed. They experienced (and grappled with) experiences of  sharing, intimacy, and 
being accepted for who they were. Health professionals and non-professionals came 
into their lives and facilitated other ways of  understanding their experiences to what 
they were familiar. With Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) Andrew experienced people who 
understood him and his history from an intimate level, as well as a willingness to 
provide readily accessible support. Accessibility was a part of  being supported and being 
understood. As he became more involved in AA, he also experienced (perhaps for the 
first time) offering support to others. These experiences expanded Andrews horizon of  
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meanings. Podraig told of  similar experiences when he entered drug and alcohol 
rehabilitation and when he joined AA, and similarly William, when he attended Adult 
Children of  Alcoholics (ACoA). These different experiences (both good and bad) 
brought to consciousness alternative understanding of  self, and self  in relationship to 
others. The difference between what was helpful and what was not helpful was not 
possible to recognise at the time. What was helpful became visible only in the later 
practical application of  those understandings. Podraig goes as far as saying that what 
was helpful can only be seen in hindsight, suggesting that while what is discovered to be 
helpful is serendipitous, the later application of  what was learnt from experience 
discloses its helpfulness. 
In contrast to swallowing a pill or receiving ECT and simply awaiting the biological 
change to bring about normality, these men regarded work as beginning within a 
relational context. Reconstructing their personal histories of  distress in order to 
understand differently entailed a degree of  questioning or critical reflection that in turn 
could produce heightened anxiety. Such anxiety could in turn provoke familiar 
understandings and responses. However, relationships in which they felt affirmed and 
valued could also provide sufficient safety to work through different understandings. 
Their work entailed psychotherapy, group work, and individual counselling. It 
additionally, involved working on their relationships in the home as well as with many 
and varied non-professional people (e.g. gurus, friends, self-help groups, etc). 
Recovering was an application of  different understandings. It was a reconstruction of  
their history in a way that they now identify as personal growth. This is captured in the 
remark that they have had to learn more about themselves than most men will ever have 
to learn. Rather than being able to be informed, or provided with the knowledge of  
what works and what doesnt and then following the logic in a rationale and 
instrumental fashion, the significant task before these men was to do with the context 
and breadth of  their experience. Furthermore, it was necessary to critically reflect on 
their experiences both good and bad, for what had helped and what did not. However, 
without the means to view experiences from an expanded horizon of  meaning, 
reflection alone was insufficient to the work of  personal growth. Podraig provided an 
exemplar of  the task before him, using the metaphor of  peeling back the layers of  an 
onion and once peeled back, there was nothing. Podraig needed something else; 
something he alone could not produce from within himself  to move him forward. 
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These men described this reflective reconstructive process as much more than simply 
dwelling on the past, but instead, as a circular revisiting, grappling with, and 
contemplating a different understanding of  their history that in turn, is then used to 
return to their history at ever deeper levels to understand other parts of  their history 
differently. In this process, present understandings of  themselves, and their place in 
their present social context was also changed. This coming to know myself  differently 
involved close scrutiny, experiences of, and knowledge about emotions that they remain 
aware that other men find alien. They have found that it is not possible to discuss this 
knowledge of  themselves with other men, but can do so with women. So, for these 
men, they continue to be acutely aware they remain different to other men and see no 
future in which this will change.  
In the work of  reflecting upon their history it can also be seen that their 
understanding of  themselves as mentally ill or disordered was challenged. At the same 
time, they also began to take a stand on the legitimacy of  their exclusion (i.e. not fitting 
in to hegemonic conceptions of  masculinity). This is an incomplete work, and they each 
state that it is an ongoing task. For these men then, there is no recovery in the sense of  
returning to normal, as normal has never existed for them; they have never fitted into a 
norm. They are unable to look back and state when the process of  recovering began. 
Recovering therefore seems to be more to do with a productive figuring out or working 
through of  something necessary in order to survive and offers hope of  meaningful 
living. Their view then is that they are always in the process of  recovering. That is, an 
ongoing process in which they grow, conscious of  their difference. They do not celebrate 
their difference, instead they struggle to find a way to live meaningfully whilst remaining 
sad about the constraints that are now visible to them.  
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C h a p t e r  9  
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTAL 
HEALTH NURSING PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 
The exploration undertaken in this study of  four mens experiences of  suicidality arose 
from a desire to explore suicidal experience from an explicit concern with masculinities. 
The desire to explore these issues was prompted by my own clinical experiences of  
working with men who were suicidal. In undertaking this study, the aim was to inform 
mental health nursing practice of  alternative possibilities for intervention with suicidal 
men informed by an awareness of  the influence of  masculine values on mens 
experiences of  suicidality.  
Three particular concerns have contributed to the shaping of  this study. Firstly, given 
that mental health nurses constitute a substantial portion of  the mental health 
workforce, it seems inconsistent that the dominant body of  knowledge that informs 
mental health nursing practice with suicidality rests on theories and research borrowed 
from other disciplines. Secondly, while there is significant public and professional 
concern about an historically high rate of  male suicide, the literature review undertaken 
in this thesis suggests that there is minimal research about the understanding men have 
of  their experience of  suicidality as men. Thirdly, while the core practice of  mental 
health nursing is to engage in relationships at a meaningful level (Australian and New 
Zealand College of  Mental Health Nurses, 2002, p. 6) it is only recently that models for 
mental health nursing in which this position is central, have been comprehensively 
developed (e.g. Barker, 2000). While engagement is recognised as necessary to mental 
health nursing, currently, it is frequently viewed instrumentally as serving the assessment 
process rather than as the core mode of  practice through which change is effected.  
A focus on engagement as a core element of  practice sits within a tradition of  nursing 
theory that holds to a person-centred focus (Peplau, 1952, 1997). As such, Gadamers 
(1965/1975) articulation of  understanding in the context of  human sciences, is of  
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significance to mental health nursing. In drawing on Gadamer to inform a study of  four 
mens suicidal experiences, this study parallels the relational focus of  mental health 
nursing and hence, has the potential to inform practice insofar as practice involves 
dialogically understanding anothers experience. Additionally, this study can inform 
mental health nursing practice through what it reveals about these  suicidal experiences. 
This study moves beyond an uncritical interpretation of  mens experiences of  suicidality, 
revisiting this understanding in order to explore the influence of  masculinity in the 
understanding the suicidal experience of  these men. An examination of  the literature on 
masculinities made explicit an anti-essentialist lens that was then brought to bear on the 
transcripts of  our conversations through a Gadamerian methodology.  
Interpreting suicidal experiences with four men 
Gadamerian hermeneutics calls attention to the dialogical participation of  both people 
in bringing about understanding as a fusion of  horizons. Drawing on Gadamer,  
understanding is argued here to have already occurred in conversation before analysis (or 
rather, an interpretation) of  transcripts. In contrast to other research approaches using 
participant interviews, I have taken the position in this study that there are two 
occurrences of  hermeneutic understanding that are different, yet refer to the same 
original conversations. This position on Gadamer has resulted in conceptualising this 
study as using a double hermeneutic. While participants were aware of  my dual focus on 
masculinity and suicidality from the moment of  first hearing of  it, an exploration of  
taken-for-granted meanings can only take place after an initial understanding has 
occurred. This required a second process to the research. Exploration of  taken-for-
granteds is unable to take place in the same dialogue that seeks to genuinely reach an 
understanding of  that persons experience of  suicidality. Instead, this interpretive 
horizon was later brought to bear in developing an interpretation of  the transcripts.  
Given that a Gadamerian approach aims to make explicit the conditions under which 
understanding takes place (Gadamer, 1965/1975, p. 263), all facets of  the study were 
conducted with their historical effect as overt as was consciously possible. These 
conditions of  understanding necessarily included my motivation for the study, the 
literature review, the approach taken to recruitment, conduct of  the conversations, 
interpretive processes, and the conclusions to be drawn from the study as a whole.  
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While Gadamers (1965/1975) Truth and Method is primarily concerned about the 
interpretation of  text in the form of  writings that are intended for reading, much of  the 
nursing research drawing on Gadamer applies his ideas to transcripts of  interviews as if 
transcripts were originally constructed to be read as writings. However, I have argued 
that doing so risks insufficient attention to the conditions in which understanding of  
the transcripts takes place; in particular, that of  effective history. Firstly, transcripts are 
pale proxies of  the original event. They fail to capture the situatedness of  natural speech 
and require interpretation to make them readable. Secondly, understanding has already 
occurred dialogically within the interviews or conversations that gave rise to the 
transcripts in the first instance. Assuming researcher and interpreter are the same 
person, the new understanding achieved as a result of  the original dialogue forms an 
horizon of  meaning that is then brought to bear on the transcripts. While Gadamer 
offers justification for considering that the transcripts have something to say of  the 
original communicative event (as they indeed refer back to the original event), I take the 
position that transcripts are more properly regarded as an historical record requiring 
interpretation and cannot be read automatically as would say, a literary work (or closer 
to the concerns of  this study, suicide notes). 
In this study, my participation in the original conversations must necessarily be a 
significant aspect of  the conditions under which interpretation of  the transcripts then 
takes place. The fact that I participated in the conversations that gave rise to the 
transcripts cannot be set aside when making an interpretation of  the transcripts. That is, 
as well as participating in the creation of  the conversations, I also bring the experience 
(and personal notes, i.e. memos) of  the earlier conversations to the interpretive 
endeavour. In this study I have made this explicit  by conveying my understanding of  
suicidal experience as a result of  the conversations or research interviews in a manner 
that is readable. I do this by writing a kind of  autobiographical narrative of  each 
conversation. Through writing, I make the text available for interpretation conscious 
that it is to be read. Ultimately, these contribute to the historical records available for 
(re)interpretation whilst at the same time, making explicit the effect of  history. At the 
same time, writing and rewriting synoptic stories of  each interview, and then producing 
a thematic summary of  all the stories, is also a form of  interpretive analysis 
(Richardson, 1994).  
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Gadamers work shows the dependency of  understanding on historical and cultural 
context, irrespective of  whether it is understanding of  a text, an experience, or another 
person. While Gadamer does not specifically discuss gender, it is clear that gender forms 
a key aspect of  a persons historical situatedness. As mental health nursing is an 
endeavour to engage in purposeful relationships in which understanding is central to 
practice, Gadamers investigation of  understanding can illuminate this process and 
therefore enhance mental health nursing in both practice and research. Gadamers work 
also calls attention to the active involvement of  mental health nurses in the development 
of  understanding, and that this is the case irrespective of  whether or not nurses are 
aware of  this. Hence, mental health nursing informed by Gadamerian hermeneutics is 
viewed is a situated endeavour in which history and culture (including gender) are key 
aspects of  the interpretive horizon. 
Historically emergent suicidality 
My conversational understanding was gathered under eleven thematic headings, set out 
in Table 5, below. These are historical, overlapping, and context-dependent. Although 
not strictly chronological, they tend toward a developmental sequence. The overarching 
sense conveyed by these themes is that to understand the suicidal experiences of  these 
four men, it is necessary to conceptualise suicidality and its meanings as situated and 
historically emergent in which these men were (and still are) active in the construction 
of  a sense of  self. This is a constructivist viewpoint whereby: 
par t icu lar  actors ,  in par t icu lar  p laces, at  part icu lar  t imes,  
fashion meaning out of events and phenomena through 
Table 5. Initial major themes 
Family violence and abuse 
Fathers and other men 
Sexual assault 
Unsafe schools 
Becoming different at school 
Mistrust and sexuality 
Sport 
Drugs and alcohol 
Normalness 
Finding effective help 
Ongoing recovery 
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prolonged,  complex processes of soc ia l  in teract ion involv ing 
h istory,  language, and act ion.  (Schwandt,  1994, p. 118) 
 
That is to say that doing and understanding occur all at the same time. The doing and 
meaning cannot be separated. Insofar as suicidality is experienced, and therefore a form 
of  doing, it is constituted by and constitutive of a sense of  self  and the social world. 
Contrary to the modernist sense of  self  as constant and knowable, a constructivist 
sense of  self  is an ongoing situated process of  becoming, in which multiple possibilities 
exist (Cox & Lyddon, 1997). As historically emergent, each of  the mens suicidality is 
not located in a cause and effect relationship to any one or number of  variables, but 
emerges out of  a personal engagement with the social world in an effort to understand.  
Revisiting the transcripts through an horizon of  meaning informed by a theorising of  
masculinities critical of  essentialist approaches, showed an ongoing pivotal theme of  
fitting in. The struggle to fit in was set through their early experiences of  
victimisation; though not of  itself  sufficient to produce the trajectory that emerged 
across their lifespan. 
Each of  these men related stories of  experiencing being different at school as the 
source of  a continued experience of  difference. Shame and anxiety accompanied these 
realisations of  difference. This difference was in reference to the body and in relation to 
norms for boys. For example, Podraig was aware of  his small stature not being the 
norm, William was aware of  his physical deformity, Andrew knew his family was poor. 
The surveillance of  norms was institutional; by teachers, Principals, other boys, 
eventually internalised as an embodied reality. Insofar as their school experience echoed 
their victimisation at home, the horizon of  meanings from which to understand new 
experiences was one influenced by these experiences of  difference, inadequacy, 
powerlessness, and so forth. 
That fitting in was something actively sought and struggled with, indicates a 
consciousness of  the experiences of  not fitting in. To fit in or not fit in was constructed 
in relation to something. This something however, was not articulated in the stories 
of  these men beyond that it was not this or that. The criteria against which they were in 
some way not fitting in, was unseen. Suicidality appeared to emerge in an insidious 
manner over a prolonged period in response to increasingly unbearable pain of  not 
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fitting in. This viewpoint supports Shneidmans (1998) concept of  psychache, in 
which suicide is viewed as a solution to the problem of  unbearable psychological pain. 
Removing themselves from the world became a solution to a problem of  intolerable 
anguish. This interpretation of  these mens stories supports Shneidmans (1985) 
definition of  suicide as a problem for which suicide is a possible solution. However, the 
conclusions drawn here also suggest that these men, while active agents throughout 
their entire life in their struggle to make sense of  themselves in their circumstances, 
were also constrained by largely unseen social forces.  
Problematising masculinity in mens suicidal experience 
Revisiting the conversations with the four men through a specific theoretical lens 
informed by anti-essentialist theories on masculinities produced a different set of  
themes shown in Table 6, below. Again, these themes are not mutually exclusive or 
chronological, but rather, overlapping and fluid. These themes emerge from an 
interaction of  victimisation and masculinity in the particular context in which these men 
sought to make sense of  their experiences and fit in.   
An interpretation of  the transcripts through an anti-essentialist lens contends that the 
struggle to fit in was a struggle to not be different, not be excluded, and not be less than 
something that was expected of  them. The analysis here argues that this struggle was 
especially problematic as fitting in was determined by gender norms that were 
hegemonic, and hence taken-for-granted. In their everydayness or taken-for-
grantedness, these meanings were unable to be problematised. Their struggle then, at 
least in their early years, was with something intangible and unnameable. Nonetheless, in 
examining what it was that cast them as different, excluded and less than, something of  
Table 6. A (re)interpretation: Disclosing 
masculinities in suicidal experience 
Experiencing re-victimisation 
Struggling to fit in 
Sport 
Difference and being less-than 
Fathers and heteronormativity 
Irrational men 
Quelling anxiety: A matter of survival 
Re-constructing self as recovering 
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this was gradually disclosed in the process.  
A (re)interpretation of  the conversations with the four men in this study revealed that 
the process of  becoming different, excluded, and less than, were targeted to the body; 
that is, the processes were gendered. However, masculinity was largely invisible 
frequently only glimpsed as a shadow cast by something else. Even so, such shadows 
were not questionable; the given sociocultural context provided only two gender 
positions: to be feminine or masculine. Hence, in their early years these men found 
themselves in a state of  increasing awareness of  contradiction, increasingly unable to fit 
in to the sociocultural imperatives, there was no alternative position to take.  
The view taken here is that the importance of  the masculine norm lies not in how this 
might be defined or not (e.g. as a set of  roles), but in its pervasive taken-for-grantedness. 
Being hegemonic, the masculine norm makes available readily accessible social meanings 
from which to understand oneself  and the lived-in world. These meanings already pre-
exist the entry of  these men into the world, and are already there as social material from 
which to construct oneself  as masculine or not-masculine. This was the tradition in 
which these men made meaning of  their experience. The unseen sociocultural 
constraints arise are constituted by the absence of  alternative meanings. Alternatives 
cannot be freely invented, Gadamer has made clear that unsustainable understandings 
will fail in their practical application. For instance, unsustainable meanings may seem 
incongruent or irrational; yet applying such terms immediately pulls the 
incomprehensible into a particular tradition that makes it comprehensible. This is one 
way of  interpreting Podraigs nervous collapse. Podraig is unable to resolve the 
struggle to fit into a social context that views gender as dichotomous. In Podraigs 
world, it is incomprehensible to be not-masculine while at the same time be not-
feminine. A nervous collapse appears to be how the incomprehensible not fitting in 
is made comprehensible by Podraig and others. This has an impact on the body. 
Understandings are put into practice, and consequently have health effects. In Podraigs 
example, the nervous collapse had a profound physical and mental impact.  
The growing awareness of  what constituted not fitting in was itself  an awareness that 
marked them as different to their peers. In a cyclical and back and forth process, earlier 
understandings of  failure and inadequacy became ready-to-hand meanings from which 
to understand future events. As inevitable crises were encountered, these were readily 
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construed within their existing horizon of  meanings as further failure to fit in. These 
additional experiences further expanded the horizon of  meaning, upon which later 
crises would yet again facilitate a construal of  self  as a failure, different, or faulty. 
Suicidality emerged at some point within this historical momentum, not in a 
deterministic way, but simply because other alternatives for meaning making were not 
available nor readily accessible through which they could construct a different sense of  
self. 
As they were confronted by their thinking, doing and being, that was different to the 
norm of  other boys, they accepted that they were indeed different. However, that the 
meaning of  this difference was then taken as being excluded and less-than, discloses the 
operation of  what Connell (1995) has described as a hierarchy of  masculinities. Connell 
has argued that there is a need for some form of  congruence with institutional and 
cultural practices and institutions. This is indeed seen through the collective practice of  
their peers and the institutional context (including the authority) of  the school. This was 
accomplished through the reproduction of  masculine ideals, for instance, through the 
privileging of  combative sports over other sports, and harder subjects over soft 
subjects in the academic curriculum. 
Perhaps a more pervasive and insidious issue was that at some point during school yet 
another difference rose to some level of  consciousness. This was that their life 
experiences of  fear, pain, neglect, and rape were different to the norm. Their different 
life experiences marked them in subtle ways for others to see (e.g. being labelled as 
sensitive), but they were aware that they also saw their social world  in a different way 
to that of  normal boys. This was implicit in their descriptions of  surveilling male peers 
at school and of  the adult men around them. Like other attributes that were targeted, 
they could not undo how their experiences of  victimisation had marked them as 
different from what was normal for boys.  
To a certain degree they sought refuge from their growing existential angst in sport and 
nihilistic bouts of  alcohol and drug abuse. However, as each crisis was encountered in 
their early adult years, the familiar understandings of  inadequacy and failure, resulted in 
recurrent experiences of  shame and anxiety; again, experiences they associated with 
being not-men. As intimate trusting relationships had been denied (or intentionally 
excluded), intimacy was a relatively unknown experience, so relationship crises became 
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inevitable and frequently precipitated suicidality. Intimate experiences have an certain 
emphasis in current sociocultural meanings of  masculinity, again producing a potent 
social site for constructing themselves as masculine or inadequate. Insofar as 
homophobia underpins current constructions of  masculinity (Kimmel, 1994) fear and 
anxiety became associated with terror of  being homosexual. In these conversations, 
homosexuality in their early years was always to be feared. 
Contact with psychiatric services (and other health professionals who informed their 
practice from a diagnostic model), confirmed what their past experiences of  failure and 
inadequacy had already informed them; that they were not normal. The various 
diagnostic labels said this using different words: schizophrenia, antisocial, depression, 
addiction, personality disordered, and so forth. The necessity to take medication to alter 
their sense of  self  in order to be normal also supported their view of  themselves as not 
being normal. It is therefore unsurprising that none of  the men found diagnosis-driven 
health services to be helpful. Medication was both a means to lift mood in order to do 
the work or as an alternative means to suicide through overdose. 
As a doing that is related to the body in a specific way, suicide is meaningful and 
meaning-making in the context of  masculine norms. For these four men, suicide is not 
only an escape from intolerable anguish it is also a doing of  masculinity as a body-
reflexive practice. Continuing the personal project of  working out meaningfulness 
through practice, suicide would ultimately fulfil the demand of  not fitting in. Suicide 
may therefore be construed as successfully accomplishing this task and exerting the 
ultimate control of  mind over the body. Furthermore, from this perspective, failure 
can be easily associated with femininity. The care taken in the way these men were to 
suicide demonstrates a deliberateness and an exercise of  agency that is full of  meaning. 
Children and partners were carefully considered as to how they were intended to 
comprehend his death. To contrive death to be perceived as an accident or not was 
important. The possibility of  discovery, and who should discover the body were 
considered. In bringing about their own death was an opportunity to shape how they 
were to be seen (or not) by others. The action to bring about suicide was a conscious 
consideration of  their body in relationship to their social world.  
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Suicide and suicidal experience is deeply gendered. Moreover, this interpretation of  
suicidal experience also discloses the taken-for-grantedness of  current masculine norms 
as posing intolerable existential contradictions for some men. 
Implications for mental health nursing practice 
Mental health nursing practice with people who are suicidal is informed by practice 
guidelines that generally seek to establish a measure of  risk that in turn, guides 
intervention aimed to ameliorate that risk. Practice guidelines are usually positioned as 
disciplinarily generic, yet being evidence-based privileging the scientific method and 
consequently those disciplines underpinned by positivist science (see Geanellos, 2004, 
for recent discussion in relation to mental health nursing). For instance, the recently 
published New Zealand evidence-based guidelines for the Assessment and Management 
of  People at Risk of  Suicide (2003) describe intervention that rests on assuring physical 
safety, establishing a therapeutic relationship, and instituting treatment established 
through diagnosis. Intermediate intervention includes developing strategies to change 
psychosocial stressors. While therapeutic relationships are central to intervention, such 
relationships are primarily for the purpose of  obtaining assessment data to formulate a 
diagnosis and risk rating. While these guidelines suggest engagement is necessary, 
understanding the meaning of  suicidality for the person is not necessary for diagnosis or 
intervention. As far as obtaining history is concerned, it is in order to establishing the 
bounds of  predisposing, precipitating, perpetuating, and protective factors. The 
meaningfulness of  suicidality as a human being is not considered. The person is rather, an 
object whose ailments are to be discovered through medical and psychological science.  
Gadamer has argued that understanding occurs on the basis that self  is a dialogical 
participant and open to the truth of  the other person and willing to consider that the 
others truth may be better. Whether the relationship is called therapy, research 
interview, or some other encounter, Gadamer has argued that new understandings 
derivative of  the dialogue is a fusion of  horizons. Insofar as understanding occurs at all, 
this necessarily means that the researcher or mental health nurse is inextricably involved 
in the hermeneutic of  understanding whether or not this is acknowledged. Where 
unacknowledged, understanding occurs in an unseen way, opening up the potential for 
unhelpful meanings to become part of  the encounter without being questioned. This 
was shown, for instance, in the negative meaning taken from their diagnostic labels by 
these four men. 
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The meaning of  recovering is a dynamic ongoing process of  learning and 
development without an endpoint, or even a clearly defined beginning. The survival of  
these four men and their continuing effort to recover and grow shows that the 
opportunity to build new understandings of  self  are ongoing. The potential for change 
exists throughout the lifespan. As Gadamer has shown that new understandings depend 
on dialogue and openness, relationships that were validating and supportive became 
critical for the facilitation of  change for these men. This perspective stands in contrast 
to the medical notion of  cure, whereby change (e.g. medication) is believed to fix the 
problem in a mechanistic way in which normalness is restored.  
Applying Gadamers work to therapeutic communication shows that to facilitate 
different meanings, mental health nurses need first to understand meaning-making as 
historically and socio-culturally situated. Such an approach would require that nurses 
engage in psychotherapeutic encounters as: 
an interpret ive,  prac t ica l,  moral,  and frequent ly pol i t ica l  
undertak ing a imed at  extending poss ib i l i t ies  for  d isc los ing and 
car ing for  the par t icu lar  being of an indiv idual c l ient in ways 
cons iderate of  being in general.  Such interpret ive 
understanding needs to be worked out  in  the part icu lar  
hermeneut ic  s i tuat ions that ar ise as c l ients  concerns for  
l iv ing emerge with in their  wor ld ly engagement.  (Mar t in  & 
Thompson, 2003, p.  14) 
Yet in terms of  understanding the impact of  socio-cultural and historical meanings on 
the lives of  mental health clients, and establishing therapeutic processes based on a 
constructivist position, mental health nursing research and practice frameworks are 
lacking. The influence of  the evidence-based practice movement suggests that mental 
health nursing remains largely captured by mainstream psychology and biomedical 
psychiatry. 
Nonetheless, acknowledged or not, mental health nursing does not exist outside of  the 
social world in which we communicate and understand each other. This study suggests 
that without a critical awareness of  the role of  masculinity in mens meaning-making, 
diagnosis-driven intervention with men who are suicidal may further limit their choices 
to survive. Mental health nursing intervention is likely to be complicit with hegemonic 
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constructions of  boundaries between normal and not-normal when nurses 
unreflectively communicate within a biomedical framework.  
Barker and colleagues argue that the proper focus of  mental health nursing is about 
peoples experiences as being meaningful (Barker et al., 1997; Barker, Reynolds, & Ward, 
1995). This posits a central role for nurses to make a deliberate use of  self  to facilitate 
helpful change. As this presumes a collaborative encounter, this position requires mental 
health nurses to understand the other person. In this context, to understand is not to 
be able to explain the persons troubles, but to truly understand as Gadamer has 
explicated the concept of  understanding. Adopting Martin and Thompsons (2003) 
position above on the place of  hermeneutics in psychotherapy, the potential for 
therapeutic change occurs in the fusion of  horizons when nurse and client understand 
each other.  
Adopting the proper focus of  mental health nursing does not advocate an 
abandonment of  biomedicine, but suggests the need to relocate the place of  
treatment. Rather than the treatment itself  being of  central concern to nurses, it is the 
context in which treatment is positioned in the persons life that should be of  central 
concern. In this study, this was clearly shown in statements by the men that discussed 
their view of  medication as enabling the real work to be done, in contrast to medication 
doing the real work.  
If  mental health nursing intervention aims to facilitate the growth and development of  
the other and consequently diminish distress, Gadamers articulation of  the connection 
between experience and understanding is relevant. This may be as simple as bringing 
understandings about the disorder into a state of  indeterminacy by asking questions 
and therefore beginning a process of  dialogue in which the person understands 
differently. This shifts the notion of  doing mental health nursing from treatment tasks 
to something closer to deliberate conversation. As Barker (1996) has suggested:  
The most  e legant  nurs ing in tervent ions involve ask ing 
quest ions:  the most  centra l of  which is  what exact ly  is  going 
on here?  The extens ive reper toi re of quest ions that  we might 
use to fac i l i ta te the person s voyage of  d iscovery has only  one 
proper objec t ive: to  fur ther  her re lat ionship wi th her  self ,  her  
wor ld,  and a l l  those wi th in i t  and to extend her apprec iat ion of 
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the meanings she construc ts around and about these 
interact ing re lat ionships [s ic] .  (p.  8)  
The constructivist position recognises that the relationship with a client is not from an 
objective position, but always stands in a tradition and thus makes therapeutic 
interpretations from this position (McNamee & Gergen, 1992). Facilitation of  growth 
and development through alternative meaning-making is what mental health nursing can 
bring to their situation from a constructivist position. He or she can introduce novel or 
catalytic ideas (Efran & Clarfield, 1992, p. 214) to the encounter from which change is 
invited. This is suggested in those parts of  the conversations in this study on what was 
meant by the real work. Real work was achieved through whatever facilitated a 
reconstruction of  self  as growing, developing, and leading lives they found to be 
meaningful. This was not always formalised in a discrete therapy or treatment (e.g. 
targeting the modification of  cognitions or behaviours), but could occur through books, 
gurus, close relationships, reflection, self  help groups; only in reflection was what was 
useful able to be separated from what was not. This suggests that rather than being 
prescribed, the client discovers what works through the encounter.  
Equally, Williams example of  his changed position on how he regards psychiatric 
admission cautions that an invitation to change would be inappropriate when the most 
immediate and pressing issue is to preserve life. Similarly, examples these men have 
shown that while some forms of  counselling were regarded as helpful and some 
counselling was not. For these men, the real work did not proceed through treatment 
or therapy alone, but through these men working with whatever they sought out or 
came their way that facilitated their efforts to understand themselves and their history 
differently. What understandings were ultimately hindering and what were helpful was 
not known at the time but was worked out in the process of  these efforts. Again, this 
calls attention to the dialogical process rather than imparting the experts knowledge as 
facts. 
While generic diagnosis-driven assessments have a place within the multidisciplinary 
team, they are unconcerned with personal meaning and situated understandings of  
people. This is not to argue that mental health nurses do not have a role in diagnosis-
oriented approaches, but that the purpose of  diagnosis needs to be interpreted within a 
mental health nursing practice framework that has a focus on situated understanding, 
relationship, and personal meaning. Similarly, risk assessments premised on population 
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risk, while informative for other members of  the multidisciplinary team, should be 
interpreted within a mental health nursing framework. Again, if  the contribution of  
mental health nursing is to understand risk as it relates to the individual concerned (i.e. 
situated, relational, and meaningful), then a different conceptualisation of  risk 
assessment to that developed from population data is required for nursing. This is not to 
say risk and safety is not of central concern of mental health nursing, but as with 
diagnosis, that it should be located within a framework of situated understanding of the 
person. It follows that a different assessment process and protocol from that of  
diagnosis or risk factor driven processes is required. There is however, an absence of 
practice models for mental health nursing that have understanding and meaning-making 
as a central philosophical tenet. The closest practice model consistent with the focus 
here, would be the Barkers (2000) Tidal Model, in which the persons narrative, 
language, and meanings are central to the assessment process and shape the approach to 
therapeutic relationship. 
The exploration here of  four men's experiences of  suicidality shows that the potential 
for survival and recovery lies in reconstructing an understanding of  self  and personal 
history differently in order to grow. In a Gadamerian sense, to acquire an expanded 
horizon of  meaning. Insofar as this can be generally applied to a broader range of  
mental health nursing issues, it supports Barker, Reynolds and Wards (1995) assertions 
that the proper focus of  mental health nursing is with the way in which people make 
meaning from their life experiences, having regard to the sociocultural and historical 
situatedness of  meanings; including that which the nurse brings to the encounter. The 
proper focus of  mental health nursing intervention then is to engage in human 
relationships in a conscious way to facilitate bringing into possibility the potential for 
different understandings of  their troubles. This differs from the nursing process in 
which the nurse is the expert who defines (e.g. diagnosing) the meaning of  the persons 
experiences and then intervenes (i.e. treatment). Hence, the aim is not to treat, but to 
invite. It is also an advocacy process for an ethics of  nursing practice that recognises 
nurses, and the people we work with as clients or patients to construct meaning through 
every encounter. Hence, what the nurse brings as a person to the process is important. 
This calls attention to the fact that we and the people we work with, bring ourselves and 
our worldview to each encounter. A critical awareness of  this fact is necessary in order 
to be fully aware that through what we introduce, especially the taken-for-granteds, to 
the encounter may also limit the possibilities for growth and development.  
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Implications for mental health nursing research 
An initial exploration of  the literature on suicidality showed it to be predominantly 
informed from research measuring sex-differences in population data. Although nursing 
textbooks were aetiologically eclectic, discussion of  nursing intervention for suicidality 
was rarely explicitly located within a nursing framework, theory, or philosophy other 
than the application of  the nursing process and functions (e.g. Gallop & Stamina, 2003; 
Kniesl, Wilson & Trigoboff, 2004; Shives, 2004; Townsend, 2003). Hence, mental health 
nursing intervention was substantially generic, bringing little to intervention that was 
specific to the discipline. While texts advocated the role of  nursing to be underpinned 
by the therapeutic relationship, the current approach does not attend to the process of  
understanding, and the situatedness of  suicidal experience. In particular, within the 
current universalist approach to risk assessment and risk-driven intervention, suicidality 
is not regarded as a gendered experience; yet at the same time, the same texts clearly 
state that men are at higher risk. 
There is however, a growing body of  nursing research that explores the suicidal persons 
experiences (Cutcliffe & Barker, 2002; Duffy, 2003; Moore, 1997; Raingruber, 2002; 
Samuelsson, Wiklander, Asberg, & Saveman, 2000; Talseth, Gilje, & Norberg, 2003; 
Talseth, Lindseth, Jacobsson, & Norberg, 1999; Talseth, Jacobsson, & Norberg, 2001; 
Wiklander, Samuelsson, & Asberg, 2003), the experiences of  their family (Demi & 
Howell, 1991; Fielden, 2003; Talseth, Gilje, & Norberg, 2001), and the experiences of  
mental health nurses (Dearden, 2004; Duffy, 1995; McLaughlin, 1999; Thompson & 
Brooks, 1990; Valente, 2003; Yonge & Stewin, 1992) and that of  other professionals 
(Anderson, Standen, Nazir, & Noon, 2000; Anderson, Standen, & Noon, 2003; 
Lindseth, Marhaug, Norberg, & Uden, 1994). Despite this body of  nursing research, 
recent guidelines aimed at informing practice by all mental health clinicians produced by 
the New Zealand Guidelines Group (2003) did not cite research on suicidality sourced 
from nursing journals.25 That guidelines for risk assessment and management of  suicide 
risk, for which nurses are a substantial part of  the workforce, are not informed by 
nursing research should be of  great concern to mental health nursing practice and 
mental health nursing researchers. Additionally, current nursing research tends to ignore 
the participation of  researcher (and clinician) in the construction of  meaning in the 
                                                 
25 This was established by examining the reference list in cited in the guidelines and noting whether or not the article 
was sourced from a nursing journal. 
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social context of  suicidality and therefore neglects the impact that gendered meanings 
have, including the process of  intervention by the nurse. This current study begins to 
address this gap. 
While there is a general recognition that mental health nurses have ongoing contact with 
clients who are suicidal, and in inpatient settings as a staff  group, have 24-hour 
responsibility for the safekeeping of  suicidal people, there seems minimal literature that 
provides nurses with a nursing framework to guide therapeutic practice with suicidal 
clients. Mental health nursing practice is in need of  frameworks or models that translate 
nursing research that explores the meaningfulness of  client experience into a structure 
that may be implemented in nursing settings with people who are suicidal. Cardell and 
Horton-Deutsch (1994) developed a model for assessing suicide potential based on the 
notion of  ambivalence in the interactional context of  a psychiatric admission. 
Rickelman and Houfek (1995) have proposed an interactional model based on a 
cognitive therapy framework for nurse psychotherapists. More recently Cutcliffe and 
Barker (2000, 2002) have proposed a hopeline model, premised on a notion of  
engagement rather than observation of  people who are suicidal. Much more work is 
needed for research to clarify the therapeutic processes and to define appropriate ways 
to evaluate the nursing outcomes of  these models. Additionally, an overarching mental 
health nursing framework is needed in which such approaches to suicidality are 
philosophically and theoretically congruent. As nurses have a critical role in the 
administration of  medication, such approaches must account for the meaning that 
biomedical interventions (e.g. medication) have within the broad scope of  mental health 
nursing practice.   
Appropriate research methodologies, congruent with the core precepts of  mental health 
nursing are needed. If  the core of  mental health nursing practice is to do with working 
within meaningful relationships and the meaningfulness of  experiences in which mental 
health nurses participate to facilitate growth and development, then the approach used 
in this study provides such an approach. A research approach drawing on Gadamer 
explicitly attends to the participation of  the mental health nurse in the creation of  new 
understandings. The approach taken here makes explicit the involvement of  the 
researcher in producing new understandings through the research dialogue. The 
methodical approach taken in this study seems particularly useful for mental health 
nursing researchers where, the phenomena of  interest inextricably involves both the 
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client and nurse engaged in conversation. This parallels the central role of  conversation 
in mental health nursing practice in which mental health nurses engage and work with 
clients and their families. Just as the researcher first engages with participants in order to 
understand, and then later, this understanding is further examined, mental health nurses 
similarly enter a relationship to understand the client and later reflect on this in order to 
be able to offer alternative possibilities. This study shows that a method drawing on 
Gadamer, such as described in this study, provides the opportunity to explore the many 
different aspects of  mental health nursing relationship, engagement, and working with 
clients.  
Conclusion 
This study has explored the understanding of  four mens suicidal experiences using a 
methodology informed by Gadamerian hermeneutics to arrive at an interpretation that 
also explicitly considers anti-essentialist theorising on masculinities. By drawing on 
Gadamers work on the nature of  understanding this study has made the interpretive 
horizon of  the researcher an overt aspect of  the interpretive process. Conclusions are 
therefore made standing within the tradition of  mental health nursing in New Zealand 
and Australia.  
A methodological position is developed that approaches the understanding of  suicidality 
as being initially produced through the hermeneutic fusion of  horizons of  myself  (as 
researcher) and each of  the participants. The result is suicidal experience interpreted as 
an historical trajectory, not predetermined by circumstances but instead, insidiously 
shaped over a prolonged time through childhood and adolescence, that at the same 
time, are limited by the means to comprehend those experiences. Additionally, the 
picture derived from the fusion is one in which each of  these men recollect struggling 
alone with their effort to make sense of  their experiences of  victimisation.  
Again, drawing upon Gadamer, this study then moves beyond the initial point of  
understanding within the conversations with the study participants, to further examine 
the influence of  masculinities upon the shaping of  the understandings developed in the 
dialogue. Methodologically, this move takes the position that understanding and 
interpretation have already occurred within the conversations and that an examination 
of  transcripts (and any other records) cannot be collapsed into a single interpretative 
effort, in which transcripts alone are assumed to be a sufficient proxy for the original 
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dialogue. The assumption that the analysis of  transcripts is a proxy for the original 
researcher-participant dialogue is a common feature of  hermeneutic studies. However, 
such an assumption fails to sufficiently account for the conditions of  understanding 
that a Gadamerian approach demands. 
Through an explicit consideration of  anti-essentialist theorising on masculinities, this 
(re)interpretation explores the potent influence of  unquestioned and taken-for-granted 
social norms for boys and men in shaping the understanding of  their experiences of  
victimisation as a boy. In a social world that locates gender as a dichotomy of  men and 
women, and in which men can only be not-women, these men were thrown into a 
struggle to meet the required sociocultural expectations to fit in as best they could as 
boys and teenagers. In a hierarchical masculine social context, transgression of  the 
dominant worldview met with further experiences of  victimisation that echoed prior 
experiences. Furthermore, being a victim in itself  was a transgression of  dominant 
masculine norms.  
A potent claim to a masculine identity in New Zealand through participation in rugby 
was not available to these men. Alternative means of  enacting violence and 
competitiveness (e.g. school ground fighting, gay bashing, etc.) as a means of  making a 
claim to the dominant forms of  masculinity was similarly not available, as these men 
already knew the consequences of  their physical vulnerability from their childhood at 
home and school. Instead, sport, and then drugs and alcohol were accessible and an 
acceptable means of  both quelling the growing psychological pain and ameliorating 
social isolation.  
Gadamerian hermeneutics locates the pathway to suicidality in an historical and 
sociocultural context, showing the way in which early understandings can be carried 
through from the past in a continual interpretation and reinterpretation of  experiences. 
For the participants of  this study, suicidal experience is not so much a result of  an 
immediate crisis but as a way of  understanding the present through a fusion with the 
accumulated understandings from the past. In this sense, this interpretation suggests 
that suicidality is socioculturally situated and historically emergent rather than an 
irrational response to immediate difficulties. This approach to suicidality, from the 
premise of  understanding rather than explaining, provides mental health nursing with a 
different range of  possibilities to engage with and provide nursing intervention. 
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Furthermore, the attendance to situatedness means that nurses are also able to work 
with the individual uniqueness (including difference) of  both themselves and the person 
who is suicidal; and at the same time, within the social constraints and possibilities that 
the current gender order affords for women and men in society. Gender is not viewed 
here as a universal category of  either woman or man determined by biology, but rather, 
that in being suicidal these men were also doing their best to remain men as they 
understood men to be.  
Significantly, a socio-cultural and historical interpretation also suggests that there is a 
substantial and unrealised scope for suicide prevention from having a focus on the 
construction and processes of  understanding. For instance, along with recent research 
that has examined the impact of  bullying and its relationship to mental disorders and 
suicide (Coggan, Bennett, Hooper, & Dickson, 2003), the exploration of  suicidal 
experiences undertaken here indicates that the struggle to comprehend experiences of  
victimisation would be a fruitful process to engage with. In addition, by drawing upon a 
Gadamerian perspective to underpin practice, the potential for a range of  approaches to 
facilitate change begins to come into view. This potential may be realised by drawing 
upon recent theorising in constructivist psychology that is underpinned by Gadamerian 
hermeneutics in which individual agency is viewed as operating within possibilities and 
constraints offered by the persons particular sociocultural and historical context (Martin 
& Sugarman, 1999; Martin & Thompson, 2003).  
While patient-centred practice is a commonly held premise within mental health nursing 
and generally accepted that this locates the nurse-client relationship at the centre of  
practice, (and hence reflected in practice standards), this study suggests that a 
constructivist mental health nursing practice emphasises relationship in such a way that 
current best practice is unable to achieve. A mental health nursing practice underpinned 
by constructivism raises a concern for human meaning and human relationship in a way 
that is prior to the concerns of  the biomedical or behavioural sciences, rather than 
merely a necessary function or mechanism to facilitate biomedical or behavioural 
intervention.  
Such a shift in focus calls attention to the place in mental health nursing of  relating and 
relationships and what it means to understand the other person. With the current 
emphasis in mental health on measurable outcomes and biological intervention, this 
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study argues that at the core of  mental health nursing endeavours are complex (and 
often distressed) human beings who are more than objects of  biomedical or behavioural 
science. This study calls for a reinvigoration of  the interpersonal in mental health 
nursing as the centre of  practice and professional identity. At the same time, this study 
provides a cautionary note that neglect the interpersonal may exacerbate existing 
distress. 
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